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ABSTRACT 
An Alternative Politics: 
Texas Baptist Leaders and the Rise of the Christian Right 
by 
Blake A. Ellis 
This dissertation examines one of the most counter-intuitive southern 
responses to the rise of the Christian Right. Texas Baptists made up the largest 
state association of Southern Baptists in the country. They were theologically 
conservative, uniformly uncomfortable with abortion, and strident in their 
condemnation of homosexuality. Yet they not only rejected an alliance with the 
Christian Right and the Republican Party, but they did so emphatically. They 
ultimately offered a more robust critique of the Christian Right than even many of 
their secular counterparts. While their activities might seem surprising to 
contemporary readers, they were part of a long and proud Baptist tradition of 
supporting the separation of church and state. On issues like organized school 
prayer, government regulation of abortion, and private school vouchers, they 
were disturbed by the blurring of lines between church and state that 
characterized the Christian Right as it emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. Texas 
Baptists were also uncomfortable with the backlash against integration and 
sought to promote racial justice in any way they could. While many southerners 
adopted a politics of cultural resentment, Texas Baptists often worked for racial 
justice and promoted interracial cooperation. They also fought the move towards 
economic conservatism in the South. From their campaigns to raise the welfare 
cap in Texas to their promotion of Lyndon Johnson's Community Action 
Programs, Texas Baptists defended government activism to alleviate poverty. 
They embodied a very different economic ideology than that of the ultra-
conservative southerners who have dominated the scholarship of southern 
politics after 1960. On all of these issues, the experience of Texas Baptists 
challenges prevailing ideas about southern political change. Their story is one 
that undermines the notion of a unified evangelical reaction to the racial, 
economic, and political changes that swept the South (and the nation) after 1960. 
It should give pause to those who have assumed that the alliance between 
Southern Baptists and the Christian Right was inevitable or unavoidable and 
force us to reconsider the complexity of southern evangelicalism. 
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Introduction 
Texas Baptists: 
The Untold Story of Southern Evangelical Politics 
On the eve of the 2004 presidential election, news coverage focused on 
the importance of evangelical Christians to the electoral chances of the 
Republican candidate, George W. Bush. One Southern Baptist pastor summed 
up the feelings of many conservative Christians about the election: "I see it as a 
spiritual divide between true believers and seculars. I think we as a nation are 
more divided than we were before the Civil War ... Those who pray a lot tend to 
vote Republican; those who don't tend to vote Democrat."1 One of the most basic 
facts in recent American political campaigns has been the strong Southern 
Baptist support for Republican candidates. The nation's largest Protestant 
denomination was heavily Democratic throughout much of the twentieth century, 
but a shift toward the GOP began in the late 1970s and grew stronger during the 
next two decades. During the 1980 presidential election, Southern Baptist 
pastors favored the Republican candidate over the Democrat by a margin of 56 
to 42 percent, which represented stronger Democratic support than the national 
vote. In 1996, Southern Baptist ministers preferred the Republican candidate by 
1David D. Kirkpatrick, "Battle Cry of Faithful Pits Believers Against Unbelievers," The New York 
Times, Final Edition, 31 October 2004, Section A, 24. For other examples of such coverage, see 
Robert D. McFadden, "On the Final Sunday, Sermons Pulse with the Power of Spiritual 
Suggestion," The New York Times, 1 November 2004, Section A, 22; Anne Saker, "Moral Values 
Propelled Bush; Views on Abortion, Marriage Echoed with White Evangelicals," The News and 
Observer (Raleigh, North Carolina), Final Edition, 7 November 2004, Section A, 1; "Focus on 
Moral Values Tipped Vote for Bush," The Washington Times, 4 November 2004, Section A, 1. 
a margin of 80 percent to 14 percent in an election easily won by the Democrat. 2 
The alliance between the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) and the 
Republican Party is such an integral aspect of contemporary politics that 
observers might be forgiven for not knowing that it is a relatively recent political 
development. 
2 
The increasing affinity of Southern Baptists for the Republican Party since 
1980 is part of a larger historical trend: the rise of the Christian Right as a force in 
American politics.3 A recent proliferation of scholarly work on the origins of the 
movement has deepened our understanding of it. Most of these works have 
examined its religious and political impulses, attempting to explain how the 
movement came into existence and what its goals are for the United States. 
These works have demonstrated that the political involvement of religious 
conservatives was the result of deeply held religious beliefs about controversial 
social issues. Without question, the most important of these issues was abortion, 
which religious conservatives stridently opposed. Opposition to gay rights, 
support for organized prayer in public schools, and concern about sex education 
also defined their agenda. Southern Baptists have been a crucial component of 
the Christian Right from its earliest days. Several books have addressed the 
2 James L. Guth, "Southern Baptist Clergy, the Christian Right, and Political Activism in the 
South," in Glenn Feldman, ed., Politics and Religion in the White South (Lexington, KY: University 
Press of Kentucky, 2005), 192. 
3The term "Christian Right," while generally acceptable as a term for religious conservative 
voters, remains somewhat controversial. Scholars have used such terms as "Religious Right," 
"religious conservatives," and "Christian Right" to refer to a group of voters motivated primarily by 
their religious beliefs and concerned with social issues. The group includes orthodox Roman 
Catholics, Protestant evangelicals, and conservative members of mainline denominations. 
Despite such theological diversity, scholars have found it beneficial to address the group as a 
unified voting bloc when they acted in unison to support socially conservative causes. 
3 
importance of Southern Baptists to the growing power of religious conservatives. 4 
While this work on Southern Baptists and the Christian Right has been helpful in 
explaining why the denomination's national leadership made easy alliance with 
religious conservatives and the Republican Party, it has been neglectful in one 
important respect: it has provided no serious examination of conservative 
Southern Baptists who did not find a political home in the Christian Right or the 
Republican Party. 
One of the most intriguing and surprising developments in Southern 
Baptist life during the late 1970s and early 1980s was the refusal of Texas 
Baptist leaders to follow the national denomination into alliance with the Christian 
Right. Despite their state's reputation for social conservatism and the drift 
towards Republicanism in Texas politics, leaders of the Baptist General 
Convention of Texas (BGCT) deliberately resisted their denomination's move 
towards conservative activism and alignment with the Republican Party. Citing 
the traditional Baptist support for the separation of church and state, these 
conservative Baptists argued against the notion that Southern Baptists had a 
duty to support the Christian Right or the Republican Party. While they shared 
the theological conservatism of their fellow Southern Baptists, they steadfastly 
opposed their denomination's move to embrace political conservatism. In doing 
so, they charted a relatively unique course for a state Baptist convention, 
4For examples of this work, see Barry G. Hankins, Uneasy in Babylon: Southern Baptists 
Conservatives and American Culture (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2002); Oran P. 
Smith, The Rise of Baptist Republicanism (New York: New York University Press, 1997); and 
Nancy Ammerman, Baptist Battles: Social Change and Religious Conflict in the Southern Baptist 
Convention (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990). 
4 
distinguishing themselves from most of their southern counterparts.5 
The scholarship on Southern Baptists and the Republican Party has 
focused mostly on explaining the relative ease with which Southern Baptists 
allied with the Christian Right. The experience of Texas Baptists in the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s mostly falls outside the reach of this current work. Rather than 
joining forces with the emerging movement of religious conservatives, BGCT 
leaders opposed such an alliance. The reason was clearly not a lack of 
theological conservatism. Their writings during these years indicate a theology 
that was just as conservative as their counterparts in other states. Even on hot-
button social issues like abortion and gay rights, they had much in common with 
the Religious Right. A disdain for abortion and a belief in the sinfulness of 
homosexuality characterized their writings during these years. 
But despite their pronounced social conservatism, the largest state Baptist 
convention in the country followed a much different course than did the national 
SBC by refusing to join Christian Right leaders in endorsing the Republican 
Party. Texas Baptists embraced their historic support for the separation of church 
and state, even as many southern evangelicals turned away from it. They took 
unconventional positions on issues like school prayer, government funding of 
5Aithough very little work has been done to examine the responses of state Baptist conventions to 
changes in American politics, it is clear that most of them moved to embrace the political 
emphases of the Christian Right. A notable exception was Virginia, where state leaders followed 
a similar path as their allies in Texas. Historian Bill Leonard notes that only Virginia and Texas 
"made significant adjustments in their organizations that pointed them toward the moderate 
position in denominational politics." In both cases, this shift resulted in more conservative Baptists 
separating to form a rival state convention. No work has examined the experience of Virginia 
Baptists with the Christian Right, but their leaders joined Texas in opposing the rightward drift of 
the convention. See Bill Leonard, Baptists in America (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005), 126-127. See also Leonard's God's Last and Only Hope: The Fragmentation of the 
Southern Baptist Convention (Grand Rapids: Eerdman's, 1990). 
5 
private schools, abortion rights for women, and a host of other contentious topics. 
They embraced a broad-based view of government's role in alleviating poverty, 
fighting the tide of economic conservatism that swept the South during the 1960s 
and 1970s. They pursued a course of racial moderation, even as most other 
southern whites embraced the politics of cultural resentment. Finally, Texas 
Baptists fought against the influence of fundamentalists in their own 
denomination, even once they realized that they would lose that battle.6 On all of 
these issues, Texas Baptists fought against the shift towards Christian Right 
activism, economic conservatism, and racial strife that dominated the South 
during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s. The current scholarship on southern 
politics after 1960 implies that white evangelicals' shift to political conservatism 
was the inevitable result of their orthodox theology and conservative social 
moorings. But the story of Texas Baptists indicates that white evangelicals 
experienced these changes in much more complicated ways than historians have 
previously assumed. 
American Fundamentalism: Prelude to the Christian Right 
The experience of Texas Baptists is so counterintuitive to our common 
perceptions of southern religion that any study of them should begin by 
s-rhe term "fundamentalist" can be contentious and many Southern Baptist conservatives deplore 
use of the term to describe themselves. In this article, I have followed Nancy Ammerman's lead in 
using the term in "its historic sense, not with any pejorative intent. During the earlier part of the 
twentieth century, the term was coined by groups that chose to fight to defend their traditional 
understanding of the Bible against the onslaughts of liberalism and the social gospel ... They 
intentionally organized against a real threat to what they believed. The threat and the organization 
are what distinguish fundamentalists from ordinary believers or traditionalists." Ammerman also 
points out that using the term "fundamentalists" helps distinguish between various types of 
conservatives. Even the "moderates" were conservative in their theology. Rather than call those 
to the right of moderates "ultra-conservatives," Ammerman chose to use the term 
"fundamentalists." For a complete description of her use of these terms, see Baptist Battles, 16-
17. 
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summarizing what the current scholarship has taught us about the Christian 
Right. To begin with, the question of when a cohesive movement actually 
organized has been a subject of some confusion among scholars. But William 
Martin sums up the general consensus: The Christian Right mostly organized 
during "the period from 1960 forward, but the New Christian Right, as the 
movement is also known, is the lineal descendant of an older Christian Right 
whose roots run back to the early years of the twentieth century."7 Certainly, 
Christian Right activists owed something to the fundamentalist movement of the 
late 1800s and early 1900s. Those fundamentalists who resisted the dual 
onslaught of Darwinism and higher criticism of the Bible paved the way for a new 
kind of hyper-organized evangelical politics; Christian Right activists of the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s built on their work. 8 To fully understand the modern 
Christian Right, historians must recognize that the movement did not simply 
appear out of nowhere in the 1970s. Rather, organized conservative Christians 
built upon a longer tradition of evangelical political activism that historians are 
only beginning to fully comprehend. 
During the nineteenth century, evangelicalism9 had been the dominant 
form of American religion, influencing believers on both sides of various 
7William Martin, With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America (New York: 
Broadway Books, 1996}, 1. 
8For more on fundamentalist politics in the early twentieth century, see George Marsden, 
Fundamentalism and American Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
9Evangelicalism is another term that stirs controversy; for the purposes of this work, I rely on 
Marsden's classic definition of evangelicals as "people professing complete confidence in in the 
Bible and preoccupied with the message of God's salvation of sinners through the death of Jesus 
Christ (Fundamentalism and American Culture, 3). Although fundamentalists distinguished 
themselves within evangelicalism for their narrow, literal interpretation of the Bible, all 
evangelicals held to the Bible as the ultimate guide for living, the inspiration for political and social 
viewpoints, and the authoritative text on virtually all matters of debate. 
7 
controversies. As historian Richard Carwardine has demonstrated, most 
discussions of social or political issues in the nineteenth century took place in a 
context of evangelical dominance of the popular culture. This was especially true 
of the greatest controversy of the time: the debate over slavery. Although 
evangelicals came to vastly different conclusions about the proper Christian 
response to that issue, the influence of evangelical religion on the debate was 
undeniable. 10 
By 1920, the evangelical consensus that had dominated American politics 
and culture was unraveling. Darwin's theory of evolution had gained 
respectability among a majority of scientists, most college campuses were filled 
with professors offering historical, scientific, and geographical criticisms of the 
Bible, and popular culture was sliding towards secularism. In response to these 
changes, a movement of fundamentalist Christians became active in fighting to 
ensure that various Protestant denominations rejected modernism, the attempt to 
integrate modern knowledge with traditional Christian beliefs and adapt 
Protestant faith to the times. These fundamentalists mostly failed to gain control 
of mainline denominations, but they established a pattern of political resistance 
that expanded beyond their local churches and into the broader political sphere. 11 
Clearly, the most famous example of this impulse was the Scopes Trial, which 
came to symbolize fundamentalist resistance to liberalism and the national drift 
towards secularism. The popular impression of the trial was that William 
10Richard Carwardine, Evangelicals and Politics in Antebellum America (New Haven, 
Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1993), 30-33. 
11 For more information on the complex fundamentalist response to modernism, see Marsden, 
Fundamentalism and American Culture. 
8 
Jennings Bryan and his fundamentalist allies looked foolish and that organized 
fundamentalist politics was waning in its influence. As Marsden put it, "William 
Jennings Bryan's ill-fated attempt in the summer of 1925 to slay single-handedly 
the prophets of Bail brought instead an outpouring of derision. Very quickly ... 
the strength of the movement in the centers of national life waned 
precipitously. "12 
Revivalism and the Resurgence of American Evangelicals 
By 1925 most observers believed the movement of organized 
conservative Christians had run its course. While fundamentalist ideas would 
continue to influence pockets of believers, particularly in southern and rural 
areas, most academics, media commentators, and theologians believed that the 
movement would cease to exert much influence on the national consciousness. 
In 1925, the editors of the Christian Century, a leading light for religious liberals, 
summed up the conventional wisdom: "Anybody should be able to see that the 
whole fundamentalist movement was hollow and artificial and wholly lacking in 
qualities of constructive achievement or survival."13 Rarely have pundits been so 
wrong as in this type of prediction about American fundamentalists. Religious 
historian Joel Carpenter has noted that even while fundamentalists left the 
national scene during the 1930s and 1940s, they built up a sophisticated 
infrastructure that would help them stage a comeback in the 1950s and beyond. 14 
In his view, the separatist impulse that led fundamentalists to abandon Scopes-
12Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture, 184-85. 
13Quoted in Joel A. Carpenter, Revive Us Again: The Reawakening of American Fundamentalism 
~Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 2. 
4For more on evangelicalism and fundamentalism during these years, see Carpenter, Revive us 
Again. Also, see Mardsen, Fundamentalism and American Culture. 
9 
like attempts to alter the public discourse ultimately gave way to their evangelical 
heritage. In other words, they became convinced of the need to reenter public 
debates not just to push a particular agenda, but to save the country from its 
movement towards secularism. 
No figure epitomized the evangelical return to public life more than 
revivalist preacher Billy Graham. He first entered the national scene in 1949 
when he led a series of Youth for Christ revivals in Los Angeles. The events drew 
thousands of attendees and widespread media attention; Graham became an 
overnight celebrity. His message could scarcely have been better suited for the 
times. He peppered his speeches with nationalistic appeals and staunch, anti-
communist rhetoric. He received a great deal of attention from national political 
leaders and often commented on issues of public interest. While he adamantly 
refused to endorse presidential candidates, his views were usually no secret to 
his supporters. 15 During the 1960 presidential race, Graham made no official 
endorsement, but privately gave counsel to his old friend and anti-communist 
ally, Richard Nixon, who was running against Democrat (and Roman Catholic) 
John F. Kennedy. As scores of Protestant ministers spoke out against the notion 
of a Catholic president, Graham did nothing to counteract the anti-Catholic fervor. 
In one letter to Nixon, he encouraged his friend to "concentrate on solidifying the 
Protestant vote" by choosing as his running mate someone who was an 
unabashed evangelical. Graham believed that if Nixon reached out to 
15 William Martin, With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America (New York: 
Broadway Books, 1996), 45-46. Martin also covers Billy Graham's role in the 1960 election, the 
Kennedy administration, and the Johnson administration in William Martin, A Prophet With Honor: 
The Billy Graham Story (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1991). 
evangelicals, he could "present a picture of America that would put much of the 
South and border states in the Republican column and bring about a dedicated 
Protestant vote to counteract the Catholic vote."16 
10 
Graham's message to Nixon was an early indication that conservative 
Christians recognized the impact they could have on the political process. 
Although Graham never bonded with the Catholic Kennedy, he forged a 
relationship with Kennedy's vice president, Lyndon Johnson. Following 
Kennedy's assassination, Graham offered his counsel to Johnson, which the new 
president readily accepted. The relationship was mutually beneficial. Johnson 
was happy to have the friendship of the country's most beloved evangelist, 
knowing that many of Graham's supporters would conclude that he supported 
Johnson's politics. For his part, Graham was happy to have access to the White 
House and the ear of the president. Significantly, Graham defended Johnson's 
tragic prosecution of the Vietnam War, saying it was an important part of the 
larger effort to defeat communism. When Johnson decided not to seek reelection 
in 1968, he spared Graham the difficult task of choosing between himself and 
Nixon, who Graham encouraged to seek the Republican nomination. During the 
election, Graham was anything but neutral, despite his refusal to issue a formal 
endorsement. At a September crusade, he offered Nixon a seat of honor in the 
VIP section, where photographers easily found him. Graham also sat in the 
audience at one of Nixon's question and answer sessions. After making repeated 
references to Nixon's strong sense of morality, Graham finally acknowledged just 
before the election that he had cast an absentee ballot for Nixon. The Nixon 
16Martin, With God on Our Side, 46-48. 
campaign used this proclamation to gain the support of undecided Protestants 
who admired Graham. 17 
II 
There is no doubt that Graham was more careful in his political dealings 
than leaders of the Christian Right, and his outlook was always more balanced (if 
still very conservative). But his willingness to be a serious political player 
provided an important bridge between the fundamentalist activism of the early 
twentieth century and the Christian Right activism of the late twentieth century. 
His decision to blend conservative theology and evangelism with a nationalistic, 
anti-communist message demonstrated for many evangelicals that good 
Christians could take stands on issues of public policy. His friendships with 
Presidents Johnson and Kennedy provided access to power that previous 
evangelicals had never known. Although Graham never fully embraced the 
Christian Right as it organized in the 1970s and 1980s, his career demonstrated 
the impact conservative Christians could have on the political process if they 
expanded their activities beyond religious entreaties to political ones. 
The Rise of the Christian Right 
Ultimately, Billy Graham's mild-mannered style of politics gave way to a 
more partisan, confrontational style of evangelical activism. Although the 
Christian Right would eventually become one of the Republican Party's most 
important voting blocs, it was a Democratic candidate who first galvanized 
Protestant voters to unite behind a modern presidential campaign. Born and 
raised in conservative Southern Baptist churches, Jimmy Carter's evangelical 
roots could not be denied. During his run for the presidency, he made no secret 
17Ibid, 95-97. 
12 
of his evangelical beliefs and often used the phrase "born again" to describe 
himself. Despite frequent references to his Protestant faith, he also avoided 
references that could be construed as offensive to other religious traditions, 
particularly Catholicism and Judaism. Significantly, he retreated from taking 
strong stances on controversial issues like abortion rights and the rights of gays 
and lesbians. By the time of his 1976 presidential campaign, a vocal anti-abortion 
lobby was already active, and opposition to gay rights was increasingly a 
galvanizing issue for evangelicals. Despite the potential for political gain, Carter 
refused to emphasize either of these issues, choosing instead to center his 
message on honest government and a host of economic proposals. Carter did 
not make significant contact with evangelical leaders, as Ronald Reagan would 
later do, nor did he target evangelicals through television or radio campaigns. He 
worried that doing so would offend other groups and bring down his coalition, 
which also included most of the country's liberals. 18 According to Carter's 
campaign manager, "Our appeal to them (evangelicals) in 1976 was not done as 
formally as it was in '80 and '84 by Reagan and the Republicans. The appeal 
was because of Carter's own religion, because he's a born again Christian and 
his experience as an evangelical. There was no particular message."19 
Although he refused to make opposition to abortion or gay rights a central 
part of his campaign, Carter's identification with the evangelical tradition was 
enough to earn him strong support from voters who shared his faith. A majority of 
white evangelicals supported Carter for president over incumbent Gerald Ford. At 
18Bruce Nesmith, The New Republican Coalition: The Reagan Campaigns and White 
Evangelicals (New York: Peter Lang, 1994), 59-61. 
191bid., 60. 
13 
the time, the group consisted of over 45 million Americans, and their support was 
crucial to Carter's narrow victory.2° For that support, many evangelicals expected 
that Carter would grant them access to the White House and use his office to 
expand their influence. For many of them, their expectations for Carter included 
serious attention to controversial social issues. 21 
Because of the attention Carter's campaign brought to evangelicals, 
Newsweek magazine proclaimed 1976 "the year of the evangelical."22 Given the 
influence of evangelicals on the presidential race, that description was certainly 
accurate; but white evangelicals had not yet aligned with one particular political 
party. They voted Republican in 1968 and 1972, but their voting patterns only 
mirrored the national trend. Their switch back to the Democratic column in 1976 
signified the instability of white evangelical voting patterns and the lack of a 
cohesive movement. When Carter began his presidency, few people had even 
heard of Pat Robertson or Jerry Falwell, the two men who would become leaders 
of the Christian Right in the 1980s. Falwell was a prominent Baptist minister who 
had not yet jumped into full-fledged political work, and Robertson was known 
mostly for his charismatic bent and his religious broadcasting. 23 Not only that, but 
neither figure had fully aligned himself with the Republican Party. In fact, 
Robertson made numerous statements during the 1976 campaign in support of 
his fellow evangelical, Jimmy Carter. He later broke with Carter over social 
201bid., 59-61. 
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issues and subsequently claimed to have cast a last-minute vote for Ford due to 
his doubts about Carter.24 We may never know for sure whether Robertson 
actually voted for Carter or Ford, but we do know that Carter's administration 
angered evangelicals to the point that Robertson and Falwell both became 
strident Republicans. 
Carter's one term as president did much to move white evangelicals into 
the Republican column. As president, he did little to please the group and was 
very reluctant to speak out on issues like abortion and gay rights. Of particular 
concern to leaders like Billy Graham and Francis Schaeffer, the evangelical 
scholar whose work influenced a generation of conservative believers, was 
Carter's stance on abortion. The issue had been a troubling one for Carter during 
the campaign. He received significant support from both supporters and 
opponents of a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy. When pressed to take a 
stand, he usually acknowledged that he was personally opposed to abortion, but 
thought the best way to handle the issue was to enact measures that would 
make abortion less prevalent. These measures included support for poor families 
and a comprehensive program of sex education. Once in office, Carter adopted a 
moderately pro-choice stance in which he opposed both legal prohibition of 
abortion and federal funding of abortions. For religious conservatives, who were 
just beginning to develop a coherent ideology that centered on opposition to 
abortion, this stance was insufficient. In the minds of many evangelical leaders, 
including Billy Graham, Pat Robertson, and Jerry Falwell, Carter's refusal to 
support a ban on abortions was an abdication of his responsibilities as an 
2401dfield, 88. 
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evangelical Christian.25 
As journalists pressed Carter for details about his beliefs, he became less 
appealing to conservative evangelicals. Not only was he nominally pro-choice, 
but he was no inerrantist on the issue of biblical authority. He was influenced 
heavily by the writings of Richard Niebuhr, the liberal theologian who had been a 
critic of Billy Graham's in the 1950s. Carter also confessed that he had no 
problem with the occasional drink of alcohol and opposed the idea of returning 
organized prayer to public schools.26 Perhaps the greatest frustration 
evangelicals had with Carter was his consistent support for the Equal Rights 
Amendment. First proposed in 1923 to ensure that women received the equal 
protection of the law, the amendment was opposed by social conservatives who 
viewed it as an attack on the traditional family structure and a liberal attempt at 
social engineering. Most evangelicals fell into this group, and Carter's advocacy 
for the amendment's passage was the final breach in his formerly collegial 
relationship with evangelicals. During his term in office, the debate over the 
amendment heated up significantly, with conservative leaders like Jerry Falwell 
organizing evangelicals to oppose it. When Carter refused to join their efforts and 
worked for the amendment's passage, he virtually ensured that his reelection bid 
would not garner the same level of evangelical support that his first campaign 
had.27 
More than any other year, the 1980 presidential election assured that 
25Martin, 156. For a detailed discussion of the breakdown in relations between Carter and the 
emerging Christian Right, see Daniel Williams, God's Own Party, 133-158. 
26Martin, 157. 
27Williams, 127-28. See also Martin, With God on Our Side, 155-158. 
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southern evangelicals would become a major part of the Republican coalition. By 
1980, religious conservatives were a much more cohesive group than they had 
been in 1976. During the intervening years, the fundamentalist Falwell had 
formed the Moral Majority, along with other conservative leaders. Although the 
Christian Right clearly had historical antecedents, the Moral Majority's founding 
in 1979 marked its formal beginning as an organized movement. Falwell 
dedicated his organization to galvanizing conservative Christians and involving 
them in politics by supporting candidates who made social conservatism a 
central focus of their campaigns. More so than just about any other politician, 
Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan understood the political power 
the group could hold if white evangelicals voted as a bloc. 28 
Although this group's disenchantment with Carter made Reagan's task 
easier, he did not have the advantage of Carter's evangelical background. 
Reagan was not "born again," at least not in the sense that most evangelicals 
used the term. When asked about the issue by a reporter, Reagan stumbled over 
his words and provided an answer that made clear he was no evangelical: 
In the religion of the church that I was raised in ... you were baptized 
when you yourself declared that you were, as the Bible says, as the Bible puts it, 
that that is being born again. And so, it was, within the context of the Bible, yes, 
by being baptized.29 
Without the luxury of an evangelical background, Reagan had to appeal directly 
to conservative believers by adopting both their issues and rhetoric. 
Early on in the campaign, one of Reagan's advisers recognized the 
2801dfield, 106-108. 
291bid., 61. For more on the Reagan campaign of 1980, see Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A 
History, 1974-2008 (New York: Harper, 2008), 84-126. 
17 
potential for Republicans to add conservative Christians to their coalition. Donald 
Devine, himself a conservative Protestant, identified two historically Democratic 
demographic groups that could be enticed to vote Republican almost solely on 
the basis of the abortion issue: orthodox Catholics and evangelical and 
fundamentalist Protestants. While Carter worried that reaching out to 
conservative evangelicals would erode his liberal support, Reagan's campaign 
had far more to gain from an alliance with these voters than it stood to lose. 
Reagan had an advantage in that groups likely to be offended by strong stances 
on social issues, particularly feminists and civil libertarians, would not be 
supporting his candidacy anyway. As his campaign manager, Lee Atwater, put it, 
"We did not fear a backlash because ... you can't lose support where you never 
had it in the first place."30 After this deliberation, Reagan and his campaign 
openly courted evangelical and fundamentalist leaders. His messages 
increasingly emphasized traditional moral values and conservative religion. 
Speaking to the National Religious Broadcasters, Reagan proclaimed his belief 
that organized prayer should not have been taken out of public schools. He also 
met privately with leaders of the Christian Right. Significantly, he met with Falwell 
on several occasions and garnered the fundamentalist preacher's unequivocal 
support.31 
Reagan was also selective in choosing which religious constituencies to 
meet with. He declined an invitation to address the more liberal National Council 
of Churches, but readily affiliated with the National Association of Evangelicals, a 
3001dfield, 76. 
31 lbid. 
group of conservative Protestant leaders. Most importantly, Reagan made 
opposition to legal abortion a central theme of his campaign. Not only did he 
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publicly state his support for a constitutional amendment banning abortion, but he 
repeatedly mentioned the issue in his speeches in the context of his support for a 
return to traditional values. In August 1980, Reagan made an appearance at a 
briefing of the Religious Roundtable, organized by conservative clergy. He told 
them, "I know you cannot endorse me, but I endorse you and what you are 
doing" and openly questioned the biological theory of evolution. While Reagan's 
appeals to religious conservatives clearly benefited his campaign, Carter was 
more constrained. If Carter sought the support of these newly organized voters, 
he would risk alienating the pro-choice community, supporters of gay rights, and 
liberals, all of whom were crucial to the Democratic base. The result was that 
Reagan made significant inroads with religiously conservative voters, while 
Carter's standing dropped. In the end, a majority of white evangelicals supported 
Reagan over Carter, solidifying the group as a very important base for 
Republican presidential candidates.32 
Since 1980, GOP presidential candidates have counted on white 
evangelicals as a solid voting bloc; indeed, it is difficult to imagine several 
Republican victories without those voters. But historians should remember that 
Republican dominance of this powerful voting bloc is a relatively recent political 
phenomenon. Evangelicals voted overwhelmingly Democratic before the 1960s, 
and the shift to the Republican Party was not easy or uncomplicated. Texas 
321bid., 77-78. For more on Reagan's courting of conservative evangelicals, see Ruth Murray 
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Baptists, the largest state organization of evangelicals in the country, found the 
rise of the Christian Right as an organized wing of the Republican Party to be a 
profoundly negative development. Their story should alter the prevailing narrative 
of an easy alliance between white, southern evangelicals and the Republican 
Party. 
The Christian Right: What We Have Learned 
Evangelical politics clearly has a long history in the United States. But the 
modern political movement that scholars call the Christian Right did not begin 
organizing until at least the 1960s, and it did not make its impact felt at the level 
of national politics until at least the 1976 campaign. For that reason, discussion 
of the Christian Right in this work will be limited to what Martin calls "the New 
Christian Right," the movement of conservative Christians who organized 
politically and reshaped national politics in the 1970s, 1980s, and beyond. It is 
that movement that scholars have struggled to understand, attempting to answer 
the question political scientist Justin Watson posited: "What do they really want 
(emphasis his)?"33 While the answer to that question is not entirely clear, recent 
scholarship has at least given us a starting point for understanding the deepest 
impulses of the Christian Right and placing the movement in proper historical 
context. 
First and foremost, leaders of the Christian Right have emphasized a 
stronger role for the government in regulating private morality. On issues from 
abortion rights to gay rights to school prayer and sexual education, the 
33 Justin Watson, The Christian Coalition: Dreams of Restoration, Demands for Recognition, (New 
York: St. Martin's Griffin), 1. 
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movement has been ardent in opposing the separation of church and state and 
pushing government to become more involved in promoting a particular moral 
vision of America. Justin Watson, who spent years studying Pat Robertson's role 
in developing evangelical politics, found that the "restorationist impulse" of the 
Christian Right grew out of a desire to have government forcibly bring back a 
"return to a lost or golden era."34 He aptly sums up the goals of the Christian 
Right: "This agenda is one of aggressively reasserting, through political and legal 
means as well as by persuasion, the public authority of evangelical belief and 
morality. Evangelicals who adopt this stance are interested in the restoration of a 
lost past in which life was better and more godly."35 A lot can be said about 
whether that golden past ever existed in the first place, but the point is that 
millions of evangelical Christians believed that it needed to be restored and that 
government activism was the way to do it. On just about every social issue that 
has animated American politics, the Christian Right has advocated for a 
weakening of the wall separating the government (and its policies) from the 
private practice of faith. 
James Davison Hunter has argued that differences over the church/state 
issue are fundamental to the "culture wars" waged by Christian conservatives in 
the political, legal, and media arenas. To him, Christian Right activists rejected 
the idea that the wall of separation should be "unapproachable and totally 
unbreachable."36 They viewed strict separation as a liberal trick designed to 
~atson, 89. For more on the Christian Right and church/state issues, see Ruth Murray Brown, 
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guarantee that on questions like gender roles, reproductive rights, and the role of 
religion in public schools, society would move steadily away from traditional 
Christian understandings. In their view, "what is ultimately at stake is the ability to 
define the rules by which moral conflicts of this kind are to be resolved."37 For 
Christian Right activists, undermining the separation of church and state was a 
way to ensure that their desired cultural outcomes came to fruition. As Hunter 
puts it, "Influencing the structure of the rules represents a critical part of the 
overall effort to reestablish an old or to formulate a new cultural hegemony."38 
Pat Robertson himself has written extensively about what he sees as the 
menace of strict church/state separation. Echoing the work of conservative 
constitutionalists, he has argued that the Establishment Clause of the 
Constitution was used improperly by liberals to promote secularism. To him, the 
clause should have only one purpose: To ensure "that government should not set 
up an official sect or denomination ... intervene in the internal affairs of religious 
institutions," or "give churches official representation in government (emphasis 
his)."39 Beyond that, though, Robertson has not supported the separation of 
church and state, saying its defenders were part of "a determined effort to 
radically alter the historical understanding of separation."40 Starting with Engel vs. 
Vitale, the 1963 Supreme Court decision banning organized prayer in public 
schools, courts have generally ruled that church/state separation requires 
government's neutrality in matters of religion. But Robertson and other Christian 
1991}, 260. 
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Right leaders rejected that view, insisting that it "could lead to the removal of the 
religious world view from the political process."41 To him, church/state separation 
should never mean "that religious ideals and ideas are to be excluded from the 
political and lawmaking process. Nor should it mean that government is (or 
should be) disabled from generally endorsing, promoting, or encouraging 
religious belief and practice, from acknowledging God, or even from giving 
certain forms of aid (including financial) that advance the cause of religion."42 This 
general rejection of the separation of church and state (as understood and 
promoted by the courts) has been a hallmark of Christian Right politics, and it is 
nearly impossible to discuss the movement without analyzing its contempt for 
church/state separation. 
Besides their emphasis on weakening the separation of church and state, 
Christians Right activists have also been known for an intense focus on issues of 
gender and sexuality, particularly conservative views on the subjects of women's 
roles, abortion rights, and homosexuality. When Jerry Falwell formed his Moral 
Majority in 1979, he immediately placed abortion "at the head of the list" in terms 
of its importance to evangelicals.43 Of course, it was Roman Catholics who had 
been the original opponents of legal abortion in the years following Roe vs. 
Wade, but by 1979 huge numbers of conservative Protestants were equally 
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passionate about the issue. After the founding of the Moral Majority, the issue 
would bedevil many Democratic candidates and provide conservative 
Republicans with an issue that could be used to galvanize millions of evangelical 
Protestants. Indeed, Carter's inability to articulate a strident anti-abortion 
message hurt his campaign with this group of voters and paved the way for 
Republican dominance in areas of the country influenced by conservative 
Protestant religion.44 
But the Christian Right's opposition to abortion was never just about the 
revulsion many of its members held towards the practice itself; it was also tied up 
in a conservative vision of family life that rankled progressive voters and 
energized conservatives. James Davison Hunter puts it this way: "For pro-life 
activists, motherhood tends to be viewed as the most important and satisfying 
role open to a woman."45 So viewed, abortion "represents an attack on the very 
activity that gives life meaning."46 For many conservative Christians, "legalized 
abortion represents an assault on the mother's principle obligation and her 
source of identity" and "an attack on the very activity that gives life meaning."47 
For the pro-life movement, whose rise paralleled that of the Christian Right, 
abortion rights for women were a fundamental assault on the traditional roles for 
men and women that most evangelicals still supported. 
The same was true for their position on lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
44Martin, 200-201. 
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transgender (LGBT) rights, which by the late 1970s had already become a hot-
button political topic. Liberals began pushing, ever so timidly, for legislation that 
would grant same-sex couples at least some of the same rights as married 
heterosexual couples. The Christian Right immediately organized against what 
they viewed as a liberal attack on the traditional family. Chuck Mcilhenny, a 
Christian Right activist who worked to defeat pro-gay legislation in California, 
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perfectly summed up the viewpoint of many conservative activists on the issue of 
gay rights. The movement for equal rights, he insisted, was an attempt "to 
redefine the marriage relationship and therefore the family itself'; it was nothing 
less than "a fundamental attack upon Christianity, a fundamental attack upon the 
traditional, biblical family and marriage ideal."48 These activists never specified 
exactly how allowing LGBT families equal rights would harm their own families, 
but for many of them, the threat was so obvious it did not need articulation. Jerry 
Falwell himself became adamant about the issue of gay rights in the 1970s, 
inviting anti-gay crusader Anita Bryant to appear on his television show, Old Time 
Gospel Hour. He was so extreme in his hatred of homosexuality that he went 
public with his belief that the murder of Harvey Milk and George Moscone had 
been a judgment from God. Harvey Milk, of course, was San Francisco's first 
openly gay elected official, and Moscone, the city's mayor, was a close ally of the 
city's LGBT population.49 
The Christian conservative community was generally opposed to abortion 
rights and LGBT rights by the mid-1970s, with many activists having already 
481bid., 4. 
49Martin, 197-98. 
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begun work on those issues. But it was the National Women's Conference, held 
in Houston in 1977, that caused an irreparable breach between "family values" 
conservatives on one side and feminists and LGBT activists on the other. 
Congress had provided five million dollars to fund the conference and had asked 
for the conference to recommend ways to "identify barriers that prevent women 
from participating fully and equally in all aspects of nationallife."50 Delegates to 
the convention included both conservative and liberal women, and even a good 
number of radical women who identified as socialists, radical feminists, or with 
some other ideology to the left of American liberalism. The convention easily 
ratified a twenty-five point plan, which included measures like extending Social 
Security benefits to housewives and an increase in funding for rape prevention. 
But three issues were not included in the original plan, and they would ultimately 
split the convention, causing conservative women to abandon efforts to work with 
the feminist movement. These issues were the Equal Rights Amendment, 
abortion, and lesbian rights. A large majority of the delegates supported taking a 
liberal stance on all these issues, but Time magazine estimated that about 20 
percent of the attendees (mostly from southern and western states) opposed any 
action on these topics. Ultimately, the supporters had an easy time passing 
resolutions in favor of the ERA, ensuring access to abortion, and advancing the 
rights of lesbian women. But the opposition withdrew from the convention over 
these issues. 51 Many of them echoed the stance of Phyllis Schlafley, who 
insisted that working with lesbians was detrimental to the cause of women's 
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rights: "I remember the impassioned pleas by Betty Friedan ... Saying, 'Yes, we 
have to work with the lesbians and they have to be part of our movement.' They 
did that on national television, and the American people saw it and they didn't like 
it."52 The conservative women eventually abandoned the convention, joining up 
with a "pro-family" rally taking place across the street from the main convention. 53 
The women at that rally mostly agreed with Jerry Falwell's assessment of the 
ERA: "We believe in opening the door for our women, helping them with their 
coats, providing them with their living, and protecting them from their enemies. 
We are against the Equal Rights Amendment because we believe it degrades 
womanhood, and may one day cause our women to use unisex toilets and fight 
in the trenches on the battlefield, where men belong."54 From at least that 
moment in 1977, the Christian Right was associated in national politics with 
opposition to the feminist movement, particularly its stances in favor of abortion 
rights and the rights of lesbian and gay Americans. 
Besides its conflicts with feminists and gay rights activists, the Christian 
Right was also defined by a somewhat ambivalent stance on the subject of 
African American advancement. The relationship between racist attitudes among 
whites in the South and the rise of the Christian Right is a subject of much 
contention, and one that historians and other scholars have only recently begun 
to analyze. But only the most ardent Christian Right defenders would claim that 
race and racism played no role in galvanizing the movement, led almost 
exclusively by whites and centered mostly in the South. Dan Carter has 
52Martin, 165. 
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described how the overtly racist politics of George Wallace laid the groundwork 
for the Christian Right. "The genius of George Wallace," writes Carter, was his 
ability to connect conservatism to "cultural beliefs and symbols with a much 
broader appeal to millions of Americans: the sanctity of the traditional family, the 
certainty of overt religious beliefs, the importance of hard work and self-restraint, 
the celebration of the autonomous local community."55 Joseph Crespi no has 
argued that by the mid-1960s, many southern evangelicals "saw the civil rights 
drive as the leading wedge in a much larger and broader movement rooted in a 
modern liberal theology that was corrupting the mission of the church and 
threatening traditional practices in their communities and churches."56 Paul 
Harvey has noted that white southern evangelicals initially embraced a politics 
that resisted integration "when the moderate elites in charge of denominational 
leadership angered conservative Christians in local communities by supporting 
measures of desegregation."57 Eventually, though, these same conservatives 
abandoned the overt racism of their past (largely, Harvey notes, for reasons of 
political expediency) and moved to embrace gender norms as their chief political 
cause. "For the contemporary religious right, in short, gender has supplanted 
race as the bedrock defining principle of God-ordained hierarchy," he writes. 58 
Without question, the mass organization of conservative Christians in the 
1970s and early 1980s coincided with a new Republican politics of cultural 
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grievance that pitted white, middle-class southerners against African Americans 
who remained very loyal to the Democratic Party. At the very least, historians 
and political scientists would agree that race was a major factor, if not the only 
factor, in drawing white evangelicals to the Republican cause and fueling a 
divided racial politics in the South. From their lukewarm reaction to integration to 
their massive exodus from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party, white 
evangelicals were among the last to embrace the sweeping racial changes that 
ended Jim Crow in the South and created a space in which African Americans 
could exercise real political power. Certainly, scholars would be wrong to assume 
a monolithic evangelical reaction to racial issues or to assume that Christian 
Right activists were just as racist as they were homophobic or antifeminist. To do 
so would be to oversimplify a movement that is rife with complexities. But there is 
little doubt that Christian Right politics merged rather easily with the politics of 
cultural resentment, with many white southerners drawn to the Republican Party 
both for its affiliation with Christian social issues and for its refusal to embrace 
African American advancement. 
Without question, the Christian Right is a diverse movement with a 
number of competing impulses. But a clear picture emerges from the scholarship 
of a movement that is hostile to the separation of church and state, adamantly 
committed to strict gender roles, opposed to abortion and gay rights, and 
comfortable with the racial status quo. The movement has demonstrated these 
qualities time and again, and few scholars would deny that these characteristics 
have defined the political involvement of white evangelicals since 1960. Still, the 
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scholarship has been too quick to assume hegemony among conservative, 
religiously devout whites in the South. To read much of this scholarship is to 
assume that, for the most part, white southern evangelicals made a rather easy 
transition to the politics of social conservatism and merged seamlessly with the 
Republican coalition that was emerging at the time. But what about those 
southern evangelicals who did not ally with the Christian Right or the Republican 
Party? They have been given so little scholarly attention that readers might 
assume they never existed in the first place. It is to that group of southerners that 
historians must turn their attention in order to understand the changes that swept 
the South and the nation after 1960. Not only did such southerners exist, but they 
existed in large numbers. Their experiences should complicate our 
understanding of southern and national politics during the Republican-dominated 
years of the late 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. For if the transformation of white 
evangelicals into foot soldiers of the Christian Right was not as easy as scholars 
have imagined, perhaps the great changes that rocked national politics during 
these years were not as inevitable or unavoidable as those same scholars have 
led us to believe. 
Texas Baptists and the Rise of the Christian Right 
The story of Texas Baptists and the rise of the Christian Right is one that 
will certainly seem counterintuitive to many historians. Texas Baptists made up 
the country's largest statewide organization of Southern Baptists, and they 
wielded a great deal of influence in the national Southern Baptist Convention and 
in state and national politics. The Baptist General Convention of Texas, as the 
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state Baptist convention was formally known, was made up almost exclusively of 
whites, nearly all of whom were far more conservative on theological issues than 
the country at large. Not only were they committed to a conservative, orthodox 
interpretation of the Bible, but they rejected outright the liberalism they believed 
was dominant in mainline Protestant denominations like the United Methodist 
Church, the Episcopal Church of the USA, and the Presbyterian Church, USA 
They shared many of the social views of the Christian Right, believing abortion to 
be against God's will and certain that homosexuality was a sinful perversion 
against nature. On nearly every religious issue, Texas Baptists were on the far 
end of the theological spectrum, always outpacing their more moderate 
Protestant brethren when it came to a literal interpretation of the Bible. In short, 
they were exactly the kind of southern Protestants that scholars might expect to 
find allying with the Christian Right and moving to embrace Republican politics. 
But Texas Baptists not only rejected an alliance with the Christian Right, 
they did so emphatically. On a wide range of issues, they broke with the leaders 
of American evangelicalism and charted a unique course that held fast to their 
theological conservatism, yet rejected the embrace of Republican politics that 
characterized many of their southern evangelical counterparts in the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s. Why they did so should be a question of utmost importance to 
scholars interested in the rise of the Christian Right, as well as historians 
grappling with the move towards Republican dominance in the South during 
these years. Not only is the experience of Texas Baptists surprising, given the 
current scholarship on American evangelicals; it is also instructive about how this 
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important group has been examined in the literature. It calls into question 
previous notions about the seamlessness of evangelicals' transition to 
Republican politics and strikes at the argument that Republican dominance of the 
South was a foregone conclusion, given its religious impulses. 
To understand why Texas Baptists reacted so differently to the rise of the 
Christian Right than did many other evangelicals, historians must first understand 
the historic Baptist support for the separation of church and state. As historian 
Bill Leonard has documented, Southern Baptists have historically been among 
the most ardent defenders of church/state separation, largely due to their history 
as a persecuted religious group in early US history. 59 While many Southern 
Baptists gradually shifted away from these beliefs after 1960, Texas Baptists 
defended them, influenced by strong leaders with a history of activism on 
church/state issues and inspired by a disdain for Baptist fundamentalists, who 
were beginning to gain power in the national convention. 5° 
In Chapter One, I discuss the strong support that Texas Baptist leaders 
exhibited for the separation of church and state in the 1960s. On issues like 
school prayer, funding for parochial schools, and even the 1960 presidential 
campaign of John F. Kennedy, they insisted on the strictest of lines between 
government prerogatives and private religious activity. Perhaps the most 
interesting aspect of their activism during this period was that it was simply a 
continuation of earlier work by leaders of the Southern Baptist Convention. While 
contemporary readers might not associate issues of church/state separation with 
59Leonard, Baptists in America, 157. 
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evangelicals, Southern Baptists in Texas had been preaching the virtues of strict 
separation for many years, as had leaders of the national convention. In Chapter 
Two, I examine Texas Baptists' politics in the 1970s, where they again proved 
willing to take a strong stand against any promotion of religion by the 
government. Not only did they celebrate Supreme Court rulings prohibiting 
organized prayer in public schools, they also agitated against efforts to amend 
the Constitution to allow for such activities. When Jesse Helms, the staunch 
conservative senator from North Carolina, reached out to Baptists to organize 
support for such an amendment, he faced some of his fiercest opposition from 
Texas Baptists. For historians examining the rise of the Christian Right, it is 
important to note that in opposing Helms' efforts, Texas Baptists were in sync 
with the leadership of the national Southern Baptist Convention, which had not 
yet come under the control of Baptist fundamentalists. 
In Chapter Three, I explain the battle between moderates and 
fundamentalists for control of the Southern Baptist Convention and its impact on 
shaping Texas Baptist responses to national politics. To put it simply, Texas 
Baptists were on the losing side of a denominational struggle for the soul of the 
SBC. That struggle pitted two competing visions of Baptist belief against one 
another. On the fundamentalist side, leaders like Paige Patterson and Paul 
Pressler argued that the denomination was drifting towards liberalism and sought 
to gain complete control over its institutions. On the moderate side, Baptists like 
James Dunn and Foy Valentine insisted that the denomination was sufficiently 
conservative and viewed the fundamentalist crusade as little more than a power 
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grab. Fundamentalists ultimately won the conflict, seizing control of various 
Baptist institutions and pushing a more overtly political agenda for the SBC. 
Texas Baptists developed a distaste for this brand of conservative politics and 
were particularly defensive of Texas institutions like Baylor University and 
Southwestern Seminary. They viewed fundamentalist attacks against these 
schools as outrageous and sought to keep the schools as autonomous as 
possible. They ultimately moved to protect these schools from fundamentalist 
influence, even going so far as to found the George W. Truett Theological 
Seminary as a haven for Baptist pastoral students who resisted a fundamentalist 
interpretation of Baptist theology. The fundamentalist takeover of the SBC was a 
formative experience for many Texas Baptists, and it instilled in them a disdain 
for the politics of the Christian Right. Because Baptist fundamentalists were often 
allied with Christian Right leaders like Jerry Falwell, their growing influence in the 
SBC only deepened the chasm between Texas Baptists and the Christian Right. 
In chapter four, I examine the role that gender politics played in splitting 
Texas Baptists from the emerging Christian Right movement. As the Southern 
Baptist Convention moved to the right on the issue of abortion, Texas Baptists 
became more and more uncomfortable with the blurring of lines between the 
government and citizens' private religious decisions. To be sure, Texas Baptists 
never celebrated abortion rights, nor were they ever at ease with a full-throated 
defense of women's reproductive freedom. But they rejected the notion of heavy 
government involvement, arguing that the matter was a private religious one that 
should be handled in churches and homes, not debated in political campaigns. 
Beyond the issue of abortion, Texas Baptists defended the right of Baptist 
women to take leadership roles in the church and fought against the 
fundamentalist attempt to ban Baptist churches from ordaining women as 
ministers. Once again, Texas Baptists were not crusaders on the issue of 
women's rights. But they were turned off by fundamentalist attempts to enforce 
denominational purity, believing it would split the convention and reduce Baptist 
influence. They also defended Texas institutions like Baylor University and 
Southwestern Seminary that were more welcoming to women leaders than the 
denomination at large. Ultimately, the disagreements over abortion rights and 
women ministers helped solidify the rift between Texas Baptists and the 
fundamentalists who came to lead the national convention. 
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In chapter five, I describe the Texas Baptist response to poverty in the 
1960s and 1970s, demonstrating how their more liberal outlook on economic 
issues led them away from an alliance with the Christian Right and the 
Republican Party. As many southern whites began to embrace conservative 
economic policies in the 1960s and 1970s, Texas Baptists moved in a different 
direction. Not only did they insist that Christians had a responsibility to help the 
poor, but they extended that belief out of the private sphere and into the very 
public arena of state politics. Often working with liberal legislators like Houston's 
Barbara Jordan, Texas Baptists repeatedly led campaigns to raise the welfare 
limit in Texas. In these campaigns, they offered a passionate defense of 
government activism, using an assortment of evidence to show that the welfare 
program of Texas deserved protection and defending it from conservative 
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attacks. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Baptist Standard ran article after article that 
readers might expect to see in liberal political journals, but not in the largest state 
Baptist magazine in the country. Besides their political and spiritual defense of 
government programs to help the poor, Texas Baptists also conducted their own 
unique poverty relief efforts, often working with organizers from Lyndon 
Johnson's Community Action Program (CAP). From a campaign to ensure clean 
drinking water to a robust defense of bilingual education to job training in the Rio 
Grande Valley, Texas Baptists demonstrated a concern for social activism that 
distinguished them from many other evangelicals in the South. That activism also 
placed them on the opposite side of Christian Right leaders, who were already 
joining the conservative critique of government programs and allying with 
economic conservatives of various stripes. 
In chapter six, I examine the role that racial politics played in Texas 
Baptist life. At the same point that many southern whites were developing a 
politics of cultural grievance, Texas Baptists actually worked towards moderation 
and, in some cases, racial liberalism. Leaders in the Baptist General Convention 
of Texas conducted conferences to prepare for (and encourage) integration, 
while editors at the Baptist Standard wrote eloquently of the need for southerners 
to move away from their racist pasts. While other southern evangelicals grew 
angry at the prospect of integration, Texas Baptists often welcomed it. If the story 
of white evangelicals and race was mostly a negative one, Texas Baptist leaders 
provided courageous examples that belied the larger narrative. Through the 
Texas Christian Life Commission, they pushed for more integrated churches, 
insisted on accepting desegregation, and espoused the view that Christians 
ought to be on the front lines of the fight for racial equality. 
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On each of these issues, Texas Baptists provide a strong counterpoint to 
the conventional understanding of white southern evangelicals in the 1960s and 
1970s. There is little doubt that Texas Baptists were, in many respects, the 
exception to the rule. Unlike Baptists in most other states, they had a long history 
with academic institutions like Baylor University and Southwestern Seminary that 
were under their control. These institutions were by no means liberal, but they did 
provide a moderating force on issues like church/state separation, social 
activism, women's advancement, and racial justice. Defending these schools 
from fundamentalist attacks was certainly a critical part of the split between 
Texas Baptists and Christian Right leaders. Additionally, Texas Baptists were 
influenced by the work of the Texas Christian Life Commission, the social activist 
arm of their state convention. The leaders in that organization tended to be more 
liberal on issues and helped pull Texas Baptists in a more moderate direction 
than their counterparts in places like Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina. 
The presence of the Baptist Standard also provided a pull to the left, with an 
editorial staff that was certainly more liberal than the rank-and-file Baptists who 
read its pages each month. No doubt, each of these factors influenced Texas 
Baptists, pushing them towards a more moderate politics and away from the 
hard-edged conservatism of leaders in the national convention. 
But to write Texas Baptists off as an exception to the rule is to miss a 
chance for reevaluating our understanding of southern politics in the years after 
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1960, particularly among the white evangelicals who eventually made up the 
base of the Christian Right and the Republican Party. The experience of Texas 
Baptists during these years suggests that the transition of white evangelicals into 
the Christian Right and, by extension, the GOP was not as simple as the current 
scholarship indicates. That the largest Baptist state convention in the country 
would offer a robust critique of the Christian Right should give pause to those 
who have assumed that Baptists were a natural fit for the movement because of 
their deeply-felt theological conservatism. Texas Baptists were also quite 
orthodox on religious issues, but they resisted the strident conservative politics 
that came to dominate the South and reshaped American elections. Their story 
implies that the Baptist alliance with the Republican Party was not the inevitable 
result of Baptist theology. If such a large and important group of Southern 
Baptists could emphatically reject the politics of the Christian Right, perhaps 
historians have been too quick to dismiss the experience of white southerners 
who were theologically conservative but did not find an easy home in the 
Christian Right or the Republican Party. My hope is that this study will push 
religious and political historians to rethink the common wisdom that white 
evangelicals were uniformly celebratory of these two institutions. At the very 
least, it should remind us that white evangelicals as a group were far more 
complicated in their theology, their political activism, and their views on 
controversial issues than current discussions seem to imply. For historians 
wondering where southern moderates fit into the great political changes that 
rocked American politics after 1960, one thing is clear: Texas is an important 
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starting point. Southern Baptists in that state provide a compelling and surprising 
case study that should alter our understandings and temper our previous 
conclusions. 
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Chapter 1 
A Firm Foundation: 
Texas Baptists and the Separation of Church and State, 1960-1970 
The 1984 presidential election pitted the popular Republican incumbent, 
Ronald Reagan, against the Democratic challenger Walter Mondale. By then, a 
majority of white southerners had staked out a position of strong support for the 
Republican Party in general and its 1984 standard bearer in particular. That fall, 
81 percent of Southern Baptist ministers voted for Reagan, the highest recorded 
percentage up to that point for a Republican candidate. 1 Despite that trend, the 
Baptist Standard, the newsmagazine of Texas Baptists, refused to support either 
candidate and ran several editorials seeming to support Mondale's position on 
the proper relationship between church and state. Noting that a great deal of 
"political thunder" had erupted between the two candidates on church/state 
issues, the editors came to the quick defense of those arguing for a strict 
separation. The editorial quoted the most famous champion of religious liberty 
and church/state separation, Thomas Jefferson: "Believing with you that religion 
lies solely between a man and his God ... I contemplate with solemn reverence 
that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature shall 
'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and state." 
Critiquing those who believed the separation of church and state was a "modern 
1James L. Guth, "Southern Baptist Clergy, the Christian Right, and Political Activism in the 
South," in Glen Feldman, ed., Religion and Politics in the White South (Lexington: University of 
Kentucky Press, 2005), 192. 
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invention," the editors insisted that it was "mostly a Baptist achievement" and 
warned that, "No revision of history can write out the constitutional concept of 
separation of church and state." Finally, the editorial proclaimed boldly, "As 
champions of religious liberty and separation of church and state, Southern 
Baptists should be at the front in shedding light on the subject."2 
That the official news organ of the country's largest state organization of 
Southern Baptists would run such an editorial might be surprising to 
contemporary observers of white evangelical politics. The editorial's basic 
premise flies in the face of the Christian Right's agenda and, by extension, that of 
the modern Republican Party. But in taking their 1984 stance, Texas Baptists 
were actually acting in a long Baptist tradition of supporting the separation of 
church and state. They were also expressing their discomfort with the 
increasingly political stances of the SBC and the acceptance of the Christian 
Right's agenda by broad swaths of the white evangelical South. The reasons for 
Texas Baptists' reluctance to follow their denomination's drift towards Republican 
activism and an alliance with the Christian Right are complicated, and they touch 
on issues of race, gender, and intra-denominational politics. But their unwavering 
support for the traditional Baptist view on the separation of church and state was 
clearly the most powerful force in preventing any kind of partnership with leaders 
of the Christian Right and the Republican Party. 
Long before abortion, gay rights, and school prayer became the chief 
issues for many white southerners, Texas Baptists had developed a tradition of 
2"Shedding Light on Separation of Church-State," The Baptist Standard, September 19, 1984, 6 
(all quotations). 
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strong support for the separation of church and state. Although they ultimately 
parted ways with many other Southern Baptists, who more or less abandoned 
the separation of church and state as a guiding principle, Texas Baptists were 
originally on the same page with the national convention and quite consistent 
with the historic emphases of nearly all Baptists. Church historian Bill Leonard is 
surely correct in his assessment that Baptists have been "among the most 
outspoken advocates of religious liberty in modern Protestant history." As he 
notes, they have most often "identified themselves with ... a general support for 
the separation of church and state, the belief that government should not 
interfere in matters of religion." That conviction has manifested itself in a variety 
of ways throughout Baptists' history in the United States, but an unwavering 
commitment to each individual's right to make her own religious choices has 
been a hallmark of the Baptist faith. The earliest Baptists' experiences in Europe 
had a profound impact on their actions in the United States, leading them to 
establish a tradition of supporting church/state separation that Texas Baptists 
ultimately carried on. To use Leonard's phrase, the earliest American Baptists 
"were not satisfied to receive the crumbs of mere tolerance doled out by assorted 
state-supported religious establishments in England and colonial America. 
Rather, they demanded complete religious freedom for heretic and unbeliever 
alike."3 Leonard acknowledges that different groups of Baptists have offered 
varying interpretations on the theme of religious liberty generally and separation 
of church and state specifically. But, as he notes, a fair reading of the Baptist 
3Bill Leonard, Baptists in America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 157 (all 
quotations). 
42 
experience in the United States suggests that they were among the most ardent 
defenders of the separation of church and state for much of that time. 
In the second half of the twentieth century Baptists became divided over 
these issues, and a group arguing against strict separation ultimately triumphed 
within the Southern Baptist Convention. But Texas Baptists refused to concede 
the point, and nearly every decision they made about national or denominational 
politics reflected their strident belief in the separation of church and state. To 
Texas Baptist leaders, abandoning that emphasis would have been akin to 
forsaking their heritage as Baptists and Christians in America. To fully 
understand their complicated relationship with the Christian Right and their 
response to politics after 1960, historians must contend with their views on 
church/state separation. For it is that element of their ideology that most 
influenced them to reject any alliance with the burgeoning movement of religious 
conservatives in the 1970s and 1980s. By the time the Christian Right formally 
organized, Texas Baptists had already staked their claim on the side of 
church/state separation. Their activities in the 1960s and early 1970s 
demonstrate clearly some of the reasons they would ultimately offer a different 
response to the Christian Right than many of their southern counterparts. 
The 1960 presidential election ushered in a new wave of concern for 
Texas Baptists and inspired many state leaders to reaffirm their commitment to 
the separation of church and state. The candidacy of John F. Kennedy, only the 
second Catholic to run for president on a major party ticket, prompted a renewal 
of discussion about the historic Baptist belief in the separation of church and 
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state. Unfortunately, this renewal was characterized by a flurry of anti-
Catholicism and not a few ridiculous allegations that had little or no bearing in 
political realities. For Texas Baptists, the 1960 election brought to the fore issues 
that had first arisen with the 1928 presidential candidacy of AI Smith, another 
Catholic Democrat, who ran against incumbent Republican president Herbert 
Hoover. In that election, J. Frank Norris, the popular pastor of First Baptist 
Church in Fort Worth, actively campaigned against AI Smith. Calling Smith a 
"wet-catholic," he traveled across the state on behalf of Hoover, whom he 
referred to as "that Christian gentleman." Over a period of fourteen weeks, Norris 
delivered 119 speeches in thirty different cities, and he made no secret of his 
anti-Catholicism. He invoked the specter of Dark Age persecution, viciously 
attacked the Pope, and insisted that a Smith election would represent the end of 
religious liberty in the United States. For good measure, he ended most of his 
speeches with a fervent appeal to "mother, flag, God, the Bible, and Herbert 
Hoover."4 The 1960 election held a number of lows for Texas Baptists in terms of 
blatant anti-Catholicism, but it surely did not rival the intensity and venom of 
Norris' explicit attacks on AI Smith. In 1960, Texas Baptists tended to express 
their arguments in a less audacious way. Their concerns about Catholic power 
were also inextricably merged with a serious defense of the separation of church 
and state. 
By any measure, it is fair to say that Texas Baptist leaders were among 
the most difficult for Kennedy to assure that his interest was in governing the 
4John W. Storey, Texas Baptist Leadership and Social Christianity, 1900-1980 (College Station: 
Texas A and M University Press, 1986}, 204. 
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entire country, not in promoting the agenda of one religion. The Baptist Standard 
ran several articles questioning whether Kennedy would be able to avoid doing 
the bidding of Catholic leaders.5 Leading the charge was Baptist journalist E. S. 
James, a strong proponent of church/state separation and editor of the Standard. 
He insisted that Kennedy could only allay his concerns by renouncing his 
supposed "allegiance to the foreign religio-political state at the Vatican" and 
issuing "a declaration of freedom from the domination of the clergy."6 But 
Kennedy had made clear early in his campaign that he would be a strong 
proponent of the separation of church and state. In particular, he gave an 
interview to Life magazine in which he made explicit his intention not to take 
political marching orders from Catholic prelates.7 So when James continued to 
criticize him from the pages of the Baptist Standard, Kennedy offered a reply to 
the news magazine. Noting his previous statements, he sought to reassure 
Baptist voters: "I thought my previous expressions have made it perfectly clear 
that ... my undivided political allegiance is to the best interests of this country." 
Going further, he insisted that he determined those interests "on the basis of my 
best conscientious judgment, without domination from any source."8 While James 
applauded Kennedy's statements, he refused to let up and continued voicing his 
church/state concerns right through the-November election. Unfortunately, the 
Catholic press did little to aid Kennedy's efforts to assuage Protestant fears, 
particularly the concerns about keeping church and state separate. Following 
5For examples, see the Baptist Standard, Feb. 3, 1960, pgs 3-4; February 17, 1960, pgs 3-4; and 
May 4, 1960, pg. 3. 
6Storey, 204. 
71bid. 
8"Kennedy Responds," Baptist Standard, May 4, 1960, pg. 3. 
Kennedy's statements to the Baptist Standard, a Vatican newspaper, 
L'Osservatore Romano, disputed Kennedy's claims. Its editors concluded that 
the Catholic leadership had a "duty and right to guide, direct, and correct" 
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members of its laity in political matters. James pounced on these statements and 
used them as evidence that despite Kennedy's protestations to the contrary, no 
Catholic politician could truly be free of church influence in matters of 
governance.9 
One of the most ardent sources of pro-separation sentiment came from 
the Texas Christian Life Commission (TCLC). The Commission had been 
founded in 1951 as a body operating under the auspices of the state convention. 
Pioneering pastors like J. Howard Williams, T. B. Maston, and A. C. Miller 
founded the TCLC to deal with the moral aspects of various social issues. At the 
time of its founding, these leaders specifically targeted six issues: the family, race 
relations, the economy, the "world order," public morals, and the "scriptural basis 
on moral issues." Miller led the Commission in its early days, but Foy Valentine 
succeeded him in 1953. He served until1960 when Jimmy Allen took over the 
leadership role. 10 During the 1960 election, Allen shared the views of other 
Texas Baptist leaders in wondering if Kennedy could ever be truly independent of 
his church. "We were all rather skeptical that he could indeed carry through with 
his position because there were such pressures with the hierarchical church on 
9Storey, 205. 
10Joseph E. Early, Jr., A Texas Baptist History Sourcebook: A Companion to McBeth's Texas 
Baptists, (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2004), 346. For a more detailed discussion 
of the founding of the TCLC, see Storey, pgs. 122-143. 
the subject at that time," he recalled. 11 As the decade progressed, the TCLC 
would become an even stronger advocate for Texas Baptists to defend a strict 
separation between church and state. 
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James and Allen were not alone in their reaction to Kennedy's candidacy, 
and not all Texas Baptists shared their willingness to avoid overt statements of 
anti-Catholicism. W. A. Criswell, the longtime pastor of First Baptist Church in 
Dallas, insisted that to be a faithful Catholic was to heed all political directives of 
the church leadership. In his mind, Kennedy was "either a poor Catholic" or "just 
stringing people along." He believed that electing one Catholic president would 
inevitably lead to another, who might give "the pope his ambassador, the church 
schools state support, and finally recognition of one church above all others in 
America." Blake Smith, pastor of the relatively liberal University Baptist Church in 
Austin, announced his belief that the election of a Catholic president would not 
harm the separation of church and state in a September sermon. The Austin 
Baptist Pastors' Association quickly condemned his statements by a vote of 25 to 
The national Southern Baptist leadership followed a similar pattern. At the 
convention's annual meeting, attendees affirmed the traditional Baptist 
commitment to the separation of church and state, but added special statements 
unique to the ongoing presidential election. In a confusing statement, the 
convention affirmed the right of any man to choose his own religion and that 
personal faith should not be a test for national political office. But those 
11AIIen, Jimmy. Oral Memoirs of Jimmy Allen. Interview by Daniel B. McGee (August 27, 1973), 
Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 133. 
12Storey, 206 (first quotation), 205 (second quotation). 
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statements were followed by a resolution that seemed to do just that: "When a 
public official is inescapably bound by the dogma and demands of his church, he 
cannot consistently separate himself from these." The resolution continued: "This 
is especially true when that church maintains a position in open conflict with our 
American way of life as specifically related to religious liberty, separation of 
church and state, the freedom of conscience in matters related to marriage and 
the family, the perpetuation of free public schools and the prohibition against the 
use of public monies for sectarian purposes."13 Without mentioning the words 
"Kennedy" or "Catholic," the resolution came very close to putting the 
denomination on record in opposition to the Democratic ticket. Ironically, it did so 
in the name of the separation of church and state. 
Although the relationship between Texas Baptists and the Kennedy 
candidacy remained strained throughout the 1960 election, the addition of Texan 
Lyndon Johnson to the Democratic ticket at least opened a new line of 
communication between Kennedy and BGCT leaders. According to Jimmy Allen, 
Kennedy found Texas Baptists mysterious from the very beginning: "John 
Kennedy couldn't figure us out ... 'Who are these people' was his basic 
question."14 But in Johnson, Texas Baptists found a politician who, at the very 
least, understood the historical and theological concerns they were expressing, 
even if his motives were transparently political. In this respect, Bill Moyers, an 
influential aide to Johnson, served as a crucial liaison between the two camps. A 
13 John Wickie in, "Baptists Question Vote for Catholic," The New York Times, May 21, 1960, 
Section A, 12. 
14AIIen, Jimmy. Oral Memoirs of Jimmy Allen. Interview by Daniel B. McGee (August 27, 1973), 
Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 133. 
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Texan himself, he had once roomed with Bill Pinson, who served as Allen's 
associate at the TCLC. Soon after Johnson joined the ticket, Moyers called Allen 
to inform him that he had just spent an hour and a half briefing the vice-
presidential candidate on the specific concerns of Texas Baptists. Ultimately, 
Kennedy's famous declaration of independence from the Catholic hierarchy 
came as a result of Moyer's work. It was at his behest that Kennedy agreed to 
meet with Houston-area pastors; his assuagement of many Protestants with his 
comments is by now politicallegend. 15 The Catholic Democrat never convinced 
Texas Baptist leaders that he was totally free of influence from his church, but 
Moyers' work and Kennedy's masterful political maneuvering went a long way 
towards helping him narrowly win the state of Texas that fall. 
Texas Baptist leaders were especially tough on John Kennedy on 
church/state separation, but they were no pushovers when it came to Republican 
Richard Nixon's handling of aid to private schools. Even before Nixon addressed 
the issue, E. S. James had ruffled Republican feathers by running an editorial 
attacking the GOP vice-presidential candidate Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., for 
supporting aid to parochial schools. When Kennedy tried to court James later in 
the campaign, the senator remembered James' attack on Cabot Lodge and 
admired him for it. Of course, the entire Cabot Lodge family was well known to be 
an enemy of the Kennedy's. 16 A little-known fact of the campaign for Texas' 
electoral votes is that, for all his haranguing of John Kennedy, E. S. James also 
151bid. Also, see Wayne Phillips, "Johnson Decries Religious Issue," The New York Times, 
October 21 , 1960, Section A, 15. 
16"Vice-Presidential Candidate Supports Aid to Private Schools," Baptist Standard, July 7, 1960, 
2. Also see Allen, Jimmy. Oral Memoirs of Jimmy Allen. Interview by Daniel B. McGee (August 
27, 1973}, Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 135. 
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broke an important story on Nixon's tacit support for federal aid to private 
schools. James' first cousin, Jack Porter of Houston, served on the Republican 
National Executive Committee. James used the connection to pressure the Nixon 
campaign to go public with a position on federal aid to private academies. 
Eventually, James broke the story in the Standard, describing the Nixon 
campaign's position. In typical fashion, Nixon tried to finesse the topic, but he 
finally conceded that he would support such funding, though he insisted that it go 
to the states first where local officials would decide how the money was spent. 17 
Jimmy Allen later noted that James' willingness to attack Nixon infuriated 
those Baptists who were opposed to Kennedy strictly on grounds of anti-Catholic 
prejudice: "To everybody's consternation who had tried to use the hate the 
Catholic theme, Dr. James ... came out to say (of Nixon) 'This man is 
wrong."'18 The publication of such an article in the most widely distributed 
publication of Texas Baptists was not insignificant in a state that was listed as a 
"tossup" right up to the election. 19 In the final results, Kennedy beat Nixon in 
Texas by a mere 45, 264 votes out of 2,288,940 cast, one of the closest state 
contests in the nation.20 No one can be sure how much impact James' editorials 
had, but at least one Texas Baptist credits his Nixon article with helping put 
Kennedy over the top. Allen later stated that it was "a pretty well accepted 
political judgment that that editorial in the Baptist Standard tilted the scales in 
Texas ... toward John Kennedy carrying the state, because it released enough 
17E. S. James, "Nixon Supports Federal Money to Private Schools," August 23, 1960, Baptist 
Standard, 2. 
18AIIen, Jimmy. Oral Memoirs of Jimmy Allen. Interview by Daniel B. McGee (August 27, 1973}, 
Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 135. 
19"17 States Views as Election Key," The New York Times, October 18, 1960, Section A, 46. 
20"Presidential Vote Totals," The New York Times, November 13, 1960, Section A, 71. 
tension on the part of Baptists who were ordinarily Democrats to say to them, 'I 
am not betraying my position as a believer in religious liberty to vote for John 
Kennedy."' James' relationship with Kennedy continued to thaw during 
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Kennedy's administration, particularly when James concluded that Kennedy was 
living up to his campaign commitment to defend the separation of church and 
state. When Kennedy was assassinated, James attended the funeral at the 
request of the family. 21 Whatever the political implications of James' article, his 
work at least made clear that not all Texas Baptists were consumed with hatred 
of Kennedy. James took an equally tough line with Nixon, and his comments 
regarding both candidates were issue-based. 
While anti-Catholicism clearly played a role in the hysteria surrounding the 
possible election of John Kennedy, the response of Texas Baptist leaders was 
more complicated and involved deeper issues than fear of Catholic political 
power. It was also reflective of a distinctly Baptist ideology that emphasized the 
separation of church and state as a moral and political imperative. In 1960, no 
one could have imagined that just twenty years later a new movement of 
religious conservatives would rise to power. Issues like abortion and gay rights 
had not yet entered the lexicon of American politics, and few observers gave 
much thought to their salience as social issues. But the 1960 election was an 
early indication that, when pressed, Texas Baptists would come down firmly on 
the side of church/state separation. Although their entreaties against Kennedy's 
candidacy were laced with assumptions about Catholics that would today pass 
21AIIen, Jimmy. Oral Memoirs of Jimmy Allen. Interview by Daniel B. McGee (August 27, 1973), 
Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 135. 
for intolerance, they also reflected a powerful belief in the Baptist heritage of 
support for the separation of church and state. As the decade passed, Texas 
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Baptists would remain fierce warriors in the battle to keep government decisions 
separate from the religious views of any one denomination. 
Following Kennedy's election, E. S. James admonished Baptists to 
support the new president "so long as he is in the right." He also insisted that 
Kennedy was "entitled to our prayers daily and to the best encouragement we 
can give him."22 Ultimately, he came to view Kennedy as "sound" on issues of 
church/state separation and to consider Kennedy a friend. 23 Jimmy Allen, who 
had worried about whether Kennedy could truly separate his political duties from 
his religious faith, came to believe that Kennedy was indeed telling the truth 
about his intentions to keep church and state separate. He later stated that, "In 
retrospect ... we probably had not had as effective a lever for religious liberty 
and separation of church and state in the executive branch in the history of our 
country at least since the Thomas Jefferson days as we had during the three 
year term of John Kennedy." To Allen, the reason for this trend was that Kennedy 
"politically could take the Catholic vote for granted and therefore had to play to 
people who were in the opposing camp."24 By the end of the decade, James had 
also experienced a change of heart about Kennedy. "I was just as sincere as I 
could be in my belief that no Roman Catholic would be allowed to make his own 
decisions without help from the Vatican, and I didn't think America could use that 
22E. S. James, "New President Deserves Support," November 11, 1960, Baptist Standard, 2 . 
23Storey, 207 (both quotations). 
24AIIen, Jimmy. Oral Memoirs of Jimmy Allen. Interview by Daniel B. McGee (August 27, 1973), 
Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 139. 
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kind of a president," he said. But Kennedy's three years as president did more to 
convince James that his assumptions were incorrect than all his campaign's 
attempts to sway Texas Baptists. James ultimately conceded, "When he became 
president, he proved to us that a Catholic can make his own decisions, that he 
can be fair to all people."25 Kennedy's gracious treatment of James, despite 
James' very public reservations about Catholic politicians and Kennedy's 
candidacy, seems to have helped the two form an unlikely friendship. James has 
stated on the record that Kennedy called him personally the night before his 
death. Kennedy was in Texas, of course, and wanted James to attend a 
luncheon the following day, which James agreed to do. James and his wife were 
at the luncheon waiting to see Kennedy when they received the news of his 
assassination. Ultimately, James came to view their relationship with great favor: 
"We had a rather personal relationship, between an ordinary country man and 
the President of the United States, but I enjoyed it and he was most gracious to 
me. And incidentally, he did more to keep church and state separated than any 
other President we've had in my lifetime."26 
Despite this thawing of relations, Texas Baptists remained concerned 
about specific issues. The most important of these during the shortened Kennedy 
administration was federal aid to private schools, particularly Catholic ones. On 
the surface, aid to private schools might not seem like a dividing issue for 
Baptists and Catholics. As the Christian Right gained power in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s (and southern whites were increasingly forced to send their children 
25James, E. S. Oral Memoirs of E. S. James. Interview by Thomas L. Charlton. (August 5, 1971), 
Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 104 (both quotations). 
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to schools with black students), Protestant schools grew rapidly. But during the 
early years of Kennedy's administration, a huge discrepancy existed between 
Catholic schools and other private religious academies. In 1960, approximately 
3.5 million students attended parochial schools, compared to 225,000 at 
Protestant schools and 22,000 at Jewish ones. As Kennedy's administration 
began, Texas Baptists worried that Catholics would push for public funding of 
these schools, and prominent Catholic leaders had already gone on record 
supporting such aid. The Supreme Court's Everson vs. Board of Education 
decision in 1947 had deemed direct funding of private schools unconstitutional, 
but it had not examined the issues of federal aid for transportation, school heath 
care, school lunches, and textbooks that were not religious in nature. Supporters 
hoped that Kennedy's election would help their cause, and the issue was 
politically provocative in 1960.27 Citing theological and political concerns about 
the divide between government and church organizations, Texas Baptists staked 
out a clear position against public funding of parochial (or any) private schools. 
In educating Baptists on issues of church/state separation and promoting 
a pro-separation position, no agency was more influential than the Baptist Joint 
Committee on Public Affairs (BJCPA). A prominent Texas Baptist, J. M. Dawson, 
was instrumental in creating the agency, and he served as its head from 1946 to 
1953. Dawson was a longtime pastor in Waco, Texas, and the J. M. Dawson 
Institute for Church State Studies at Baylor University is a testament to his 
legacy. The Institute was named for Dawson because of his ardent advocacy on 
27Storey, 208. 
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behalf of church/state separation and religious liberty.28 The BJCPA focused 
primarily on advocacy for the separation of church and state. During the 1960s, it 
played a particularly important role in organizing against any federal funding of 
private religious schools. During the 1950s, Dawson had issued clear warnings to 
Baptists about the employment of nuns in public schools, the use of publicly-
funded buses for transporting students to parochial schools, federal grants for the 
construction of religious schools, and a number of actions by local school boards 
(usually ones dominated by Catholics) that he considered antithetical to the 
country's legal traditions of church/state separation.29 
One specific case in the early 1960s seemed to confirm Texas Baptists' 
suspicions that government monies were being used for private religious 
purposes. In Bremond, a small town in east central Texas that consisted almost 
entirely of Catholics, an elementary school became the cause for controversy. 
Starting in 1948, the local school board leased a public building to St. Mary's 
Elementary School for the ridiculous sum of one dollar per year. The school 
essentially operated on the basis of government funding, with publicly-financed 
school buses taking the children to school each day. But despite its source of 
funding, the school functioned largely as a private Catholic school. The faculty 
was composed almost entirely of nuns, who wore religious garb to work each 
day, Catholic imagery filled the school's walls and billboards, priests often visited 
the school, and an entire section of the library was dedicated to Catholic 
literature. By 1958, the Texas Christian Life Commission (TCLC) had taken 
28lbid., 6-7. 
291bid., 208. 
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notice of the issue. Foy Valentine headed the TCLC at the time, and he was 
instrumental in forming the Citizens' Association for Free Public Schools, which 
brought a lawsuit against the school district on grounds that the enterprise 
violated the constitutional separation between church and state. By 1962, the 
district agreed to discontinue the practice, ending the court battle and earning 
Texas Baptists a clear victory in the fight to oppose the merging of church and 
state.30 
Valentine, along with E. S. James of the Standard and several others, 
became a hero of sorts to Baptists focused on church/state issues. His stance 
was unequivocal, and in the 1960s he laid the groundwork for what would 
become forty years of activism on the issue. "In those days there was a pretty 
strong consensus among Baptist people generally, but Baptist leaders 
particularly, that separation of church and state was the best guarantee of 
religious liberty," he later recalled. Referring to what would become a favored 
term of the Christian Right, he insisted that church/state separation was "not a 
'shibboleth of doctrinaire secularism,' but was indeed a primary plank in the 
Baptist platform." As early as the 1960s, he was determined to oppose "people 
who were not historically rooted as Baptists who wanted government support for 
parochial schools."31 To Valentine and other Texas Baptist leaders, such a 
position was the only possible Baptist response, given their denomination's 
history of supporting the separation of church and state. But their impulse to 
defend that separation would put them at direct odds with other Baptists who 
301bid, 209. 
31Valentine, Fey Dan. Oral Memoirs of Fey Dan Valentine. Interview by Thomas L. Charlton. (May 
22, 1989), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 5 (all quotations). 
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would soon join with leaders of the Christian Right to reshape American politics. 
The activism of Valentine, James, and other Texas Baptists during the 1960s 
established a pattern of political activity that put them on a collision course with 
other evangelicals. That split would not become completely evident until the late 
1970s, but given the stridency with which Texas Baptists defended the 
separation of church and state during the 1960s, it was inevitable. 
As the decade progressed, issues of church/state separation did more 
than cause friction between Catholics and Baptists; they also pitted Baptist 
against Baptist. While Texas Baptists, particularly the state's leadership, had a 
history of defending separation, the issue became contentious when the state 
government of Texas offered the possibility of financial support to private 
colleges through the Higher Education Facilities Act. The act offered low-interest 
loans to private colleges for the construction of new buildings, which would 
benefit large swaths of Texas college students. Aware of the coming crisis, the 
Baptist General Convention of Texas had commissioned a special committee to 
review the issues relating to federal funding of Baptist institutions and 
recommend guidelines. Led by Harold G. Basden, the committee also included 
Jimmy Allen, who remained an ardent advocate for strict church/state separation. 
The committee's findings were not especially surprising, given the pro-separation 
bent of the state's leadership. The group opposed "all direct aid" to Baptist 
institutions and specifically singled out low-interest government loans. 
Significantly, the committee allowed some exceptions, the most obvious of which 
involved the benefits of subsidized mail charges for non-profit organizations. That 
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exemption clearly benefited the Baptist Standard, whose editorial page 
consistently blasted any and all perceived breaches of church/state separation. 
Arguing that there was "no realistic way to approach the problem of adequately 
compensating the government" for postal fees, the committee termed such 
subsidies "a technical violation" and permitted them. 32 The report's authors were 
surely correct that, in contrast to other federal funding, postal subsidies 
presented pragmatic concerns that were seemingly impossible to avoid. But the 
report still irked Baptists who bristled at the exception for the Standard, 
particularly given the financial benefit that it provided the magazine at a time 
when other institutions were struggling financially. 
Baylor University president Abner McCall pushed the issue again in 1965 
in an issue of the Baylor Line, a magazine published by the University and sent 
to all Baylor alumni. In a special article, McCall argued that Baylor could accept 
federal or state funds for its projects without compromising Baptist beliefs about 
the separation of church and state. He did so by pointing to a distinction between 
religious liberty and the principle of separation. Religious liberty, he concluded, 
was of "supreme importance," while church/state separation was "a political 
devise" designed to defend religious liberty but that was not "indispensable to 
religious liberty."33 He also chided members of the Basden committee for issuing 
a report that was based more on "intra-denominational politics than on 
principle."34 He specifically attacked the exemption for mail services to the 
32Storey, 210. 
33Abner McCall, "Baptist Institutions and Government Aid and Regulations," Baylor Line, reprinted 
in the Baptist Standard, May 26, 1985, 6. 
34lbid, 7. 
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Standard, calling it "by far the largest governmental subsidy taken by a Southern 
Baptist agency." Significantly, he painted Baptists who opposed taking federal 
funds as behind the times. "I have news for them: our institutions are already 
licensed and regulated by the government," he wrote.35 To no one's surprise, 
E. S. James provided a quick response to McCall's charges. While admitting that 
his publication saved at least $100,000 a year by virtue of its status a nonprofit 
organization, he alleged that McCall overstated the level of savings to the 
Standard. He also went on record opposing the Standard's acceptance of these 
funds, but maintained that it was the responsibility of the state convention to 
change the policy. In a clear shot at McCall, he sarcastically noted that the Baylor 
president was currently serving as president of the BGCT. 36 
In October 1965, McCall went even further in his arguments. He used his 
presidential address at the BGCT's annual meeting to press his views on the 
separation of church and state. In a clear attack on James, he concluded that all 
Baptist institutions should be so lucky as to enjoy government subsidies even 
while protesting against them. He listed numerous instances in which Baptists 
had technically violated their beliefs on church/state separation without 
endangering the broader (and, in his mind, more important) principle of religious 
liberty. To McCall, Baptists like James were too devout in their opposition to any 
entanglements with government agencies. But the state convention was not with 
McCall on these questions. In a powerful counter to his arguments, Baptist pastor 
Herbert Howard took to the convention floor to defend Baptists' concern about 
351bid, 8. 
36E. S. James, "On the Recent Controversy," Baptist Standard, May 26, 1965, 4. 
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the separation of church and state. His statements could scarcely have been 
more direct: "We cannot, we dare not, we shall not forsake our Christian, our 
Baptist position, regardless of the consequences to our institutions."37 James 
Dunn later recalled the division of Baptists, but reiterated that the leadership was 
mostly opposed to such grants. For his part, the funds represented "a violation of 
separation of church and state, a very serious compromise of the clarity of our 
witness." He also intoned, "How can you expect us to be true to separation of 
church and state?" if Texas Baptists also sought federal loans for their private 
schools. As Dunn noted, doing so would "make it more difficult all the time for us 
to oppose aid to parochial schools."38 The TCLC also offered an official statement 
on the subject, insisting that "the preservation of our institutions through the use 
of tax money may increase the difficulty in preserving religious liberty through 
separation of church and state." Although the state convention took no official 
position on these matters in 1965, the 1966 convention came down on the side of 
James, the CLC, and others who defended the traditional Baptist opposition to 
accepting government funds for religious activities. At the same convention, 
Texas Baptists also reiterated the convention's support for the recommendations 
of the Basden Report. 39 
As usual, E. S. James was vigilant (some would say intransigent) in his 
defense of strict church/state separation. He was particularly frustrated by 
McCall's claim that the Standards editorials were hypocritical in light of special 
37 Storey, 212. 
38Dunn, James M. Oral Memoirs of James M. Dunn. Interview by Daniel B. McGee (September 
23, 1980), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 138. 
39See, Baptist Standard, November 3, 1965, 5. 
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postal rates that saved it a great deal of money. James was quick to note that he 
had argued against any special rate for his magazine due to its religious content. 
At the time, almost all publications paid a second-class rate, but religious papers 
received a different second-class rate that helped defray mailing costs. James 
insisted that his publication pay the same rate as secular papers, but the fifteen-
member Board of Directors that governed the Standard 'felt it would embarrass 
other religious papers that could not do that." In his dealings with McCall over the 
issue, James felt McCall overstated the significance of the subsidy, even after 
James had corresponded with him about his personal desire to do away with any 
subsidy at all. "I acknowledged in my correspondence ... with McCall that there 
is a subsidy," he said. "Bless his big heart, he contended that we were receiving 
a tremendous subsidy, because he compared what we were paying for mailing a 
Baptist Standard with what it would cost if we paid first class rates. Well, of 
course that's an unreasonable comparison because no paper pays first class 
rates."40 
Ultimately, James thought McCall used the issue unfairly to defend 
government subsidies to Baylor University, a decision James saw as a serious 
breach in the wall between church and state and a divergence from traditional 
Baptist teachings on the subject. James insisted that, "There is a subsidy there, 
nobody can deny, just like in any church paper that's sent out; but it doesn't 
compare with what the government proposes to do in grants to our institutions for 
40 James, E. S. Oral Memoirs of E. S. James. Interview by Thomas L. Charlton. (August 5, 1971 ), 
Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 100 (all quotations). 
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equipment and for services."41 The battle over government funds to Baptist 
colleges and universities provided yet another example that, when pressed, 
Texas Baptist leaders were willing to expend political capital to defend separation 
of church and state, even if it came at great cost to those institutions. 
Of all the issues that captivated Baptists during the 1960s, none could 
match the passion generated by the Supreme Court's 1962 ruling on school 
prayer, Engel vs. Vitale. The 6-1 decision embraced the claims of plaintiffs that 
the reading of a 22 word official school prayer was unconstitutional and could not 
be allowed in public schools. The broad scope of the decision, which dubbed 
organized school prayer "an establishment of religion" forbidden by the First 
Amendment of the Constitution, was clear at the time of the ruling. A New York 
Times article noted that the decision would eventually outlaw such common 
practices as the reading of Bible verses in classrooms and chapel exercises, 
which were common across the country. The article also observed that the case 
probably represented "a stricter attitude in the Supreme Court towards breaches 
of what it has called the 'wall of separation' between church and state." Justice 
Hugo Black authored the decision and made its sweeping ramifications perfectly 
clear. "In this country, it is no part of the business of government to compose 
official prayers for any group of the American people to recite," he wrote. He also 
rejected the argument of the school district that allowing children of other 
religious traditions (or no religious tradition) to leave class during the prayers was 
sufficient protection. He argued that placing "the power, prestige and financial 
support of government" behind any religious practice inevitably results in some 
41 1bid. 
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form of religious coercion by the government, a practice specifically forbidden by 
the First Amendment. That statement alone represented a massive shift in what 
the Court would allow, but Black went even further. He argued that the 
establishment clause "does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental 
compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official 
religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or 
not." He added, "The prayer of each man's soul must be his and his alone. That 
is the genius of the First Amendment."42 
By offering such a broad interpretation of the establishment clause, Black 
and his fellow justices made clear that the Court would not tolerate any form of 
organized religion in public schools. The impact of the decision was felt 
immediately, and it was certainly not lost on white southerners who had long 
complained that the federal government and its courts were growing too 
intrusive. The New York Times noted that the initial reaction in Congress was 
"dominated by unfavorable comment from southern members." In one of the 
most explicit condemnations, Representative George Andrews of Alabama 
complained, "They put the Negroes in school and now they've driven God out."43 
Not all southerners expressed their conviction with such blatant racism, but huge 
numbers of white southerners opposed the Supreme Court's ruling as an attack 
on their deepest values and an attempt by the federal courts to undermine them. 
The response ofT exas Baptists to the issue demonstrated a different sensibility 
to issues of church/state separation. The reaction from these southern 
42Anthony Lewis, "Supreme Court Outlaws School Prayers in Regents Case Decision," The New 
York Times, June 26, 1962, Section A, 1 (all quotations). 
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Protestants could not have been more different from George Andrews' feelings, 
and it helps explain why Texas Baptists ultimately rejected an alliance with 
leaders of the Christian Right. 
Few scholars have written more extensively and gracefully about the rise 
of the Christian Right than sociologist William Martin. He argues that the 
Supreme Court's decision on school prayer was instrumental in creating the 
confrontational culture of the Christian Right and in spurring its members to 
political action. "Nothing, perhaps, generated more lasting resentment against 
the Supreme Court and stirred more concern among conservative Christians" 
than the 1962 prayer decision and the 1963 decision outlawing official Bible 
readings in public schools. Conservative believers, Martin notes, "viewed the 
decision as a declaration of war against Christianity, a conviction that has not 
diminished over time."44 The Texas Baptist leadership generally welcomed the 
decision, in contrast to their southern Protestant counterparts. E. S. James 
insisted that God had "not been driven from the public school room by the U.S. 
Supreme Court." What the Court had done, in James' mind, was rule that 
"prescribed and controlled religion shall not be forced upon students by the 
power of government." The decision was "moral, fair, American, and best for the 
preservation and the progress of the nation."45 When asked to join a crusade to 
enact "An Amendment for God," codifying the right to organized school prayer, 
he became even more explicit (and infuriating to his fellow southerners). "This 
country doesn't need an amendment for God," he replied. "God was not brought 
44Martin, With God On Our Side, 77. 
45E. S. James, Baptist Standard, August 8, 1962, 2. 
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into American life by the adoption of the constitution, and His tenure here will not 
be determined by acts of Congress nor by ballots of the people."46 The TCLC had 
condemned all official religious activity on public school grounds as early as 
1958. Its leadership strongly supported the Supreme Court's decision, issuing a 
statement of support.47 
At the time of the ruling, James Dunn was an instructor of religion and 
director of the Baptist Student Union (BSU) at West Texas State University. He 
was already rising to prominence in Texas Baptist circles, and he would later 
become the executive director of the TCLC. After the ruling, he shared the 
disdain of other Texas Baptist leaders for attempts to reverse the decision. He 
derided the "recurring attempts to pass a prayer amendment ... to quote, 'put 
prayer back in the schools,' as if you loaded up a wheelbarrow with prayer and 
shoved it back into the schools." First as a BSU leader and later as leader of the 
TCLC, he "called upon Texas Baptists to recognize that the best thing 
government can do for religion is to leave it alone. And that was consistent with 
the church-state position we'd taken all along."48 Foy Valentine was another 
important leader who agreed with the Supreme Court's ruling and struggled to 
understand why some Baptists viewed it as an assault on Christianity. After all, 
he was quick to note, "the majority of Texas Baptists and of Southern Baptists 
really supported the idea of separation of church and state. It was pretty much in 
46 E. S. James, Baptist Standard, April 8, 1964, 2. 
47Storey, 214. 
48Dunn, James Milton. Oral Memoirs of James Milton Dunn. Interview by Daniel B. McGee. 
(December 12, 1980), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 165 (both quotations). 
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our bloodstream."49 At the time, leaders like James, Dunn, and Valentine could 
not have known how contentious issues of church/state separation would 
eventually become. They simply viewed their position as the logical extension of 
a Baptist tradition that was as dear to them as any other. But their support for the 
Court's decision placed them on the opposite side of a great political divide that 
would ultimately reshape southern politics and, by extension, U.S. politics. 
Although it would be another fifteen years before the Christian Right would 
formally organize under Jerry Falwell's leadership, these Texas Baptists drew a 
line in the sand on church/state issues that ensured they would never join other 
southern evangelicals in gravitating towards the Christian Right. 
Although the Texas Baptist leadership was generally supportive of the 
ruling, opposition came from some quarters of state Baptists. In response to 
James' editorials lauding the opinion, one angry woman from Victoria, Texas, 
wrote to the Standard to express her disagreement. "We Baptists are trying so 
hard to keep church and state separate that we are literally joining the atheists," 
she wrote. 5° No doubt, many rank-in-file Texas Baptists shared her view, even if 
they rarely took on the leadership over the issue. Among the leadership, T. A. 
Patterson was the most notable critic of the Court's ruling, though he was 
certainly not as agitated over it as many southern believers. At the time, he 
served as executive secretary of the BGCT and wrote a regular column for the 
Standard. Although he and James had a mostly positive working relationship, 
Patterson later admitted that he felt some tension with James over occasional 
4~alentine, Foy Dan. Oral Memoirs of Foy Dan Valentine. Interview by Thomas L. Charlton and 
David Stricklin. (December 4, 1989), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 153-54. 
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disagreements on issues like school prayer. 51 He worried that the Court's 
decision would lead to a "further paganization of American life" by giving atheists 
a major legal victory (he mostly ignored the fact that the suit had included only 
one family of non-believers and also included Jews and Unitarians). He predicted 
that in the end anti-religionists would use the ruling to "eliminate everything that 
pertains to religion" from public schools.52 Given the wording of the ruling, that 
fear was probably not unwarranted, but James saw it in a much different light. He 
pointed out the important distinction between organized, official school prayers 
and private religious expression. In fact, the Court had focused its ruling only on 
official prayers, not private ones. To James, that distinction was crucial and 
meant that Texas Baptists had little reason to fear the decision. 
The turbulence of the 1960s has been well documented by historians and 
other commentators. Most discussions about that decade focus on the changes 
in sexual norms, race relations, campus culture, and foreign policy that 
eventually provoked pushback from cultural conservatives. In most narratives of 
the Christian Right, the 1960s are significant because of the social changes that 
prompted conservative outrage and led finally to organizations like Jerry Falwell's 
Moral Majority. But for Texas Baptists, especially leaders of the state convention, 
the 1960s were important years for entirely different reasons. During that decade, 
Texas Baptists solidified their commitment to the separation of church and state, 
placing them on a path that would eventually bring them into conflict with the 
51 Patterson, T. A. Oral Memoirs ofT. A. Patterson. Interview by Thomas L. Charlton. (April 29, 
1975), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 197-200. 
52T. A. Patterson, "Court Decision Brings Uncertainty," The Baptist Standard, September 26, 
1962. 
67 
Christian Right. Issues like abortion rights and gay rights had not yet come to 
dominate southern politics, and few Baptists gave much public thought to 
whether those issues should be resolved through state action or private 
decisions. But the campaign of 1960, the debate over funding for parochial 
schools, the issue of school prayer, and the controversy surrounding potential 
government loans to Baptist institutions each provided an opportunity for Texas 
Baptists to moderate their strict views on church/state separation. On each 
occasion, they not only refused to concede ground but actually increased their 
determination to fight against breaches in the wall of separation. The 1970s and 
early 1980s would bring new battles to the forefront of Baptist life, particularly on 
issues of church and state. But Texas Baptists had already staked out a position 
on the side of strong support for church/state separation. They could not and 
would not abandon traditional Baptist understandings of the separation of church 
and state. To do so would be to forsake one of their proudest traditions. As the 
ensuing years ushered in great changes to southern politics, many observers 
were surprised to find Texas Baptists standing on the side opposite the Christian 
Right and, in many cases, an increasingly powerful Republican Party. But given 
the firm foundation Texas Baptists had already established on church/state 
issues, their actions made perfect sense. Their battle with the Christian Right 
during the 1970s and 1980s was based on deeply held beliefs, grounded in 
historic Baptist traditions, and consistent with the path Texas Baptists traveled 
long before the political and social changes of those years. 
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Chapter 2 
Fighting the Winds of Change: 
Texas Baptists and the Separation of Church and State, 1970-1985 
In 1980 Southern Baptists gathered in St. Louis for the denomination's 
annual meeting. The event took place in the shadow of the 1980 presidential 
election, which pitted incumbent Democrat (and staunch Southern Baptist) 
Jimmy Carter against Republican challenger Ronald Reagan. The meeting 
turned out to be one of the most controversial in Southern Baptist history, with 
messengers debating amendments on abortion, prayer in public schools, 
President Carter's White House Conference on the Family, and the tax status of 
businesses owned by churches. On each of these issues, disagreements about 
the separation of church and state and the proper relationship between religion 
and government lay at the heart of the debate. In the end, the Southern Baptist 
Convention (SBC) adopted an amendment strongly supporting an abortion ban, 
except in cases when the mother's life was in danger. The resolution represented 
a real triumph for convention conservatives and contradicted a 1976 resolution 
that had affirmed women's privacy rights and "the full range of medical services" 
in the abortion decision.1 It also signified a serious shift on an important issue 
related to church/state separation. By affirming that a private, controversial 
decision was well within the purview of the federal government, Baptists seemed 
to reject an older consensus on the issue that opposed abortion on a religious 
level, but simultaneously sought to keep the issue out of the realm of government 
1"Resolutions Chart New Course: SBC Hits Abortion, Asks Doctrinal Integrity," The Baptist 
Standard, June 18, 1980, 4. 
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activity. 
The abortion reversal received by far the most media attention, but those 
who supported the traditional Baptist insistence on the separation of church and 
state won important victories on other issues. They fought back efforts to change 
the denomination's position on prayer in public schools, with the convention 
again recording its support for the 1963 Supreme Court decision outlawing 
organized prayer in public schools. The convention also supported removing the 
tax-exempt status for businesses owned by churches that compete in the private 
sector. The stance was evidence that, while times were clearly changing, 
Southern Baptists had not completely abandoned their previous commitments to 
the separation of church and state. Finally, the SBC gave a modest nod to one of 
its own, affirming President Carter's White House Conference on the Family, 
which had been the subject of criticism from conservatives for its inclusion of 
gays, lesbians and feminists.2 
These victories by the pro-separation forces belie the popular narrative of 
the 1980 election and the rise of the Christian Right. In that narrative, 1980 was 
the turning point in evangelicals' shift from Democratic to Republican. On the 
surface, the point is difficult to dispute. As Bruce Nesmith has noted, Ronald 
Reagan's concerted strategy to woo evangelicals (including Southern Baptists) 
from the Democratic fold was largely successful. Evangelicals nationally, who 
numbered close to 45 million by 1976, had supported Carter in his first run for 
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president but switched to Reagan in 1980.3 But for Texas Baptists, the issues 
that drew many evangelicals into the Republican camp were far from settled. 
That they and their allies could win support for pro-separation measures at the 
national convention is a testament to the influence they still held in 1980. Their 
success in pushing an SBC resolution supporting Jimmy Carter is further proof 
that even at the national level, Southern Baptists had not fully cemented their 
alliance with the Republican Party by 1980. The story of Texas Baptists in the 
1970s and early 1980s helps explain why these issues remained unresolved for 
Southern Baptists. It also serves as a reminder to historians that southern 
evangelicals offered a far more complicated response to the rise of the Christian 
Right than scholars have previously assumed. 
By the early 1970s, the Texas Baptist leadership had established clearly 
that the separation of church and state was a non-negotiable issue for them. As 
the decade progressed and conservative evangelicals became more politically 
organized, Texas Baptists reiterated their defense of church/state separation, 
sometimes in provocative and unexpected ways. The funding of secondary and 
higher education remained a contentious issue for them as the 1970s began. In 
the spring of 1971, the Texas legislature passed a bill providing for government-
funded assistance to students attending private colleges. The general idea was 
that, even with the assistance, those students would pay much more for college 
than their counterparts in state schools. Also, since the money was directed 
towards individuals, not religious institutions themselves, even some Baptists 
3 James Nesmith, The New Republican Coalition: The Reagan Campaign and White Evangelicals 
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concluded that it would not stir controversy. But once again E. S. James of the 
Baptist Standard came down strongly on the side of strict separation. He called 
the bill"bad legislation," insisting that, "We ought to do everything we can to keep 
church and state separate." Going further, he intoned, "I'm unwilling to be taxed, 
and I won't do it quietly to support any religion ... I wouldn't think of being willing 
to be taxed to support a Baptist church."4 His statements made clear again how 
devoted he was to strict separation. James knew full well that the legislation 
would benefit many Baptists students who wanted to attend Baylor University or 
other Baptist colleges but could not afford the steep tuition prices. His statements 
opposing taxpayer funding of Baptist activities were geared directly to that issue. 
In short, his stance against public funding of private religion was not limited to 
Catholic schools; his opposition was just as strident when it was Southern Baptist 
students who stood to benefit. 
Although James focused on funding to individual students, the larger focus 
of Texas Baptists in the early 1970s was state aid to private secondary and 
elementary schools. A lingering bill in the state legislature would have provided 
up to $50 million of aid to those schools by funding non-religious activities, such 
as the hiring of teachers to provide instruction in secular subjects, the purchase 
of books, and transportation costs. The Baptist General Convention of Texas 
adopted an official stance against such funding at its annual meeting in Austin in 
1970. The proclamation was unequivocal: "Baptists are committed to religious 
liberty and its corollary separation of church and state, a strong public school 
4James, E. S. Oral Memoirs of E. S. James. Interview by Thomas L. Charlton. (August 5, 1971), 
Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 110. 
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system, and racial justice. We call on Texas Baptists to support the expenditure 
of public funds for only public schools through public channels." With that 
statement of support from the state convention, the Texas Christian Life 
Commission (TCLC) went to work opposing the bill and encouraging Texas 
Baptists to contact their representatives with their concerns. In a TCLC report 
that was widely distributed in Baptist churches, associate director Phil Strickland 
outlined the primary reasons for his organization's opposition to the bill. First, the 
bill would ultimately draw funding away from public schools. "The education tax 
dollar will stretch only so far," he argued. "The public is committed by tradition, 
constitution, frequent vote, and legislation to support public schools. It has no 
obligation to support private schools." But Strickland did not limit his concern to 
the issue of funding; he went further, arguing that the proposed funding would 
exacerbate the existing problem of educational inequality. "Texas would move 
towards government sponsorship of two separate educational systems," he 
wrote. "This would guarantee inequality in opportunity." Finally, he invoked the 
Texas Constitution, noting that it prohibited "direct or indirect" tax aid to churches. 
"No matter how carefully drawn, this legislation would violate that prohibition," he 
wrote. With the support of the state convention, the TCLC acted to make Texas 
Baptists a central political player in the battle over state funding of private 
schools.5 
In April 1971 the state legislature debated the bill, sponsored by 
Representative Raul Longoria of Edinburg. The most controversial aspect of the 
5"AIIen Leads Opposition; Texas Parochial Aid Debated," Baptist Standard, May 12, 1971, 3 (all 
quotations). 
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bill was its promise to pay up to three-fourths of the salaries of private school 
teachers who taught subjects not related to religious instruction. Jimmy Allen of 
the TCLC led the fight against the bill, gathering opponents from a diversity of 
backgrounds to testify against the bill before the state legislature. Supporters of 
the bill insisted that the $17.5 million it would spend to pay private school 
teachers would ultimately save the state money. If all the students in private 
schools entered public schools, the estimated cost to the state would have been 
$75 million. Of course, supporters ignored the obvious fact that the vast majority 
of students in private schools would stay there regardless of whether their 
teachers received a salary from the state or from private funding. But supporters 
of the bill filled the chamber with what Allen estimated was an 80/20 split in favor 
of the bill. Despite that show of support, Allen's effort against the bill was 
organized and focused. Among the prominent figures he brought to testify 
against the bill were members of Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State (of which Allen was the current president), the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the 
Anti-Defamation League. He also brought in clergy to testify against the bill; they 
ranged from Episcopal to Baptist to Seventh Day Adventist and Church of Christ. 
James Wood of the Institute for Church-State Studies at Baylor also testified 
against the bill, another indication of how united Texas Baptists were in opposing 
the measure.6 
Allen was unequivocal in his stance: "Any attempt to aid parochial schools 
from tax money is patently unconstitutional under the Texas Constitution." He 
61bid. 
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continued, "It is unwise, as far as public education is concerned, and is 
unthinkable as a violation of the free religious conscience."7 E. S. James joined 
the chorus of those opposing the bill. He emphasized what he believed were 
misleading arguments by supporters, saying they "cloud the issue with their cry 
about double taxation--- taxes for public schools while having to pay tuition for 
their children in parochial schools." He reminded them that "there is no 
compulsion in the latter" and accused them of ignoring "the double taxation which 
will come our way if we have to support both church and public schools."8 In 
working against public funding for private schools, Allen and James reiterated the 
Texas Baptist position of strong church/state separation. At the time, the 
Christian Right had not formally organized, much less developed its ideology on 
issues of church and state. But Texas Baptists' position on school funding was 
an early indication that their basic assumptions would conflict with the Christian 
Right, whose leaders supported government funding of private schools from the 
movement's earliest days. 
One of the central reasons Texas Baptists opposed government funding of 
public schools was that they believed it to be an unconstitutional violation of the 
separation of church and state. In the summer of 1971 the Supreme Court 
vindicated their concerns. In an 8 to 1 decision, the Court ruled that state 
programs that reimburse private religious schools for instruction in secular 
subjects were a violation of the separation of church and state and constituted 
"excessive entanglement between government and religion." The ruling was in 
71bid. 
8"Disaster in Austin," Baptist Standard, May 19, 1971, 6. 
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response to state programs in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, which plaintiffs 
claimed were in violation of church/state separation; it was the first time the Court 
had struck down government aid to parochial or other private schools. The Court 
ruled specifically on direct aid to teachers who teach at private schools, but the 
spirit of the ruling seemed to call into question other forms of aid, like the 
purchase of textbooks and transportation for students at private schools. By 
1971, thirty-six of fifty states had adopted some form of aid to religious schools, 
much to the chagrin of Texas Baptists and other advocates for church/state 
separation. But in a separate 5-4 ruling, the Court upheld the Higher Education 
Facilities Act of 1963, which provided funds for the construction of new facilities 
at private colleges and universities. Interestingly, in issuing the majority opinion, 
Chief Justice Warren Burger noted that elementary and secondary schools were 
more involved in religious indoctrination than colleges. He also argued that "there 
is substance to the conclusion that college students are less impressionable and 
less susceptible to religious indoctrination" than their counterparts at elementary 
and secondary schools. He also insisted that a one-time grant for academic 
facilities involved much less "entanglement" between church and state than the 
funding of teachers over long periods of time, particularly given that the bill 
providing funding for facilities barred the use of these buildings for religious 
purposes.9 In general, though, the Court's rulings provided little solace to 
advocates of government funding of private schools. The Court made it 
abundantly clear that, with very few exceptions, the principle of church/state 
9Fred P. Grahams, "High Court, 8 to 1, Forbids States to Reimburse Parochial Schools; Backs 
College Level Help 5 to 4," New York Times, June 29, 1971, Section A, 1. 
separation was more important than the monetary needs of private schools. In 
authoring the decision on funding for teacher pay, Justice Burger wrote, "The 
Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the 
family and the institutions of private choice, and that while involvement and 
entanglement is inevitable, lines must be drawn."10 
Not surprisingly, Texas Baptist leaders celebrated the Court's ruling. The 
Standard ran an editorial lauding the decision, saying it "should give major 
encouragement to those determined to keep church hands out of the public 
treasury." It hailed Justice Burger's insistence that taxpayer funding of private 
schools would inevitably "entail political activity," calling his comment "the 
understatement of the year."11 But the editorial was mostly negative, voicing its 
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disagreement with the decision on the Higher Education Facilities Act and citing 
the decision as a call to action by Baptists who supported the separation of 
church and state. E. S. James correctly noted that the ruling avoided the issue of 
public grants to private elementary schools for buildings. 12 While the Court 
seemed more concerned with entanglement between the state and elementary or 
secondary schools, it also seemed to indicate that funding for facilities was less 
of a threat to church/state separation than funding of teacher's salaries. Of 
course, each of these decisions was arbitrary, and James worried that advocates 
of school vouchers (Catholics in particular) would continue to push for 
government funding of private schools. 
10 John Novotney, "Court Rules Aid Unconstitutional," Religious News Service, reprinted in the 
Baptist Standard, July 7, 1971, 3. 
11"Editorial: Route of the Tax," Baptist Standard, July 7, 1971, 4. 
12 Ibid. 
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James pointedly asked, "Will the voucher plan for schools and colleges be 
upheld? If not for both, will the Court differentiate between the voucher system 
for parochial schools and colleges as it did between college buildings and 
parochial teacher salaries?" He worried that, in the meantime, states would move 
to further fund parochial and other private schools, at the expense of taxpayers 
who did not share the religious beliefs of those schools. James was 
characteristically unequivocal in his message to Texas Baptists: "The call now is 
to gird for battle, both in the legislative halls and the courts, to strike down the 
efforts of those who want a voucher system to support the church schools. It is 
still tax money, whether it goes directly to the teacher or through the pupil to the 
teacher." Going further, he intoned that "Tax-subsidized churches are dead 
churches, and should be dead. No taxpayer wants to be robbed for teaching 
something he does not believe."13 Later in the decade, a nascent Christian Right 
movement would elevate the issue of school vouchers to a place of prominence 
on its national agenda. Leaders like Jerry Falwell argued that the "expulsion of 
Almighty God from the public schools" necessitated a shift to private education, 
and that government funding of those schools was not only appropriate but 
desirable. 14 The reaction of Standard editors to the Court's 1971 ruling was one 
of many early indications that Texas Baptists would follow a different course. Not 
only were their religious beliefs incompatible with school vouchers, but they saw 
them as an affront to the separation of church and state, one of their most 
cherished ethical traditions. 
131bid. 
14Herbert H. Denton and Marjorie Hyer, "President to Ask Hill for Prayer Amendment," The 
Washington Post, Final Edition, 7 May 1982, Section A, 1. 
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By the summer of 1971, Texas Baptists were fighting off another 
challenge: a proposed "prayer amendment" in the U. S. House of 
Representatives that was being pushed by conservative groups. The amendment 
was designed as a response to the Supreme Court's 1963 decision banning 
organized school prayer. Its supporters believed that it was a necessary 
supplement to the First Amendment's statements on religion and free speech, 
given the Court's ruling. The amendment simply read, "Nothing contained in this 
Constitution shall abridge the rights of persons lawfully assembled, in any public 
building which is supported in whole or in part through the expenditure of public 
funds, to participate in nondenominational prayer."15 According to proponents, the 
amendment would effectively prevent the Supreme Court from banning 
organized prayer and Bible reading in public schools, but opponents noted that 
religious groups had rarely been able to agree on what a "nondenominational" 
prayer was. Supporters worked tirelessly throughout the summer to gain the 218 
sponsors that would force the issue to a vote on the House floor, bypassing the 
Judiciary Committee, whose members had blocked the amendment from a floor 
vote for months. 16 The Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, the political 
advocacy arm of the national convention, had warned repeatedly that the 
amendment would fundamentally alter the First Amendment and help crumble 
the wall of separation between church and state. The Southern Baptist 
Convention had passed resolutions affirming their support for the First 
15Beth Hayworth, "Baptist Opposition Cited: Supporters Try Again for Prayer Amendment 
Passage," Baptist Press, reprinted in the Baptist Standard, July 28, 1971, 11. 
16Marjorie Hunter, "School Prayer Vote is Forced in House," New York Times, September 22, 
1971, Section A, 1. 
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Amendment and in opposition to any changes that could affect its meaning. In 
1964 and 1971, Southern Baptists passed resolutions opposing any changes to 
the First Amendment, and Texas Baptists were strongly supportive of that 
position. The Texas Christian Life Commission sent letters opposing the prayer 
amendment to every U.S. representative in Texas, and they included with these 
letters copies of both the 1964 and 1971 Southern Baptist resolutions. 17 Their 
harmony with the national convention on church/state issues might surprise 
contemporary readers, but in the early 1970s fundamentalist Baptists had not yet 
taken control of the national convention. 
The Baptist Standard was adamant in its opposition to the amendment. A 
pointed editorial claimed that while the bill"appears harmless at first glance, it 
raises far more questions than it answers."18 Supporters of the bill were vague 
about what exactly the bill would do; after all, allowing non-denominational prayer 
could mean different things in different schools. But the editors of the Standard 
were certain that whatever its various effects, the results would be nefarious: "We 
think the proposed amendment will permit government-ordered prayers. Such 
eliminates voluntarism which is basic to our understandings of prayer. Such 
becomes a ritual and is without meaning to God or man."19 The editors were 
especially concerned that the phrase "non-denominational" necessarily would 
include faiths far outside the Protestant tradition. "What about our Jewish 
friends? Are we to ignore the Moslem and the Hindu? Satisfy all these with the 
17Hayworth, 11. 
18Editorials: Guard the Amendment," Baptist Standard, August 25, 1971, 6. 
191bid. 
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'nondenominational' and we have an idea that God would rather be ignored."20 
More than even these concerns, the editors expressed a reverence for the First 
Amendment and a concern that tampering with it would undermine religious 
freedom and the separation of church and state. They insisted that, "Anything 
that has stood so well the test of time should have proven itself in almost 200 
years." After laying out their various complaints, the editors warned ominously 
that, "Tampering with the First Amendment could be far more dangerous than we 
would like to imagine."21 
By the 1980s, the cause of organized prayer in public schools would 
become a rallying point for religious conservatives. The distinction between 
organized prayer and voluntary prayer was often lost as conservative Christians 
spoke of a government attempt to "ban God" from the public sphere. But for 
Texas Baptists, this distinction was crucial to their opposition to a prayer 
amendment. A resolution of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs 
insisted, "At no time has the Supreme Court prohibited voluntary prayer but has 
only ruled against governmentally prescribed prayer." Going further, a 
representative of the organization stated, "We ought to be applauding the 
Supreme Court in these cases. We ought to hang our heads in shame that an 
agnostic took this issue to the Supreme Court when we Baptists should have."22 
For contemporary readers, conditioned to associate Southern Baptists 
with the Christian Right, statements like the previous ones might seem strange. 
Indeed, it would be easy to conclude that Texas Baptists must have been a clear 
201bid. 
21 1bid. 
22"Committee Opposes Amendment," Baptist Standard, September 13, 1971, 3. 
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minority within the larger convention. But to truly understand how southern 
religious life changed during the 1970s and 1980s, historians must contend with 
a singular fact: On issues like the prayer amendment, Texas Baptists were in line 
with the national convention. Carl Bates, who served as president of the SBC in 
1971, was robust in his opposition to the amendment. "We see not only 
separation of church and state being attacked," he wrote, "but we see the free 
exercise of religion itself about to be breached." Referring to the proposed 
amendment as "one of the most insidious developments against freedom and 
true religion that I have seen," he argued that, "Real prayer and genuine New 
Testament religion have nothing to gain and all to lose if this amendment 
becomes a part of the Constitution." Besides his strident opposition to the 
amendment, he also defended the Supreme Court's decision, which was under 
attack from elements of the burgeoning movement of conservative evangelicals: 
"It is my deliberate opinion that the Supreme Court gave voluntary religion a 
tremendous boost by removing governmental authority from the devotional life of 
school children."23 His statements were an indication that, at least in the early 
1970s, Texas Baptists' support for church/state separation was completely 
consistent with the mainstream of Baptist thought. They were simply echoing a 
common Baptist concern about breaches in church/state separation; such 
concerns had been a dominant feature of Baptist politics from the denomination's 
earliest days. But Texas Baptists would soon learn that the separation of church 
and state was of little concern to the emerging group of Christian activists that 
eventually became known as the Christian Right. 
23
"Not Vote Against God: Prayer Bill Defeat Urged," Baptist Standard, September 27, 1971, 19. 
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In the 1970s and 1980s, other evangelicals would conclude that religious 
liberty could coexist with a strong affirmation of religion by the state. Indeed, they 
would eventually argue that for such liberty to thrive, the state must be proactive 
in promoting private religion.24 But in the early 1970s, Texas Baptists saw the 
issue much differently, and their reaction to the prayer amendment helps explain 
why they ultimately parted company with members of the Christian Right. One 
Standard issue warned that supporters of the amendment were no friends to the 
cause of religious freedom: "They are those who make it appear that the 
steadfast friends of the First Amendment are against God, country, and 
motherhood, but such an impression is a deception and a delusion."25 The 
portrayal of political opponents as godless and unpatriotic would become a 
hallmark of Christian Right politics in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and such 
attacks are now standard course in campaigns against secular adversaries. But 
Texas Baptists experienced such tactics long before the formation of Jerry 
Falwell's Moral Majority in 1979 or Ronald Reagan's 1980 presidential campaign. 
The interesting aspect of such attacks is that the charge of godlessness seemed 
especially absurd, coming as it did against a group of Christians who spent most 
of their time on church work. Despite the attacks, Baptist leaders in Texas were 
steadfast in their support for church/state separation and their opposition to the 
proposed amendment. One editorial was typical: "The truest friends of religion 
and the most constructive citizens of the state are those who support the First 
24For more on the Christian Right and church/state separation, see James Davison Hunter, 
Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York: BasicBooks, 1991 ), 260-271; and 
Justin Watson, The Christian Coalition: Dreams of Restoration, Demands for Recognition (New 
York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1997), 105-109. 
25"Baptists Warn Against Amendment," Baptist Standard, August 4, 1971, 3. 
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Amendment guarantees that have made possible in the United States a fuller 
measure of religious freedom than was previously known in the world."26 
Although such arguments were perfectly in keeping with Baptist tradition, they 
would become more conspicuous among Southern Baptists as time wore on. But 
the power of those sentiments, at least for Texas Baptists, was enough to 
prevent an alliance with leaders of the Religious Right in the 1970s and beyond. 
The commitment of Texas Baptists to the separation of church and state 
led them to focus heavily on the presidential election of 1972. That contest is 
most often remembered for the sharp policy differences between liberal 
Democrat George McGovern and conservative Republican incumbent Richard 
Nixon.27 But Texas Baptists found that on the subject of federal aid to private 
schools, the candidates were both in agreement and very misguided. Before 
McGovern was even a serious contender, the Standard took Nixon to task for his 
proposals to provide federal funding to non-public schools. In November 1971, 
Nixon's administration convened a summit of educational leaders from public and 
private schools. On the agenda was a proposal to find ways to get public money 
to private religious schools without bringing up constitutional questions.28 His 
reasons for doing so may have been sincere, but there was also a clear political 
dimension to his action. The vast majority of the private schools at the 
conference were parochial schools, run by the Catholic Church. Having been 
261bid. 
27For further reading on the 1972 presidential election, please see Rick Perlstein, Nixon/and: The 
Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (New York: Scribner, 2008); Bruce Schulman, 
The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (New York: De Capo, 
2002). 
28"Administration Pushed Parochiaid: Education Office Seeks Ways to Further Tax Flow to 
Church Schools," Baptist Standard, December 6, 1971, 5. 
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John Kennedy's opponent in 1960, Nixon had a somewhat troubled relationship 
with Catholic voters. But they were a large and important constituency, and their 
support could make or break a candidate. But while Nixon was courting 
Catholics, he was alienating Baptists. John W. Baker, executive director of the 
Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, issued a statement decrying Nixon's 
"drive to provide support for the nation's parochial schools from the public 
treasury."29 The conference was only the beginning of a protracted struggle 
between Texas Baptists and the president of the United States over the issue. 
While McGovern would eventually draw their ire for half-heartedly agreeing to 
public support for private schools, it was Nixon's push for such funding that 
garnered the most criticism from Texas Baptists during the presidential election. 
In the spring of 1972, a White House-appointed panel issued a report 
advocating an increase in federal funding to private schools. The 
recommendations included tax credits for parents of children in church schools, a 
federal construction-loan program, and tuition reimbursements. The report 
recognized court rulings that direct aid to schools was unconstitutional but 
argued that indirect methods would "pass judicial muster." Texas Baptist leaders 
were furious about the decision and ran an editorial in the Standard claiming that 
the committee was biased by Nixon's appointment of Catholic educators to serve 
on it. "It is amazing," the editorial complained, "that this committee, carrying a 
White House stamp of approval, could be so stacked on an issue this 
controversial." Concluding that the president was "irrevocably committed" to 
pursuing federal funding of private schools, the editorial board called on Texas 
291bid. 
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Baptists to flood the White House with complaints that its course of action would 
breach the wall of separation between church and state.30 
As the 1972 race got underway, the Ways and Means committee in the 
House of Representatives voted 18 to 6 in favor of the very type of plan that 
Texas Baptists so stridently opposed. The plan offered parents of children in 
private schools up to 50 percent of tuition, to a maximum of $200 per month. The 
credits came in the form of a tax deduction, allowing such families to gain up to 
$2,400 per year, per child from the federal government, simply for enrolling a 
student in a private school. The estimated cost to the government, according to 
the committee's recommendations, was between $300 and $400 million a year, 
though critics of the legislation maintained the number would end up closer to $1 
billion. Although the bill easily made it out of committee, congressional leaders 
emphasized that the bill was not a priority during the election year. The bill was in 
keeping with the proposals of the Nixon administration, and Democrat George 
McGovern had already offered support for similar measures.31 
The reaction of Texas Baptists was swift and decisive. James Dunn, 
executive director of the TCLC, called the proposal"a perversion of the basic 
purpose for taxation and a serious threat to religious liberty." Going further, he 
labeled the bill"a blatant attempt to make millions of middle Americans pay the 
bills for private and parochial schools operated by those with vast wealth."32 
Another Texas Baptist, James Wood, echoed Dunn's comments. Wood, a former 
Baylor professor who served as executive director of the Baptist Joint Committee 
30
"Editorials: Stacked for Parochiad," Baptist Standard, May 3, 1972, 6 (all quotations). 
31
"Debates on Religious Liberty Enter Presidential Race," New York Times, April10, 1972, A7. 
32
"Threat to Religious Liberty: Baptists Protest Credits," Baptist Standard, May 3, 1972, 5. 
on Public Affairs (BJCPA), used his speech at the organization's semiannual 
meeting to argue against the credits. He insisted that the church should not be 
"bound to the power structure of this world" and made the case for consistent 
action to protect the separation of church and state. At the same meeting, the 
BJCPA formally adopted a resolution protesting the tax credits. "Baptists have 
traditionally considered the use of public funds for religious education to be 
coerced participation in a religious program," the document noted.33 
During the presidential campaign, Texas Baptists mostly focused on 
criticizing Nixon, whose advocacy for school vouchers was by far more ardent 
than George McGovern's. But McGovern also drew the ire of Texas Baptists 
when he proposed a plan that was almost identical to Nixon's.34 As Nixon and 
McGovern fought for votes in the fall of 1972, the Baptist Standard ran an 
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editorial blasting both candidates: "President Nixon, Senator McGovern and other 
political persons refuse to read the First Amendment. Their similar positions 
prevent any voter choice on this issue as to the President but that does not deny 
a voice to those who believe in separation of church and state."35 
Although Texas Baptists were frustrated that neither presidential 
candidate would fight federal funding of public schools, they received welcome 
news from the courts. In another eight to one decision, the Supreme Court 
upheld the ruling of a lower appeals court to overturn an Ohio law providing state 
funds to private schools. The 1971 law provided $90 per year to 300,000 families 
for reimbursement of expenses relating to private secondary education. About 95 
331bid. 
34
"Separation Stands," Baptist Standard, October 18, 1972, 6. 
351bid. 
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percent of the parents were Catholic, so the law clearly favored one religious 
group. Members of the Supreme Court were so confident of their ruling that they 
made it without hearing any new oral arguments. Noting that it had ruled on a 
similar issue with the 1971 case, the Court ruled that the law was in violation of 
the First Amendment's prohibition on government aid to organized religion. The 
proposal by the House Ways and Means committee, supported by both 
presidential candidates, was very much along the same lines, giving hope to 
opponents that it would eventually be ruled unconstitutional. As with many 
church/state issues, the best recourse for opponents of federal aid to private 
schools was the court system, and Texas Baptists recognized as much.36 
The editorial board of the Baptist Standard actually encouraged rank and 
file Baptists to contact Americans United for Separation of Church and State and 
thank the organization for its legal efforts to protect church/state separation. By 
the 1980s, that organization would become a primary target of conservative 
Christian activists who viewed it as promoting secularism and persecuting people 
of faith. But in the 1970s, the country's largest Baptist state convention frequently 
allied with the group. Following the Supreme Court's decision on the Ohio law, 
the Standard called it "the David which has repeatedly slain Goliath" and 
instructed readers to "shout your praise for Americans United for Separation of 
Church and State. "37 This reaction is another demonstration of the fact that 
Baptists were not initially receptive to Christian Right claims about the separation 
of church and state. Not only did Texas Baptists view them with suspicion, but 
36 lbid. 
37 1bid. 
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they fought hard on the other side of the issue. 
On other political issues, Texas Baptists demonstrated a profoundly 
different understanding of government than did their adversaries on the Christian 
Right. One important example was Texas Baptists' response to the proposed 
Child and Family Services Act, a contentious issue during the 1976 presidential 
election. The bill offered to families (on a voluntary basis) certain health, child 
care, and education services. Some conservative critics charged that the bill 
would "take the responsibility for children away from parents and give it to the 
government" and even "duplicate the Soviet-style system of communal child-
rearing." As a result of a flyer campaign by conservative church leaders across 
the country, the bill's sponsor, Senator Walter Mondale of Minnesota, received 
between 500 and 600 letters a day from opponents of the bill.38 This 
organizational effort by church leaders was an early indication that conservative 
Christians were moving in the direction of right-wing political agitation. 
In Texas, Baptist leaders did not join their counterparts in advocating 
against the bill's passage. In a stinging editorial, the Standard called the protests 
"worthless" and based on "misinformation." The editorial included comments from 
an interview with Mondale and expressed support for his position. It also 
articulated a viewpoint on the relationship between religion and politics that was 
quite different from the one shared by opponents of the bill. In a rebuke of 
"extremist groups" and "those who pose as religious conservatives," the article 
admonished political agitators to stop "quoting the Congressional Record as an 
38"A Ranting Mail Campaign," The Washington Post, Final Edition, 19 February 1976, Section A, 
18. 
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authority equal to the King James Version. It is not."39 The debate over the act 
was an early demonstration of the split between Texas Baptists and the growing 
movement of politically active Christian conservatives. Not only were Texas 
Baptists adamant in their defense of church/state separation, but they were also 
not ideologically oriented towards conservative politics. One reason behind this 
reluctance to ally with the Christian Right was a deep concern that politics would 
gain a place of equal importance to religion in Baptist life. While other Baptists 
moved in a political direction, Texas Baptists remained committed to evangelism 
and missions as the most important religious duties. By 1975, Texas Baptists 
funded specific commissions for state evangelism and Christian education and 
provided very generous funding for the Home Mission Board of the national 
denomination. A significant portion of the budget also supported Sunday school 
curriculum, children's homes, and charity hospitals.4° For the Texas Baptist 
leadership, these issues were central. After 1975, they would show significant 
resistance to the national denominational leadership's shift towards a more 
political orientation. 
Other editorials in the mid- to late 1970s indicate a special concern that 
Baptists not place a political agenda ahead of the religious goal of evangelism 
that was the principle mission of Texas Baptists. One such editorial warned 
against those "organizations which trumpet a 'Christian republic,' are out to 'save 
America,' and in other ways headline morality in government." The article 
39"Editorial: Get the Facts," The Baptist Standard, 17 March 1976, 6 (all quotations). 
4°For more information on the budgets and emphases of Texas Baptists before and after 1975, 
see Joseph E. Early, A Texas Baptist History Sourcebook: A Companion to Mcbeth's Texas 
Baptists (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2004), 403-435. 
advocated against involvement with "topics which belong exclusively in the 
political arena."41 Although the editorial did not state what those issues were, it 
did attack the Christian Freedom Foundation, an organization founded in the 
1950s to promote what its leaders termed "a Christian vision for economics."42 
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The Standard argued against "dragging the name 'Christian' along with a 
platform on right-to-work laws, the minimum wage, the gold standard and similar 
issues." The editorial was a crucial moment in defining the stark contrast 
between Texas Baptists and Christian Right activists. In it, the editorial board 
articulated a belief in avoiding political alliances that could damage the 
evangelistic message of Baptists. It argued against "those who would wed the 
concept of Christian morality to ... a certain political philosophy and thus 
prostitute morality for political goals." In their rejection of a partnership with any 
political party, the editors were unambiguous: "We want no part of a 'Christian 
Party' ... Those quick to mix Christianity with the purely political are doing a 
disservice to the religious."43 As early as the mid-1970s, Texas Baptist leaders 
positioned themselves in opposition to the Christian Right. As religious 
conservatives grew in power, Texas Baptists only increased their determination 
not to follow them into the Republican Party establishment. 
The issue of school prayer provided a perfect example of the differing 
political philosophies of Texas Baptists and supporters of the Christian Right. By 
1980 school prayer was a centerpiece of the Christian Right agenda, bringing the 
41"Editorial: Guard Against Christian-Political Organizations," The Baptist Standard, 4 August 
1976, 6 (all quotations). 
42Gary Wills, "Born-Again Politics," The New York Times, Final Edition, 1 August 1976, Section A, 
59. 
43"Editorial: Guard Against Christian-Political Organizations," The Baptist Standard, 4 August 
1976, 6 (all quotations). 
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movement into conflict with the Texas Baptist emphasis on church-state 
separation. Members of the national media observed with interest a significant 
change in the 1980 Republican Party Platform, which endorsed the cause of 
restoring organized prayer to public schools.44 Observers noted that on the issue 
of school prayer and several others, religious conservatives influenced the 
Republican Platform in significant ways.45 As religious conservatives gained 
national prominence and brought the issue of school prayer to the forefront of 
national debate, Texas Baptists continued to oppose organized school prayer on 
grounds of church-state separation. That position was consistent with resolutions 
adopted by the national convention in 1964 and 1971, both of which endorsed 
the Supreme Court's decision outlawing government-sponsored prayer in public 
schools. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a Southern Baptist politician with a 
very different view pressed for a constitutional amendment circumventing the 
Supreme Court's ruling on organized school prayer. Jesse Helms, a conservative 
North Carolina senator and an ally of both Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell, 
advocated an amendment that would leave the issue of school prayer to the 
states, effectively allowing states to condone organized prayer if they wished to 
do so.46 
In response to Helms's activities and the growing power of the Christian 
44The Republican Party Platform of 1980, Adopted by the Republican National Convention, July 
15, 1980, Detroit, Michigan, in possession of the author. Also available at 
http://www. presidency. ucsb.edu/ws/index. php?pid=25844. 
45For examples of national coverage of the influence of religious conservatives on the 1980 
Republican Platform, see "Editorial: The Social Issues," The Wall Street Journal, Final Edition, 13 
October 1980, Section A, 18; Irving Kristol, "The New Republican Party," The Wall StreetJournal, 
Final Edition, 17 July 1980, Section A, 20; Richard L. Strout, "Platform: GOP, Democrats March 
to Different Drummers," The Christian Science Monitor, 12 August 1980, 5. 
46Stan Hastey, "Debate Swirls Around Helms' 'Prayer Moves,"' The Baptist Standard, 23 April 
1980, 17. 
Right, Texas Baptists articulated an alternative Baptist position on the issue: 
"There is no place in American life for prayers formulated and regulated by the 
government."47 By 1980 Baptist fundamentalists had succeeded in electing a 
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Falwell-supported candidate as president of the SBC (see chapter 3). For the first 
time, Texas Baptists found themselves at odds with the national convention, and 
school prayer was one of the most compelling issues on which the two camps 
disagreed. In an editorial outlining their position, Texas Baptist leaders criticized 
SBC president Adrien Rogers for supporting Helms's amendment and argued 
that such a position was inconsistent with traditional Baptist principles. Noting 
that from the earliest moments of American government, Baptists had been 
staunch supporters of church-state separation, the article warned that Southern 
Baptists were losing their position as "a strong voice for religious freedom." 
Significantly, Texas Baptists countered the argument by religious conservatives 
that children were not allowed to pray in schools: "No student or teacher has ever 
been forbidden to pray privately in the public schools." The editorial quoted E. S. 
James, who argued that "No Baptists anywhere" should "give support to any 
movement designed to weaken the guarantee of religious liberty for everyone ... 
we have no right to insist that our views be forced upon those who don't want 
them."48 The issue of school prayer provided a powerful demonstration that by 
the early 1980s, Texas Baptists and the Christian Right held vastly different 
views about the proper relationship between religion and government. While the 
47"Editorial: Public School Prayer and Religious Liberty," The Baptist Standard, 20 February 1980, 
6. 
48Editorial: Guard Against Christian-Political Organizations," The Baptist Standard, 4 August 
1976, 6. 
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Christian Right moved further away from the principle of church-state separation, 
Texas Baptists defended it tenaciously. 
Foy Valentine was one of the fiercest Baptists advocates for the 
separation of church and state, a position that increasingly put him at odds with 
the national convention. Valentine served as director of the TCLC from 1953-
1960, and he directed the national Christian Life Commission (CLC) during the 
1960s and early 1970s. He had been involved in opposing government aid to 
parochial schools in the 1950s and 1960s, and the movement against such 
funding had a profound effect on his thinking. He became increasingly vocal 
about the need for Baptists to embrace their history of strong support for 
church/state separation.49 He recalls the move towards de-emphasizing that 
tradition with sadness: "Our Baptist leadership began to sound like Roman 
Catholic leaders had been sounding for decades: Look, we've gotta have 
government money--tax money-- in order to do our great work for God."50 But 
under the leadership and advice of Valentine, James Dunn, and others, Texas 
Baptists preserved the emphasis on church/state separation that had been 
distinctive of American Baptists from their earliest days. The TCLC distributed 
literature on the topic and openly identified Americans United for Separation of 
Church and State as an ally on the issue. Later, Valentine went so far as to serve 
on the board of directors for that organization. 51 Valentine mostly lost his battles 
with fundamentalists in the national convention, but his ideals continued to guide 
49Storey, 209-210. Storey's book provides a fuller treatment of Valentine's work on the CLC and 
his influence on Baptist politics during the 1960s and 1970s. 
50Valentine, Foy Dan. Oral Memoirs of Foy Dan Valentine. Interview by Daniel B. McGee. (Texas 
Baptist Oral History Consortium, 18 November 1976), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 
128. 
51 1bid., 129. 
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the Baptist General Convention of Texas, where church/state separation 
remained a central emphasis. His leadership on those issues ensured that Texas 
Baptists would hold to their commitment to church/state separation and avoid 
entanglement with the Christian Right. 
After 1980, the conservative faction gained increasing institutional control 
over the SBC, mainly due to the president's ability to appoint members of various 
committees.52 During the early years of the 1980s, Texas Baptists remained 
committed to opposing the fundamentalist cause, particularly on national political 
issues. In a stinging 1982 editorial, a leading Texas Baptist pastor offered a 
robust critique of the SBC alliance with religious conservative leaders and 
defended the separation of church and state. He warned that Baptists were in 
danger of abandoning their religious heritage: "Until now, Southern Baptists have 
been leaders as advocates of religious liberty and separation of church and 
state." He admonished Texas Baptists to "ensure that religious liberty is neither 
restricted nor denied to any. It is the Baptist way."53 The article was yet another 
demonstration that the issue of church/state separation was the ultimate dividing 
line between Texas Baptists and the Christian Right. 
The first presidential term of Ronald Reagan, 1981 to 1985, was a time of 
increasing cooperation between religious conservatives and the Republican 
Party.54 While the national SBC and other evangelicals moved closer to the 
Reagan administration, Texas Baptists continued their stance of strong support 
52Nancy Ammerman, Baptist Battles: Social Change and Religious Conflict in the Southern 
Baptist Convention (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 4-6. 
53"Editorial: Southern Baptists Need History Lesson," The Baptist Standard, 30 June 1982, 6. 
54For a more detailed analysis of the Christian Right during the Reagan years, see William Martin, 
With God On Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America (New York: Broadway Books, 
1996). 
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for the separation of church and state. The reaction to Reagan's proposal for a 
constitutional amendment allowing organized prayer in public schools highlighted 
the stark differences between the ideology of Texas Baptists and that of the 
denomination's leadership. While addressing a group of prominent ministers at 
the White House, Reagan revealed his intention to push for the amendment, 
calling for an awakening "of America's religious and moral heart." His comments 
were cause for celebration among members of the Christian Right. Jerry Falwell 
pledged to dedicate "every resource" of the Moral Majority to the bill's passage 
and stated, "I think it's a bright day in America ... After twenty years of expulsion 
of Almighty God from the public schools, I think this is the light at the end of the 
tunnel."55 
The reaction of Texas Baptists was not nearly as joyful. On the heels of 
Reagan's declaration, Southern Baptists held their annual convention in New 
Orleans. A report by Baptist Press, the national newsmagazine for Southern 
Baptists, reported that an unnamed official in the Reagan administration 
encouraged a prominent fundamentalist leader to press for an SBC resolution 
supporting the amendment. The story cited Edward E. McAteer's statements that 
he was in contact with the administration as he worked to pass an SBC 
resolution on the issue. McAteer was a leading SBC fundamentalist and a 
member of Bellevue Baptist Church in Memphis, one of the largest churches 
aligned with the fundamentalist faction in SBC politics. He was also head of the 
Religious Roundtable, one of the leading organizations of the Christian Right, 
55Herbert H. Denton and Marjorie Hyer, "President to Ask Hill for Prayer Amendment," The 
Washington Post, Final Edition, 7 May 1982, Section A, 1. 
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consisting mostly of conservative clergy from various denominations. SBC 
president Bailey Smith helped McAteer's efforts when he appointed Norris W. 
Sydor, director of the Maryland chapter of Religious Roundtable and a longtime 
McAteer associate, chair of the convention's Committee on Resolutions. It was 
the first annual convention Sydor had attended. Following the story, the Standard 
ran a furious editorial condemning the activities of Sydor and McAteer at the 
convention. The article reminded Baptists that such involvement between the 
White House and a religious organization would have been roundly condemned if 
the president were "John Kennedy and the organization the Catholic Church." In 
a statement that revealed the growing chasm between Texas Baptists and the 
national convention, the editorial asked, "Are there any Baptists left who doubt 
the crumbling of the wall of separation between church and state?"56 The reaction 
of Texas Baptists to the controversy was another indication that the state 
convention would not follow the national leadership in aligning the SBC with the 
Christian Right and the Republican Party. 
As they had done with Nixon, Texas Baptists strenuously opposed 
Reagan in his quest to grant federal aid to private schools. At the prompting of 
evangelicals and conservative Catholics, Reagan announced in 1982 his support 
for a bill that would have provided tuition tax credits to families with children 
enrolled in private schools. Lauding the program as "an alternative to public 
education," Reagan promised to press for its passage even in the face of 
overwhelming resistance in Congress. He announced his support for the program 
to the National Catholic Educational Conference, prompting critics to note that it 
56"Editorial: The White House and SBC Resolutions," The Baptist Standard, 21 July 1982, 6. 
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would primarily benefit parents with children enrolled in parochial schools. At the 
time, over 70 percent of students enrolled in nonpublic schools attended Catholic 
schools. 57 The bill was the earliest version of a national school voucher program 
and the forerunner to contemporary proposals to provide public funding for 
private education. The response of Texas Baptist leaders was resoundingly 
negative. A Standard editorial condemned public funding for private education as 
a violation of the separation of church and state. The editorial revealed an 
interesting divergence from the actions of Christian Right leaders. While Jerry 
Falwell put aside his theological misgivings to work with charismatic evangelist 
Pat Robertson and Catholic Richard Viguerie, Texas Baptists were unwilling to 
forsake their theological concerns about Catholicism. The editorial blasted 
Baptist supporters of the bill for forming an alliance with Catholics that would 
ultimately result in "the government ... subsidizing parochial schools." The 
editorial made clear its opposition to government funding of any private schools, 
but it was especially harsh in its comments regarding parochial schools. Worrying 
that "the parochial school lobby could continue to seek to increase government 
funding of its schools," the article admonished leaders of the national SBC to 
avoid alliances that mainly benefit Catholics. 58 
On the issue of vouchers, James Dunn led the Texas Baptist resistance to 
the national leadership. He routinely criticized attempts by Baptist leaders to 
support public funding for private schools. He was a frequent thorn in the side of 
57Rich Jaroslovsky, "Reagan Proposes Tuition Tax Credit Plan and Reaffirms Opposition to Rise 
in Taxes," The Wall Street Journal, Final Edition, 16 April19 1982, Section A, 4. 
58
"Editorial: Tuition Tax Credits Should Be Opposed," The Baptist Standard, 1 September 1982, 
6. 
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fundamentalist leaders, who heartily embraced Reagan's plans for school 
vouchers. In his opposition to the plan, Dunn cited "the basic principles ... of 
church-state separation and the violation that is incurred when tax dollars go into 
private channels; concern for the good of public education" and "anxiety about 
anything that would siphon off support for public education; and concern for 
education of minorities and the poor."59 He also believed that public funding of 
private schools could create a system of competition that would ultimately 
undermine the public school system. To Dunn, the voucher system would create 
"divisiveness in our social fabric of a competing school system" and the 
"development of two separate school systems" that would merge the interests of 
government and private religious groups in troubling ways. 60 By virtue of his post 
with the BJCPA, he offered Texas Baptists a voice in the national convention. He 
repeatedly used that voice to articulate the opposition of Texas Baptists to the 
fundamentalist alliance with the Christian Right and the Republican Party. 
By the 1984 presidential election, conservative Christians had established 
themselves as a powerful voting bloc within the Republican Party, with white 
evangelicals having abandoned Jimmy Carter for Reagan in the 1980 election. 
Reagan had assiduously courted the group throughout his first term. But even as 
the political winds were changing, Texas Baptists continued to offer a very 
different response to Reagan's alliance with the Christian Right than many of 
their evangelical counterparts. Preceding the Republican Convention, the 
Standard ran an editorial reminding Baptists that the vote was "not a contest as 
59Dunn, James Milton. Oral Memoirs of James Milton Dunn. Interview by Daniel B. McGee (Texas 
Baptist Oral History Project, 18 November 1986), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 162. 
601bid. 
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to who will be pastor of the United States, but who will be president" and that "the 
vote primarily is to determine the political rather than the spiritual leader of the 
nation."61 Although the editorial did not specifically attack Reagan or his Christian 
Right allies, it offered a starkly different view of church/state issues than was 
becoming the norm for conservative southern Protestants. "The state is not the 
church and does not need an elected or appointed pastor, evangelist, bishop or 
pope to run the affairs of state," the article noted, adding that "the church is not 
the state and does not need an elected or appointed president, senator, 
congressman or governor to run the affairs of the church."62 The editorial was yet 
another reminder that Texas Baptists were not supportive of the politicization of 
southern religion that paved the way for Reagan's alliance with the Christian 
Right. 
The years between 1970 and 1984 were ones of great political, social, and 
religious change in the United States. In general, white southerners shifted to the 
Republican Party, the Christian Right established itself as a political force, and its 
leaders made attacking church/state separation one of the movement's central 
political aims. But it is important to note that, for all these changes, Texas 
Baptists ended the period mostly on the same ideological terrain as when it 
commenced. On issues of politics, no impulse was more overriding than the 
historic Baptist fidelity to the principle of church/state separation. The difference 
is that by 1984, that position placed them mostly at odds with the national 
denomination and with the political winds that were changing the American South 
61"Editorial: Implications of Religion in Presidential Race," Baptist Standard, August 22, 1984, 6. 
621bid. 
100 
into a bastion of Republican politics and a haven for Christian Right causes. The 
story of Texas Baptists during the 1970s and early 1980s is one that should give 
pause to historians who have assumed a natural cohesion between devout 
Southern Baptists and the new movement of social conservatives that came to 
dominate the Republican Party in the 1980s. Texas Baptists never abandoned 
their core emphases of missions, evangelism, and personal redemption. They 
simply rejected the shift away from church/state separation and argued that a 
pro-separation position was more in keeping with historic Baptist principles than 
the pet causes of the Christian Right. Their experience in the 1970s and 1980s 
belies the popular narrative that southern evangelicals made easy alliance with 
the Christian Right and the Republican Party. In fact, not all southern 
evangelicals found the alliance appealing, and Texas Baptists continued to 
oppose it long after the Christian Right had established itself as a powerful force 
in national politics. 
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Chapter 3 
Fundamentalist Fighters: 
The Conservative Insurgency and Texas Baptists, 1960-1985 
As the 1960s came to a close, Paul Pressler penned an article in the 
Baptist Standard that generated a good deal of controversy in Texas and national 
Baptist circles. Pressler, a Houston judge who was a leading critic of the 
Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) in the 1960s and 1970s, claimed that "belief 
in the authority of the Scripture has been undermined by some who would call 
themselves Christian scholars .... Individuals are urged to go in cafeteria style 
and use their own tastes in selecting those passages which they consider worthy 
of being God's revelation, leaving behind those passages and doctrines which 
they do not like."1 Pressler's complaints were common to Southern Baptist 
conservatives in the 1960s and 1970s, and he was a central figure in the 
movement to gain control of the convention for those who believed it had become 
too tolerant of theological diversity and too slow in combating new 
understandings of science, biblical truth, and history. The battle between Pressler 
and his allies and those Baptists who opposed their takeover of the SBC is a 
complicated subject and one that still provokes raw emotions from participants. 
But the struggle for control of the nation's largest Protestant denomination 
provided a forum for debating larger issues, and understanding the conflict is 
essential to explaining the changing religious and political landscape of the post-
1950 South. 
1Paul Pressler, "Respect and Authority," Baptist Standard, July 9, 1969, 13. 
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The question of why Texas Baptists formulated such an ardent response 
to the rise of the Christian Right is a difficult question and one with numerous 
answers. But their experience with fundamentalists in the national SBC and in 
their own state pushed them away from an alliance with religious conservatives 
and towards a more moderate politics in the 1960s and 1970s. 2 One of the most 
fascinating aspects of Baptist politics during this time is that two of the main 
proponents of fundamentalism in the national convention were Texas Baptists, 
despite the fact that most Texas Baptists were more moderate. Pressler was an 
important figure in the fundamentalist movement, but it was his ally Paige 
Patterson who had the greatest influence on the convention's conservative drift. 
President of the Criswell Center for Biblical Studies in Dallas, Patterson was 
relentless in his attacks on faculty members at Baptist seminaries, colleges, and 
universities and unambiguous in his position that the denomination should be 
purged of anyone refusing to adhere to strict conservative theology and politics. 
These two leaders were renegade Texas Baptists who consistently opposed the 
leadership of the state convention and pushed for an alliance between the 
Christian Right and Southern Baptists. They ultimately won control of the SBC 
but never managed to do so in their own state, where they eventually broke away 
2The term "fundamentalist" can be contentious and many Southern Baptist conservatives deplore 
use of the term to describe themselves. In my work, I have followed Nancy Ammerman's lead in 
using the term in "its historic sense, not with any pejorative intent. During the earlier part of the 
twentieth century, the term was coined by groups that chose to fight to defend their traditional 
understanding of the Bible against the onslaughts of liberalism and the social gospel ... They 
intentionally organized against a real threat to what they believed. The threat and the organization 
are what distinguish fundamentalists from ordinary believers or traditionalists." Ammerman also 
pointed out that using the term "fundamentalists" helps distinguish between various types of 
conservatives. Even the "moderates" were conservative in their theology. Rather than call those 
to the right of moderates "ultra-conservatives," Ammerman chose to use the term 
"fundamentalists." For a complete description of her statements on terms, see Baptist Battles, 16-
17. 
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and formed a rival group to the Baptist General Convention of Texas.3 As 
Pressler and Patterson joined with fundamentalists to purge the denomination of 
theological dissenters or those perceived to be sympathetic to their cause, they 
alienated many Texas Baptist leaders. Without question, the intensity of the 
struggle for denominational control played an important role in shaping Texas 
Baptists' response to the Christian Right. That struggle forced Baptists to take 
sides against one another long before the Christian Right formally organized as 
an ally of the Republican Party. 
From an outside perspective, the intra-denominational battle between 
fundamentalist Baptists and their opponents can be difficult to understand. After 
all, each side can be fairly described as theologically conservative, and the 
differences between the groups are negligible when placed on the broader 
national religious spectrum. But for both sides, the struggle was a defining event 
and one that forever changed how Southern Baptists viewed the world and 
themselves. The conflict was between fundamentalists, who wanted to purge the 
denomination of theological liberals, and moderates, who argued that the 
traditional Baptist doctrine of soul liberty required toleration of theological 
diversity in the denomination. These moderates were supporters of "the Grand 
Compromise" about which historian Barry Hankins has written extensively. While 
fundamentalists argued that denominational unity should be based on a shared 
confession of faith, moderates believed it should be "organizational and 
3For a detailed description of these two Texas Baptists, see Barry Hankins, Uneasy in Babylon: 
Southern Baptist Conservatives and American Culture (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama 
Press, 2002), especially pages 6-7, 51, and 237. 
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institutional instead of confessional."4 For most of the twentieth century, the SBC 
was led by moderates who accepted theological diversity as one of their guiding 
principles. In fact, a left wing did exist, consisting of Southern Baptists who 
pushed the denominational leadership to be more liberal on issues of race, 
gender, and poverty. Historian David Strickin has called the heritage of these 
liberal Baptists "a genealogy of dissent."5 A right wing also existed, composed of 
fundamentalists like Patterson and Pressler. The conservative and liberal wings 
of the denomination remained on the fringe of denominational politics throughout 
most of the twentieth century, with moderates holding the most power. These 
moderates tended to be conservative on issues of theology but were mostly 
unwilling to oust liberals or require the stringent confessional statements that 
fundamentalists advocated. 6 
Texas Baptists held a firm commitment to the moderate cause, which had 
a profound impact on their relationship with the Christian Right. It helps explain 
why Texas Baptists bucked the national trend in avoiding alliances with leaders 
like Jerry Falwell. Hankins has argued that during the 1970s the SBC was "held 
together by centrists ... who tolerated ideological diversity for the sake of 
missions and evangelism." That truce ended in 1979 when the convention 
elected as its president Adrien Rogers, a candidate backed by conservatives 
determined to rid the denomination of theological liberals and enforce ideological 
litmus tests for positions in the convention. Rogers was a staunch ally of Pressler 
4Hankins, 34. 
5David Stricklin, A Genealogy of Dissent: Southern Baptist Protest in the Twentieth Century 
~Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1999). 
Hankins, 1-3. 
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and Patterson, who strongly supported his election.7 The national convention's 
willingness to embrace Pressler and Patterson's agenda would ultimately leave a 
bad taste in the mouths of Texas Baptist leaders for the agenda of the Christian 
Right, which was becoming synonymous with the political agenda of the SBC. 
To understand Texas Baptists' reaction to the fundamentalist takeover of 
their denomination, historians must contend with a singular truth: the politicization 
of Baptist religion did not come easy to most of the denomination's members. 
One of the most careful scholars to study the conflict for control of the SBC is 
Nancy Ammerman, and she puts it this way: "Thinking in political terms did not 
come naturally for most Baptists. They have thought of their denomination in 
many other terms ... but the language of politics was not their native tongue."8 
But fundamentalist leaders concluded that the only way to ensure doctrinal purity 
and to force the convention in a conservative direction was to elect presidents of 
the convention who agreed with them and would appoint only like-minded people 
to serve on various boards and committees. This push was surprising and 
difficult to understand for many Baptists who "had no experience in being asked 
to support candidates for any reason other than their reputation as preachers or 
denominational statesmen. "9 
From the earliest moments of the controversy, Texas Baptists resented 
and resisted the fundamentalist push to oust fellow members, enforce doctrinal 
purity, and lead the convention in a different direction than it had followed for at 
7Hankins, 4. 
8Nancy Ammerman, Baptist Battles: Social Change and Religious Conflict in the Southern Baptist 
Convention (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 168. 
91bid. 
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least the previous fifty years. But it is important to note that they were not aligned 
with the denomination's left wing, which constantly prodded the leadership to be 
more vocal in pressing for broad changes in women's rights, race relations, and 
economic equality. Ammerman has pointed out the difference between these 
progressives who "were adopting new social and political views and giving their 
theology an intellectual foundation" and the moderates who were guided first and 
foremost by "loyalty to programs and institutions." Moderates were "traditional 
Southern Baptists who were proud of what they had accomplished," particularly 
their educational institutions, influence in southern culture, and missions 
program. 10 According to Ammerman's statistics, based on an intricate series of 
theological and social questions, these moderates made up about 45 percent of 
the denomination by the early 1980s. Progressives made up about 15 percent, 
and fundamentalists represented 40 percent. For readers unfamiliar with the 
Baptist struggle, it is essential to recognize that Texas Baptists identified with the 
larger group of moderates who sought to maintain harmony, not the progressives 
or fundamentalists who wanted to pull the denomination in a sharp direction 
away from where it had traditionally been. As Ammerman puts it, these 
moderates "were confident that the vast majority of their fellow church members 
were conservative enough to please everyone. Fundamentalist cries of alarm 
were as foreign to them as was the progressives' agitation for change."11 
As early as 1976, well before fundamentalists formally elected the first 
president from their faction, Texas Baptists were warning about the dangers of a 
10Ammerman, 73. 
11 1bid. 
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convention takeover. A stinging editorial labeled the conservative faction "20th 
century Sadducees and Pharisees" and "disciples of discord" who "launch their 
crusade on myths and assure peaks of perfection for all who follow."12 The 
editorial condemned the fundamentalist movement to gain control of the 
convention in the most unequivocal of terms: "A friend of ours once wrote a book 
entitled Fleas Come with the Dog. It had nothing to do with the Southern Baptist 
Convention but his title would be appropriate." Lest any readers be confused 
about who the "fleas" were, the editors continued: "There may be a bit of value in 
the fleas. They keep us alert despite the distraction from more important things. 
But, dog-like, we wish these fleas would go elsewhere if they don't like us. Or, at 
least quit arguing that fleas own the dog."13 As with other moderate Baptists, the 
Standard editors did not quarrel with the fundamentalists' conservative theology. 
On the contrary, a cursory reading of Texas Baptist thought reveals a theology 
that was equally committed to traditional Christian understandings of biblical 
issues. Rather, the disagreement was in the nature of the threat. While 
fundamentalists were convinced the denomination was becoming a bastion of 
liberalism, Texas Baptists saw these "trumpets of alarm" as distractions from the 
true mission of the convention. They noted that "the Southern Baptist Convention 
was organized 'for the promotion of Christian missions at home and abroad and 
any other objects such as Christian education, benevolent enterprises, and social 
services."' Those deviating from these goals were "organized to divide and 
12"Disciples of Discord," Baptist Standard, April28, 1976, 6. 
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distract" and "should go their own way."14 Of course, those fundamentalist "fleas" 
did just the opposite, and their crusade to wrest control of the SBC from 
moderates would continue on for years, placing them in direct conflict with the 
moderate leadership and their Texas Baptist supporters. 
By the late 1970s mainstream Texas Baptists were convinced that their 
denomination was under siege from fundamentalists, and they were keenly 
aware that two of the movement's leaders were from their own state: Paige 
Patterson and Paul Pressler. The same men who battled Texas Baptists over 
church/state separation and involvement with the Republican Party also pushed 
for conservative control of SBC institutions. Like other moderate Baptists, the 
Texas leadership was not especially concerned with divisive theological disputes, 
but they were very interested in defending Baptist institutions from conservative 
attacks. A 1980 Standard editorial identified Patterson and Pressler as the 
leaders of "a well-organized group of Southern Baptists" whose intention was "to 
lead the convention to secure elected leadership from among those committed to 
biblical inerrancy and the leadership of the denomination be committed to the 
reliability of the scriptures."15 Noting that the group had alleged that "liberal" 
teachings were prevalent on Baptist college campuses, the editorial was careful 
not to denounce the goal of conservative theology, even while maintaining that 
these charges were overblown. Patterson's charge that "a very large 
constituency in significant denominational posts" rejected the authority of the 
14lbid. 
15"Editorial: Concerns about 'Concerned' Organization," Baptist Standard, April 23, 1980, 6. 
Bible drew particular ire from the Standard. 16 
Challenging Patterson and Pressler to produce specific names, the 
editorial expressed "concern with the implication that all of the past and current 
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boards and commissions, elected by the Southern Baptist Convention, have not 
been vigilant in keeping the institutions under their charge committed to historic 
Baptist beliefs. If so, who and where?"17 Once again, it is important to understand 
that, unlike the progressive wing of the convention, which was composed mostly 
of college and seminary professors and their allies, Texas Baptists were not 
prodding for new understandings on issues of race, gender, or theology. They 
were chiefly committed to defending the integrity of Baptist institutions, some of 
which were located in Texas and served as a great source of pride for the state 
convention. They were also worried that rampant charges of doctrinal heresy 
could "drive a wedge between pastors and laymen by suggesting that since 
many pastors lack the courage to deal with denominational problems, the task 
must go to the laymen."18 Texas Baptists were quite conservative in their 
theology, and it would be wrong to place them in the relatively small camp of 
progressive Baptists who pushed theological boundaries and prodded the 
denomination on social justice issues. But they viewed the fundamentalist 
crusade as an unnecessary distraction from denominational work and a 
dishonest threat to Baptist unity. Their stance against the fundamentalist 
takeover of the SBC would lead them to part company with other members of the 
Christian Right and to be suspicious of attempts to use Christianity in service of a 
16lbid. 
171bid. 
18lbid. 
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conservative political agenda. 
Texas Baptists also opposed fundamentalists because they believed their 
singular focus on establishing a doctrinal creed was in contradiction to Baptist 
principles. The whole debate over creeds, or statements of belief, in the Southern 
Baptist Convention can be difficult for outsiders to understand. After all, in a 
denomination dominated by theological conservatives and with a reputation for 
being extremely orthodox, did fundamentalists really have much to worry about? 
Barry Hankins' work on this controversy is illuminating and helps explain why it 
generated such animosity among Baptists who seemed to share almost all of the 
same beliefs. "In many cases, very conservative and orthodox Southern Baptist 
moderates were tarred with accusations that would have made Joseph McCarthy 
blush," he writes. It is almost impossible to overstate the impact these charges of 
theological liberalism had on Southern Baptists who were anything but liberal. 
Moderates "charged repeatedly that conservative theology was being used as a 
cover for the rawest and crudest grab for power." Besides that, they believed that 
"conservative insistence on inerrancy amounted to an un-Baptist form of 
creedalism."19 Texas Baptists fell squarely into this camp, and they resented 
insinuations that their denomination or its institutions were anything less than 
faithful to traditional Christian teachings. 
Foy Valentine was one of the more influential Texas Baptists during the 
1970s and 1980s, and he spent much of his time fighting back fundamentalist 
influence in his denomination. He served as director of the Christian Life 
Commission at the national level for much of the time period, and he used his 
19Hankins, 7. 
Ill 
platform to oppose conservative Baptists like Pressler and Patterson. By the mid-
1970s, they had antagonized him to the point that he considered them political 
enemies. He was especially frustrated by their alliance with Jerry Falwell, who 
had been criticizing the SBC for years for not pursuing a right-wing political 
agenda. He articulated his exasperation by saying, "Jerry Falwell really acts as if 
he thinks God were a Republican. And I just--- as I have told Jerry, 'God is not a 
Republican or a Democrat, and we don't need to try to get him in one pocket or 
the other."'20 He also disagreed with fundamentalist attempts to affiliate the 
Baptist faith with one particular political movement. "The fundamentalist 
movement," he argued, "led by Paul Pressler and Paige Patterson have identified 
so closely with the right wing in the political and social and economic arena in 
America today that they are, for all practical purposes, a kept people, a kind of 
chaplain to power."21 Particularly on the issue of church/state separation, 
Valentine quarreled with Christian Right leaders, believing their agenda too 
exclusive. He worried about Baptist involvement with that agenda, noting the 
implications for traditional Baptist teachings on the separation of church and 
state. "With regard to morality in general," he said, "they have represented a 
commitment to a narrow agenda ... In which focus is made on abortion and 
separation of church and state, which they consider a 'shibboleth of doctrinaire 
secularism,' words incidentally of Roman Catholic prelates."22 Valentine lost most 
of his battles with Pressler at the national level, but he helped ensure that Texas 
20Valentine, Foy Dan. Oral Memoirs of Foy Dan Valentine. Interview by Thomas L. Charlton. 
Fexas Baptist Project, 1989), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 3. 
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In 1981, Texas Baptists were busy sounding the alarm about the dangers 
of adopting a new convention-wide creed. A scathing editorial by E. S. James, 
editor of the Standard, left little doubt where the state's leadership stood on the 
subject of doctrinal statements. He favorably quoted a prominent moderate 
Baptist who insisted that "a narrow creedal statement will cause irreversible 
rupture of fellowship in the convention." But James did not stop there; he moved 
on to list the end results of forcing a conservative doctrinal creed on Southern 
Baptists. He argued that it could "drive thousands of pastors and churches out of 
the convention; require an inquisition in every school, state convention, 
association, and denominational institution; cause many to designate funds only 
to causes controlled by 'true Southern Baptists'; and lead others to withdraw in 
disgust."23 As Baptist moderates were prone to do, James invoked the 
denomination's history to support his view that creeds were unnecessary 
distractions from denominational unity. He quoted W. G. Johnson, the SBC's first 
president who stated, "We have constructed for our basis no new creed; acting in 
this matter upon a Baptist aversion for all creeds but the Bible." In his stance, 
James was a classical Baptist moderate, chiefly concerned with denominational 
unity for the purpose of missions and evangelism. James insisted that, "The tie 
that has bound Southern Baptists together has been a common faith and a 
commitment to promotion of Christian missions, education and evangelism." He 
conceded that prior statements of faith (passed in 1925 and 1963) were 
23"Southern Baptist Convention Going Creedal?" Baptist Standard, May 27, 1981, 6. 
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important documents, but he was sure they were "not to be tests of orthodoxy but 
as expressed in the preface, 'guidelines in interpretations, having no authority 
over conscience."'24 That the official news organ of Texas Baptists was ardent in 
its opposition to any new Baptist creeds was a strong indication of where the 
leadership stood in the ongoing struggle for control of the convention. 
While the usual suspects of E. S. James and Foy Valentine were strident 
in opposing creeds, another important Texas Baptist tried to find middle ground 
between fundamentalists and moderates. Jimmy Draper, a West Texan who 
served as president of the Southern Baptist Convention from 1982-1984, 
proposed in 1983 that Southern Baptists adopt four points of belief that could 
unite Baptists, without forcing a denominational schism over minor points of 
theology. These beliefs included, "the full humanity and deity of Christ, 
substitutionary atonement by Christ for the sins of mankind, justification by God's 
grace through faith and the bodily resurrection of Christ."25 He argued that these 
beliefs constituted a core area of agreement that could satisfy fundamentalists, 
moderates, and those not affiliated with either camp. Texas Baptists leaders 
responded without the typical outrage at creedalism, perhaps in deference to 
Draper, who was one of their own. James penned an editorial lauding Draper for 
"continuing to sound the note of unity" and agreeing that the four suggested 
points "should be believed by any Christian."26 But even as he refrained from 
attacking Draper, he also pointed out that, "Creeds have a tendency to divide, 
rather than unify" and insisted that "Bible-believing Baptists are preferable to 
241bid. 
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creed-carrying Baptists." He predicted that "Drawing up a creed, if it ever could 
be done, would please neither fundamentalists, moderates or that large number 
of Southern Baptists in between which wear neither of these labels."27 His 
statements on the subject of creeds was certainly in line with the mainstream of 
Baptist thought; Baptist churches at the time (as now) made no use whatsoever 
of creeds in their services. James' prediction was ultimately correct; the ensuing 
years would witness a final split between moderate and fundamentalist Baptists. 
The ramifications of that controversy shaped the Texas Baptist response to the 
organization of the Christian Right and pushed the state convention away from 
an alliance with religious conservatives and the Republican Party. 
When Southern Baptists met for their annual meeting in 1979, few in the 
crowd had any idea that the year would mark a turning point for the national 
convention, away from moderation and towards fundamentalism. Smartly, Paige 
Patterson and Paul Pressler kept their strategy to gain control of the convention a 
secret from most delegates. But they did have a clear plan: "The conservative 
strategy, unknown to most at the time and denied by conservatives until years 
later, was to use the appointive powers of the SBC presidency to remake the 
boards of the denominational agencies and seminaries."28 While a majority of 
Southern Baptists voted for presidents not on the basis of which faction they 
belonged to, but on credentials, experience, and likeability, fundamentalist 
leaders recognized the importance of strict control over the president's office. 
Patterson and Pressler calculated "that if conservatives could hold the 
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presidency for ten years, they could achieve a majority on all the boards ... The 
president appoints members of a body that then appoints the trustees for the 
denominational agencies and seminaries. If he makes his appointments carefully 
... over time the agencies would reflect the tenor of the conservative 
movement."29 In 1979 fundamentalists worked diligently to elect Adrien Rogers, a 
conservative pastor from Memphis, as president of the convention. He received 
51 percent of the vote out of a field of six candidates, becoming the first Southern 
Baptist president committed to Patterson and Pressler's project of remaking the 
convention. The strategy ultimately worked to perfection. Many Baptists at the 
time thought little of Rogers' election. But scholars of Baptist politics ultimately 
came to view the 1979 convention not as a "temporary interruption of the Grand 
Compromise that had kept moderates in control," but as "the beginning of the 
conservative takeover of the denomination. "30 
By 1980, the fundamentalist plan was becoming clearer, and Texas 
Baptists were increasingly alarmed at the prospect that it would succeed. In April 
of that year, the Standard ran an investigative piece that identified major players 
in the fundamentalist movement and acknowledged that their goal was complete 
control of the convention. In retrospect, the piece does not seem surprising, but 
for a state Baptist newspaper to make such charges against fellow Texas 
Baptists was a bold move. The article began by noting that Patterson and 
Pressler were the forces behind Adrien Rogers' election as SBC president. It also 
claimed that their work was specifically aimed to determine "who is elected SBC 
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president for at least four consecutive years and maybe as many as 10, and 
through presidential appointments try to control nomination of trustees of SBC 
agencies."31 By that time, Pressler and Patterson had begun to move from 
clandestine operations to a public campaign to win over Southern Baptists to 
their side. On April 3, Patterson made his first public statements about what he 
believed was "the problem" of liberalism in the SBC. He and Pressler announced 
that they had contacted Baptists in every state organization who were willing to 
work with them to elect conservative presidents and to ensure that any 
denominational leaders who did not subscribe to their fundamentalist beliefs 
would be removed from leadership.32 
Patterson was the main speaker at the meeting, and he made clear that 
his goal was to organize in advance of the annual SBC meeting in St. Louis later 
that year. To motivate activists, he returned to the question of "inerrancy," which 
fundamentalists had pushed at the 1979 convention. He made clear how he 
defined the issue and the stakes for the future of Baptist life: "The issue still is 
truth--- is the Bible in fact totally and completely true?"33 His definition of 
inerrancy "would be that there was no mistake in the original autographs of the 
scriptures." He acknowledged that "transcribal inadvertencies" existed but 
insisted that the only issues with the Bible were "scribal problems that can be 
worked out gradually."34 Significantly, he refused to acknowledge any historical, 
geographical, or scientific errors in the text of the Bible. 
31Toby Druin, "At Least Four Years, Maybe 10: Seek Long Range Control of SBC Boards," 
Baptist Standard, April 23, 1980, 4. 
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The issue of inerrancy was brought up quite deliberately by the 
fundamentalist camp, and it worked not only as a religious issue but as a political 
one. Patterson knew full well that many moderates in denominational leadership, 
for all their theological conservatism, would not refer to the Bible as "inerrant," 
due to historic or scientific quibbles. In setting up the issue as the main focus of 
his movement, he seemed to drive a stake through the heart of the consensus 
that had held together liberals, moderates, conservatives, and fundamentalists 
for many years. Like fundamentalists in the early part of the twentieth century, he 
focused his attacks not on laypeople but on the denomination's leadership. "I am 
of the opinion that most Baptists hold such (conservative) beliefs," he said. "But I 
am also of the persuasion that a very large contingency in significant 
denominational posts do not in fact believe that any longer."35 When pressed 
about the wisdom of such a naked political strategy in a denomination that had 
generally eschewed political infighting, he responded with an attack on fellow 
Texas Baptist Jimmy Allen, a leader in the Texas Christian Life Commission. He 
insisted that it was Allen who started the political games by organizing to run for 
president several years earlier, a claim Allen vehemently denied.36 
At the 1980 convention, Patterson and his allies managed to elect one of 
their supporters, Bailey Smith, president on the first ballot. The Standard 
responded with an editorial lamenting the open political posturing by the 
fundamentalist side and the loss of their favored candidate, moderate stalwart 
Richard Jackson of Phoenix. The editorial placed Texas Baptists firmly on the 
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opposite side of Patterson and Pressler: "Southern Baptists grabbing for power in 
denominational political parties will spoil Southern Baptists ... Why do Baptist 
people have to borrow the ways of big-time secular politics to do their work? The 
world expects better, and surely God expects better."37 While editors of the 
Standard stopped short of endorsing political organizing by opponents of 
fundamentalism, they hinted strongly that it might eventually be necessary. "The 
success of one political party which is well-organized and goal-oriented inevitably 
leads to another of the same kind by the opposition," they wrote. "A one-party 
system leads to a two-party system. And talk of such an organization to counter 
the Paige Patterson-Paul Pressler party was heard often in St. Louis."38 Despite 
their frustrations, Texas Baptist leaders were still reluctant to offer a blanket 
condemnation of the fundamentalists and remained probably more hopeful about 
the convention's direction than events warranted. They took heart in statements 
by Bailey Smith that he "would not try to run the seminaries" and "would be 
president of all" Southern Baptists. But they warned that the "significance of the 
St. Louis convention is sizable" and anticipated that "valuable energies and 
resources will be expended in an ongoing fight against each other."39 By 1980, 
Texas Baptist leaders may not have realized it, but their break with the direction 
of the national convention had already occurred. 
Besides the election of Smith, Texas Baptists were also concerned over a 
specific resolution on "doctrinal integrity" that the convention added to the Baptist 
Faith and Message, the official doctrinal statement of Southern Baptists. Since 
37"Editorials: Significance of the St. Louis Convention," Baptist Standard, June 18, 1980, 6. 
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1963, the section on the Bible had been a fairly standard conservative recitation 
of belief about the Scriptures. For example, it called the Bible "divinely inspired" 
and "the record of God's revelation of himself to man." It had also stated that the 
Bible was "truth, without any mixture of error" and "the supreme standard by 
which all human conduct, creeds, and religious opinions should be tried."40 But 
the 1980 convention added to that statement a clause that moderate Baptists 
believed was aimed directly at seminary professors, elected denominational 
leaders, and full-time administrators who did not belong to Patterson's faction. It 
required that "seminaries and other institutions receiving our support only 
employ, and continue the employment of faculty members and professional staff 
who believe in the divine inspiration of the whole Bible, the infallibility of the 
original manuscripts and that the Bible is truth without any error."41 Depending on 
how that statement was interpreted, it could result in the firing of Baptists who 
believed in the Bible as spiritual truth, but acknowledged areas where the literal 
text was incongruent with modern scientific or historical knowledge. In other 
words, a person could be a theological conservative, but not take every sentence 
of the Bible to be literally true and find herself at odds with the official doctrinal 
statement of the Southern Baptist Church. From the beginning, moderates 
believed this push for inerrancy was directly tied to Patterson's desire to purge 
the convention of those who opposed his faction. 
As with other controversial issues in the 1970s and 1980s, James Dunn 
was central in shaping the response of Texas Baptists. As head of the Texas 
40A copy of the 1963 Baptist Faith and Message can be found at 
www. baptiststart. com/print/1963 _baptist_faith_message. htm 
41"Editorials: Significance of the St. Louis Convention," Baptist Standard, June 18, 1980, 6. 
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Christian Life Commission (TCLC) from 1968-1980, he was an early opponent of 
Patterson, Pressler, and their fundamentalist allies. Like E. S. James, Jimmy 
Allen, and other Texas Baptist leaders, he believed this resolution and the push 
for inerrancy would divide Baptists and defy the Baptist tradition of "soul liberty," 
the doctrine allowing for each believer to develop her or his own theological 
views. That doctrine had been a hallmark of Baptist faith for years, and it 
assumed that each person was responsible for her or his own religion. For that 
reason, supporters of "soul liberty" had generally opposed creeds.42 Dunn 
insisted that it "was very un-Baptistic ... to make some kind of convention 
statement. It's not even consistent with what we believe about local autonomy or 
the priesthood of the believer."43 He insisted that under normal circumstances, 
Baptists "would have gone against it overwhelmingly as an attempted intrusion 
into the autonomy of the local church." But by using "emotional rhetoric," 
fundamentalists slowly gained support at the nationallevel.44 Dunn was quite 
influential in Texas Baptists circles, and he was one of several important Baptists 
in the state who strongly opposed fundamentalist efforts in the national 
convention. Because fundamentalists were also aligned with the Christian Right, 
this trend ensured that Texas Baptists would not eagerly support leaders like 
Jerry Falwell. 
As the fundamentalists gained control of leadership positions in the 
denomination, they moved away from the traditional Baptist support for strict 
42For more on soul liberty, see Bill Leonard, Baptists in America (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2007). 
43Dunn, James Milton. Oral Memoirs of James Milton Dunn. Interview by Daniel B. McGee (Texas 
Baptist Oral History Project, 13 June 1974}, Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 29. 
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church/state separation. This trend had huge implications for national politics, 
occurring as it did around the same time the Christian Right was formally 
organizing, particularly with the 1979 founding of Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority.45 
It also led the fundamentalist leaders of the SBC into conflict with Texas Baptists, 
who mostly held true to the traditional Baptist resistance to any merging of the 
church with the state. In the early 1980s, the issue that most clearly 
demonstrated this parting of ways was the question of organized prayer in public 
schools. For many years leading up to the fundamentalist push for control of the 
SBC, Southern Baptists had been among the fiercest opponents of organized 
school prayer, on the grounds that any government involvement with such 
prayers represented an establishment of religion that violated church/state 
separation. To be clear, Southern Baptists had never opposed voluntary prayer, 
but had maintained that when it was organized and mandated in public schools, it 
was a violation of the separation of church and state. This belief was reflected in 
all SBC resolutions on the issue before 1982; these resolutions "affirm(ed) 
separation of church and state" and insisted "that the school, as an arm of the 
state, has no business mandating, organizing, promoting or encouraging prayer 
or other devotional exercises." Southern Baptists generally, and moderates in 
particular, viewed such activities as "an establishment of religion that is by its 
very nature coercive for dissenting students and demeaning to prayer."46 It was 
this viewpoint on school prayer that the fundamentalists took issue with, and the 
45For further reading on the Moral Majority and the early history of the Christian Right, please see 
Ruth Murray Brown, For a Christian America: A History of the Religious Right (Amherst, NY: 
Prometheus, 2002); and William Martin, With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in 
America (New York: Broadway Books, 1996). 
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disagreement over it further exacerbated tensions between Texas Baptists and 
the fundamentalist leadership of the national convention. 
The interesting aspect of this controversy is that most Baptists had 
originally supported the Engel vs. Vitale (1962) and Abington vs. Schemp (1963) 
Supreme Court decisions that formally banned organized prayer in public 
schools. A 1964 convention resolution endorsed the Court's rulings on school 
prayer, a position from which Baptists would not deviate for many years. At the 
1969 annual meeting, messengers embraced a resolution insisting that the 
decisions "did not restrain the free exercise of personal religion but restrained 
public officials from using their public office for promotion of religious 
experience."47 Two years later, the convention adopted a resolution on "Voluntary 
Prayer" that depicted organized prayer as a threat to private expressions of 
religion. That resolution also took issue with attempts to pass a constitutional 
amendment allowing organized prayer in public schools, putting the SBC on 
record opposing any such amendment. As late as 1980, a year after 
fundamentalists elected Adrien Rogers president of the SBC, Southern Baptists 
adopted a resolution that criticized attempts "either by law or other means to 
circumvent the Supreme Court's decisions forbidding government authored or 
sponsored religious exercises in public schools."48 It was not until the late 1970s 
and early 1980s that many conservative Baptists began to side with the Christian 
Right on the question of whether government-sponsored school prayer was 
appropriate. 
47Hankins, 145. 
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The question for historians is how so many conservative Baptists, after 
years of support for church/state separation, came to condone organized school 
prayer by the early 1980s. After extensive interviews with Southern Baptist 
conservatives, Hankins attempted an answer to that question: "Quite simply," he 
wrote, "they became convinced that the Court's rulings were being used to 
secularize public schools and to discriminate against religious students."49 The 
claim that religious students were being discriminated against was dubious from 
the start, given that the entire debate revolved not around voluntary prayer, but 
whether or not conservative Christians could use government-funded schools to 
organize evangelical prayers for all students. For all the rhetoric about 
persecution of Christian students, the main point of debate between 
fundamentalist and moderate Baptists was whether public schools were a proper 
vehicle with which to push an evangelical agenda. Regardless of their reasoning 
and despite the protests of moderates, Southern Baptists on a national level 
moved in the clear direction of embracing school prayer as an issue of 
fundamental importance. 
After Adrian Rogers' election as president of the SBC in 1979, he caused 
a stir with comments about school prayer that seemed to break with the Baptist 
tradition of supporting church/state separation. In early 1980, he went on record 
as favoring the removal of school prayer issues from the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. He argued that "state judges ruling on the matter of prayer'' would be 
beneficial because "federal judges are not without error" and stating that "some 
of us had rather trust the sensitivity of those judges closer to and more 
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responsible to us."50 His new stance seemed to be diametrically opposed to past 
Southern Baptist resolutions supporting the federal courts and portraying them as 
the final gatekeepers of religious liberty, which would be violated by organized 
school prayer. To justify his stance, Rogers returned to a frequent theme of 
fundamentalists: an almost hysterical fear of American secularism. "We've come 
to the place," Rogers argued, of an "almost anti-God" control of education. 
"Public schools have become like 'Sunday Schools' for humanism," he argued. 51 
Rogers's comments did not occur in a political vacuum; on the contrary, 
he made these remarks in the context of a very specific endorsement of a 
proposed amendment by Jesse Helms, the famed North Carolina senator most 
known for his conservative views on race, but also an ally of the Christian Right. 
Helms's amendment would have taken the issue of school prayer out of the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts and into state courts, where he believed judges 
would be more supportive of state-sponsored prayer. The endorsement of such 
an amendment by a Southern Baptist president elicited a furious response from 
Baptist moderates. In a pointed statement, James E. Wood, executive director of 
the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, called the amendment "dangerous" 
and said it would "set a precedent for the destruction of First Amendment 
freedoms if there is a majority in Congress who disapprove of a particular 
Supreme Court interpretation of the Constitution."52 Wood and Rogers held a 
public forum in which they agreed to disagree, but the battles lines were being 
drawn, and Texas Baptists would increasingly be forced to side with their own 
50"Rogers, Wood: They Agreeably Disagree," Baptist Standard, February 27, 1980, 4. 
51 Ibid. 
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traditional support for church/state separation and against the leadership of their 
denomination. 
In 1982, after several years of successful efforts to elect fundamentalist 
presidents of the SBC, conservatives passed a resolution that seemed to 
undercut Baptist support for the separation of church and state. That year, 
Republican President Ronald Reagan was pushing Congress to adopt a federal 
amendment on the school prayer issue. The proposed amendment read: 
"Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to prohibit individual or group 
prayer in public schools or other public institutions. No person shall be required 
by the United States or by any state to participate in prayer."53 The wording was 
somewhat ambiguous, but opponents of the measure believed that the 
endorsement of "group prayer" would allow school administrators and teachers to 
push organized prayer without fear or consequences. Such organized prayer was 
exactly the kind of activity that Baptists had previously opposed on grounds that it 
violated the separation of church and state. Messengers to the 1982 convention 
endorsed that resolution, over the objections of James Dunn, a leader among 
Texas Baptists who worked with the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs at 
the time. 54 
Dunn, of course, had already been fighting for the separation of church 
and state for many years. While he acknowledged that "there is legitimate honest 
room for difference of opinion among people who honestly believe in separation 
of church and state," he was also adamant that it remain a bedrock of Baptist 
53Hankins, 146. 
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belief and practice. 55 He had already taken a hard stance against any blurring of 
that separation in public schools, whether through publicly-financed church 
academies or organized prayer. To him, they were both "if not absolutely 
unconstitutional---that's not basically our prerogative to decide anyway---if not 
absolutely unconstitutional, a violation of separation of church and state."56 His 
passion for defending separation in all cases placed him and other Texas Baptist 
leaders in conflict with the fundamentalists gaining power in the national 
convention. 
Dunn also suspected that the Reagan administration was behind the 
prayer amendment and said so later. Despite Southern Baptists' official support 
for the amendment, it failed to achieve the required two-thirds majority in the 
Senate, and it never became law. But the moment marked a profound shift for 
the Southern Baptist Convention. From that point on, the denomination would be 
supportive of organized prayer in public schools. In 1992 the denomination 
adopted its most far-reaching resolution endorsing such organized prayer and 
framed the issue not as a problem of the establishment of religion, but rather as 
an issue of free speech, with students being denied their rights. The resolution 
"solidified the shift in the SBC from its separationist leaders" and formalized the 
growing Baptist sense that the school prayer issue was "a free-exercise right, not 
an establishment problem."57 For Texas Baptist leaders, this shift could not have 
been more troubling. To them, it represented a break with Baptist tradition that 
55Dunn, James Milton. Oral Memoirs of James Milton Dunn. Interview by Daniel B. McGee (Texas 
Baptist Oral History Project, 13 June 1974), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 138. 
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might have been politically expedient but did not meet the standards of their faith. 
More than any other issue, the debate over school prayer demonstrated how far 
the denomination had moved from its roots and how isolated Texas Baptists 
were in the new political and religious landscape of their denomination. 
Foy Valentine insisted that the fundamentalist takeover of the SBC, 
particularly the push to align the denomination with conservative and Republican 
politics, was detrimental to Baptists' religious witness. "When they first got 
together, Paul Pressler and Paige Patterson, they perceived that with ten votes 
from each church and precinct politics, it wouldn't be too hard" (to gain control of 
the convention).58 Once they started to gain control, his first thought was "that 
utter ruin was in the future for the convention as we have known it."59 His 
expectations for the fundamentalists were exceedingly low: "I don't think any of 
us had any feeling that Paige Patterson and Paul Pressler and Adrien Rogers 
would lead us to a great statesmanlike vision of what we could do for God ... I 
think that was simply not something that we expected to happen."60 He met 
frequently with Abner McCall, who was president of Baylor University in the 
1970s and 1980s. Along with other Texas Baptist leaders, they worked to rally 
moderate Baptists to oppose the fundamentalist takeover, but with little success. 
They "would talk about the need for being organized to do something about it," 
but rarely succeeded in organizing political opposition. "We would get all the 
agency people together and make our speeches, and they would declare, Yeah, 
58Valentine, Foy Dan. Oral Memoirs of Foy Dan Valentine. Interview by Thomas L. Charlton 
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it's serious," he remembered. But ultimately, they "would go home and back right 
out" and accomplish very little in terms of organizing. 61 
Valentine explained the lack of organization by moderate Baptists this 
way: "They dreaded a fight. They didn't think that there would be any way the 
pendulum wouldn't swing back, and they would protect their perquisites, not 
make anybody mad, except those of us who were crying Wolf! Wolf!"62 The end 
result was a complete takeover of the convention and, in Valentine's mind, a real 
loss of Baptist identity. "I think we perceived the ruin to be essentially what has 
unfolded," he remembered. "A following of an agenda foreign to our best Baptist 
insights, an agenda that rejected some of our historic commitments, such as 
separation of church and state."63 Although Valentine and others remained active 
in their local work and particular Baptist agencies, they recognized that they lost 
the battle for control of the convention. 
As with other religious and political issues, the debate over 
fundamentalism in the SBC prompted a certain defensiveness from Texas 
Baptists about the nature of Baptist institutions. Much of this conflict centered on 
two of Texas Baptists' most cherished establishments: Southwestern Theological 
Seminary and Baylor University. Located in Fort Worth, Texas, and founded in 
1908, Southwestern had over 4,000 members by 1985, making it one of the 
largest seminaries in the world. Baylor University was located in Waco, Texas, 
and was the largest Baptist university in the world. Texas Baptists were closely 
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affiliated with both schools. 54 Fundamentalist leaders began to target Baptist 
seminaries and colleges in the 1970s, and a 1980 controversy brought the issue 
to a head in Texas Baptist life. In response to Paige Patterson's insistence that 
certain employees at Baptist institutions "are not faithful to historic Baptist belief," 
the Standard published a challenge asking Patterson to produce names. 
Patterson gladly responded by identifying six college and seminary professors he 
believed were "representative of the problem." Of the six professors' named, one 
taught at Southwestern Seminary and another taught at Baylor University. The 
nature of Patterson's complaints was theological: he criticized them for refusing 
to endorse the doctrine of biblical inerrancy. 55 By the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
fundamentalists routinely questioned the theological conservatism of political 
opponents, insisting that the denomination was filled with liberals of one stripe or 
another. But Russell Dilday, president of Southwestern Seminary, was having 
none of it and offered a quick and robust defense of the professors. "These are 
committed teachers, underpaid for the most part, who do not deserve blanket 
accusations," he insisted. "They are individuals, dedicated to their task and to the 
Lord and not only are they Bible-believing teachers, they go beyond that to the 
important step of yielding to the Bible as authoritative, obeying it, following it, 
applying it."66 
Like many Baptist moderates, Dilday emphasized the distracting nature of 
theological controversies from evangelism, which he believed should be the main 
64"Editorial: The Situation at Southwestern Seminary," Baptist Standard, 27 March 1985. 
6~oby Druin, "Patterson, Seven Accused Exchange Charges," The Baptist Standard, 14 May 
1980, 5. 
66"Presidents Respond to Critics, Affirm Bible," Baptist Standard, May 30, 1979, 4. 
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focus of the convention's efforts. "It seems to me that when the world is lost and 
going to eternal hell, it is not time to be dividing our purposes as a convention, 
not time to be out in manipulating, political meetings of various kinds. It's time to 
give ourselves to the main thrust," he argued. His comment about "manipulating, 
political meetings" was an unmistakable reference to the meetings preceding the 
1979 Houston convention, at which fundamentalists plotted the election of Adrien 
Rogers. 57 To Dilday and other moderates, the issue was one of institutional 
control, and fundamentalists were simply using charges of liberalism to gain 
power in the SBC. Following Dilday's comments, which were accompanied by 
similar defenses from the other five presidents of Southern Baptist seminaries, 
Patterson issued a statement welcoming their comments. Describing himself as 
"thrilled beyond any possible way of expressing it," he described his gratitude 
that "the six seminary presidents have reaffirmed their full faith in the infallibility 
and the inerrancy of the scripture and that they assure us this is true of their 
faculties also."68 But the issue was clearly not going away, and fundamentalists' 
increasing control over the convention after 1979 would bring even more conflict 
between Patterson's faction and their moderate opponents. 
During the 1980 seminary controversy, Texas Baptist took a stand on the 
side of the moderates. The Standard came to the quick defense of the professors 
and agreed with Dilday's charge that Patterson was using the allegations to gain 
control of the convention. A heated editorial blasted Patterson for forming a 
"group that has the makings of a political party that smacks of an attempt to take 
671bid. 
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over the convention." The editorial attacked Patterson and his allies for implying 
that they were the ones best suited to interpret Baptist doctrine and warned that 
the BGCT would not support any effort by Patterson's group to control the 
convention. It also noted that the charges of theological liberalism were 
unfounded. In fact, every professor Patterson named had previously affirmed 
traditional Baptist beliefs like the bodily resurrection of Christ and the authority of 
the Bible. 59 Patterson subsequently replied to the editorial, saying that "the 
possibility of political parties" was only the result of "believers in a trustworthy 
Bible being continually ignored."70 The dispute between Patterson and the editors 
of the Standard was another indication that Texas Baptists were willing to defend 
the integrity of Baptist institutions against the attacks of Patterson and his 
fundamentalist allies. It also placed them squarely on the moderate side of the 
Baptist wars, which would bring them into conflict with the Christian Right. 
By 1985, fundamentalists had consolidated control of the Southern Baptist 
Convention, and moderates were grappling with whether they would ever feel at 
home in their own denomination. The controversy at Southwestern Seminary had 
not abated following the rift between Patterson and Dilday in the early 1980s; 
instead, it had escalated. The board of trustees for the institution still included 
many of Dilday's supporters, but it was increasingly filled with members of 
Patterson's camp who determined that the seminary had become too liberal and 
sought steps to enforce a more doctrinaire form of theological conservatism. For 
his part, Dilday refused to back down from his vocal stance against Patterson's 
69
"Editorial: Patterson Charges Dangerous," The Baptist Standard, 23 April1980, 6. 
70"Patterson Replies to Concerns of Editor," The Baptist Standard, 14 May 1980, 4. 
132 
attempts to control the denomination politically (or, as Patterson might have 
stated it, to return the SBC to its conservative roots). Dilday's activism on the 
issue had become so controversial that some of the Southwestern trustees 
sought a resolution forbidding him from speaking out publicly on the 
denominational schism. Although the motion was tabled, editors at the Baptist 
Standard, who were supportive of Dilday's efforts, noted that his "leadership had 
been challenged and left somewhat tarnished."71 The faculty at Southwestern 
Seminary followed with a special meeting and a statement expressing support for 
Dilday's right to speak freely about the "real and serious danger" that Patterson's 
faction posed to the seminary and the SBC.72 Although Dilday still had the 
support of his faculty, the denomination and Southwestern's board of trustees 
were clearly moving in the direction of Patterson and the fundamentalists. 
If the Houston convention in 1979 was the moment when fundamentalists 
first gained a foothold in controlling the denomination, the 1985 convention in 
Dallas was the moment that control was solidified. Charles Stanley, a Patterson 
ally and leader within the fundamentalist camp, was running for re-election as 
president of the convention, and moderates launched a serious campaign to 
defeat him. The moderate candidate was a Texas Baptist, Winfred Moore, a man 
who most saw as "equally conservative" on theological issues as Stanley. Pastor 
of Amarillo Baptist Church for many years, he was a vocal moderate in Baptist 
politics and held great respect from his fellow Texas Baptists, who had elected 
him president of their state convention in 1983. Moore had spoken against 
71"Editorial: The Situation at Southwestern Seminary," Baptist Standard, March 27, 1985, 6. 
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Patterson's faction for years, warning that the denomination was becoming too 
narrow in its theology. He had also advocated against the growing involvement 
with partisan politics, especially the alliance between Southern Baptists and the 
Republican Party.73 But he was a clear theological conservative; the difference 
between him and Stanley lay in the two men's vision of the "value and limits of 
diversity in an admittedly conservative denomination. Moore was convinced that 
differing views on scripture and its interpretation could be tolerated so long as 
cooperation and mission support was maintained."74 Stanley, for his part, "was 
equally convinced that such toleration was dangerous to the denomination's 
future."75 
For better or worse, both sides understood the significance of the 
convention. If Stanley won, fundamentalists would be able to strengthen their 
control of denominational agencies and force moderates to win at least five 
consecutive presidential elections to re-gain power, something both sides 
realized was highly unlikely. The fundamentalist side drew support from leaders 
of the Christian Right, which by 1985 had emerged as one of the most powerful 
political forces in Reagan's America. Pat Robertson, host of the 700 Club and 
eventual founder of the Christian Coalition, hosted a forum with leaders of the 
fundamentalist side. He provided airtime for Adrien Rogers, Bailey Smith, and 
other members of the Patterson faction to cite examples of what they believed 
were doctrinal heresies by Southern Baptists administrators, pastors, and 
73"Texas Baptists Elect Pastor," The New York Times, Final Edition, November 3, 1983, 26. For 
more information about his life and work in the BGCT and SBC, see Ferrell Foster, "Winfred 
Moore Honored as 'Elder Statesman,"' Baptist General Convention of Texas website 
http://www. bgct.org/texasbaptists/Page.aspx?&pid= 870& srcid=1887. 
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professors. Occurring as it did in the run-up to the Dallas convention, speakers 
on the program campaigned openly for Charles Stanley, emphasizing the 
importance of his election to their cause. Jerry Falwell also spoke openly of his 
support for Stanley and encouraged his followers who were also Southern 
Baptists to cast their votes for him.76 In short, the battle between Charles Stanley 
and Winfred Moore was to be the climax of the denominational struggle between 
fundamentalists and moderates. 
Leading up to the convention, both sides staked their terrain in the pages 
of The Theological Educator, a publication of New Orleans Baptist Theological 
Seminary. Patterson reiterated claims that he had been making since at least the 
mid-1970s, namely that professors at Southern Baptist seminaries and colleges 
had drifted towards liberalism and deserved to be chastised by the denomination 
at large. Recalling his own seminary education, he insisted that "some of the 
doctrinal truths I had been taught to hold precious were not only debunked but 
ridiculed ... the fires of evangelism and the fervency of heart were often doused 
with the condescending remark of a lofty academe.'177 After recalling his own 
personal experience, Patterson proceeded to cite examples of professors who 
had expressed views that struck him as theologically liberal. For example, a 
faculty member at Southern Baptist Seminary in Louisville, Kentucky, 
admonished students to consider the writings of the Old Testament "as they were 
intended, as a person living two and a half millennia ago, prior to the modern, 
scientific era" might have considered them. The faculty member, Roy Lee 
761bid, 184. 
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Honeycutt, was referencing a story from the book of Second Kings in which the 
prophet Elisha reportedly brought a child back to life. Honeycutt wrote, "That this 
is most likely a wonder story in the category of saga and legend is probable; 
even so, that the story should be weakened by rationalistic explanations is to 
miss the point of the redactor's purpose."78 While Honeycutt's comments were 
uncontroversial from a historical perspective, to Patterson they represented the 
kind of theological heresy that was worthy of a full-on denominational battle. 
Although he continued to have reservations, he acknowledged "for the first time" 
the possibility "of a formal split," claiming it was "due to the challenge to Dr. 
Stanley's reelection and the declaration of 'holy war' being made" by presidents 
of Baptist seminaries. Ultimately, he concluded that conservatives had to draw a 
line in the sand and to "insist that employees of the convention never, under any 
circumstances, call into question any statement of the Bible or say anything that 
might be construed as disbelief in the veracity of the Scriptures."79 In defining 
theological conservatism in such a narrow way (even many conservatives did not 
take every statement of the Bible to be literally or historically true), Patterson 
seemed to make reconciliation with moderates almost impossible. His 
statements, coming as they did just before the Dallas convention, set the tone for 
a tumultuous battle. 
For his part, Russell Dilday continued to maintain that Patterson's charges 
were false and that he was using them in service of a larger agenda for control of 
the convention. He called the Patterson faction a "political machine" that was 
781bid. 
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"carried forward by emotional momentum in spite of the fact that Southern 
Baptists, including our agency leaders, are practically unanimous in their belief in 
biblical authority and conservative theology. "80 He once again insisted that the 
split was not theological in nature, but was simply a debate about whether or not 
Baptist institutions should be supported and sustained. Dilday maintained that 
moderates were simply Baptists who were "equally conservative theologically, 
just as serious in their commitment to the infallibility of God's word ... but who 
have at the same time a proven record of enthusiastic support for convention 
causes. They are unapologetically Southern Baptist."81 Like Patterson, he was 
adamant about the importance of the Dallas convention, saying "There is no 'in-
between' group, for neutrality on these questions is not a viable option. The 
choices facing messengers at upcoming conventions are clear. Their votes will 
determine what kind of convention we will be."82 
Dilday also emphasized the fact that the fundamentalist faction was 
closely aligned with the movement of religious conservatives known then and 
now as the Christian Right. Labeling fundamentalist leaders "Falwellian," he 
attacked them for being more concerned with "Moral Majority political agendas" 
than with traditional Baptist emphases like missions and evangelism.83 His 
labeling of fundamentalists as "Falwellian" was indicative of an important fact 
about Texas Baptists: They were naturally skeptical of leaders of the Christian 
Right like Jerry Falwell. To be sure, Texas Baptists' resistance to Christian Right 
80Russel Dilday, "My Interpretation of the Controversy and My Hope for the Convention," The 
Theological Educator, 1985, 29. 
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politics was grounded in their support for the separation of church and state. But 
the open support of Falwell and Pat Robertson for the fundamentalist side in the 
Southern Baptist controversies of the late 1970s and early 1980s cemented a 
deep skepticism among Texas Baptists about the goodwill of Christian Right 
leaders. 
Foy Valentine agreed with Dilday that the overt affiliation of the 
fundamentalist side with Republican politics was a negative development for the 
Baptist convention. He recalled hearing George H. W. Bush, Reagan's vice 
president during his two terms in office, address a convention of Southern 
Baptists. "He spouted the most radical right-wing stuff imaginable at a pastors' 
conference," Valentine recalled.84 To Valentine, Southern Baptists' proximity to 
political power in the Reagan years did not benefit the denomination: "I don't 
think Southern Baptist have affected Washington much. I think Washington has 
affected Southern Baptists a great deal."85 He also maintained that both Baptist 
fundamentalists and Christian Right leaders overstated their own influence on 
national politics. As an example, he cited Pat Robertson's 1988 run for the 
Republican presidential nomination.86 "Pat Robertson was telling everybody how 
influential he was, how he could turn hurricanes around, how he had access to 
the White House, and how he was going to run it for the glory of God," Valentine 
said.87Uitimately, though, Robertson's forces did not show up at the ballot box 
B4yalentine, Foy Dan. Oral Memoirs of Foy Dan Valentine. Interview by Thomas L. Charlton 
Fexas Baptist Project, May 22, 1989), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 54. 
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the way he expected them to: "When the elections took place, the primaries had 
started really taking place where those troops were supposed to come out; they 
didn't come. I didn't ever think they were coming."88 To Valentine, the growing 
association of the SBC with Robertson's style of Republican politics was 
something worth fighting. Even if he was on the losing side (at least in terms of 
denominational politics), he believed opposing fundamentalist influence was the 
right thing to do. 
With both sides acknowledging the significance of the race between 
Charles Stanley and Winfred Moore for president of the SBC, Baptists gathered 
in Dallas in June 1985. The convention was more raucous than usual, with both 
sides organizing their troops, plotting strategies, and wondering if any sort of 
reconciliation was possible. On Tuesday of the convention, delegates learned 
that Charles Stanley had narrowly won reelection as president. His supporters 
cheered wildly, while moderates looked on in silence. Following the presidential 
election, messengers nominated Moore to run as vice-president, hoping that it 
would provide a pathway to reconciliation. Moore agreed, and he easily defeated 
the fundamentalist candidate for vice-president, Zig Ziglar. But within a year, he 
would complain that the fundamentalist leadership ignored his advice on 
nominations, just as they had done to previous moderate vice-presidents. 
Although moderates hoped to fight the battle at future conventions, in retrospect, 
the 1985 convention was their last serious chance to defeat the fundamentalists 
and retake some control over the convention. By 1988, nearly every 
denominational board of trustees would be dominated by fundamentalists, and 
881bid. 
moderates would be relegated to also-ran status in a denomination they had 
once controlled. 89 
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For Texas Baptists, the conflict between Baptist moderates and 
fundamentalists was a formative political experience and not one that endeared 
them to the alliance between the Southern Baptist Convention and the Christian 
Right. Throughout the 1980s and beyond, Patterson and his allies would move 
the convention further right politically, passing resolution after resolution on 
issues like abortion and school prayer that would have been unthinkable in the 
1960s or early 1970s. In short, Texas Baptists supported the losing side of a 
denominational war that reshaped southern religion and politics. They did so out 
of a deep commitment to the historic Baptist principle of separation of church and 
state, one they never really abandoned. By the early 1990s, the Baptist General 
Convention of Texas was embroiled in the same controversies that had already 
split the national convention. With the victory of fundamentalists at the national 
level, Texas Baptist leaders feared a similar occurrence in their state convention. 
Professors and administrators from Texas Baptist colleges and universities 
worried about a fundamentalist power grab that could change their schools or 
even result in their firing. A group of concerned Texas Baptists formed Texas 
Baptists Committed, an organization dedicated to preventing Patterson's 
supporters from gaining power in the BGCT. Although it took several contentious 
meetings, the group was victorious and moderates retained control over the state 
convention, prompting a minority of fundamentalist Texas Baptists to start their 
89Ammerman, 4. 
own organization.90 
To understand why Texas Baptist leaders rejected an alliance with the 
Christian Right, historians must contend with their role in the denominational 
controversy that dominated Southern Baptist life in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. As fundamentalist leaders aligned with the Christian Right, they also 
attacked the integrity of Baptist institutions, offended the sensibilities of unity-
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oriented Baptists, and annoyed Texas Baptist leaders who believed their cries of 
heresy were political manipulations. In grabbing for power at the national level, 
fundamentalists made enemies of many Texas Baptists, who were inclined to 
defend Baptist institutions and whose experiences with those institutions were 
almost uniformly positive. But beyond the personalities and disputes that 
animated these controversies, Texas Baptists held fundamental beliefs about the 
separation of church and state that led them to be skeptical of Paige Patterson, 
Paul Pressler, and the fundamentalist faction in Southern Baptist politics. That 
Baptist fundamentalists sought and received support from Christian Right leaders 
and seemed contemptuous of church/state separation only added fuel to the fire. 
By the mid-1980s, it was clear that Texas Baptists were on the losing side of the 
Baptist holy wars. But it was equally clear that they would not join other state 
conventions in supporting Christian Right causes, agitating for an expressly 
political agenda, or abandoning their traditional devotion to the separation of 
church and state. 
90Rick McClatchy, "The Texas Two-Step" in CarlL. Kell, ed., Exiled: Voices of the Southern 
Baptist Convention Holy War (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2006). 
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Chapter4 
A Baptist Woman's Place: 
Texas Baptists and Gender Controversies, 1960-1985 
In 1973, following the Supreme Court's Roe vs. Wade ruling legalizing 
abortion, a number of US representatives and senators pushed for legislation 
that would allow federally-funded hospitals to refuse abortions because of 
religious or moral concerns. James E. Wood, Jr., a professor at Baylor University 
and a prominent Texas Baptist, condemned the efforts, saying they raised 
"serious questions" about the "viability of the First Amendment."1 To him, the 
issue was not whether abortion was religiously justified, but whether or not 
government-funded hospitals could refuse "to perform medical services declared 
to be legal by the U.S. Supreme Court."2 He went further: "Regardless of one's 
own moral or religious views on abortion, the legislation cited here must be 
viewed as incompatible with the American tradition of public control and public 
interest as a necessary accompaniment to the appropriation of public funds." He 
labeled the legislation "a violation of the separation of church and state" and 
noted that "the abortion decision by the Supreme Court may be regarded as 
generally compatible with the positions taken by some of the major religious 
denominations of America."3 Woods was no casual observer: He served as the 
executive director of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, the political 
1"Wood Criticizes Abortion Bill," Baptist Standard, July 25, 1973, 4. 
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advocacy arm of the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC). 
Contemporary observers might be surprised to learn that an influential 
Texas Baptist held pro-choice views or that someone with such opinions could 
hold high office in the SBC. But the early reaction of Southern Baptists to the Roe 
decision was not nearly as critical as contemporary politics would suggest. A 
significant portion of Baptists viewed abortion not as a hot-button political issue 
but as an ethical one with profound implications for the role of government in 
private religion. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, Texas Baptist leaders 
were mostly skeptical of anti-abortion politics, particularly when the abortion 
issue clouded out other concerns. As with other political issues, their concern for 
protecting the separation of church and state was overriding, and it led them to 
question the wisdom of a crusade against legal abortion. Years before the 
Christian Right reshaped the landscape of abortion politics, Texas Baptists 
articulated a vision of abortion as a private moral issue, not one that warranted 
political advocacy or much government intervention. 
The abortion issue is just one example of a surprising trend: Texas 
Baptists handled issues of gender and sexuality in a much more moderate 
fashion than the national leadership of the SBC, particularly the fundamentalists 
who took control after 1979. The question of women in ministry became hugely 
controversial during the 1970s, splitting apart churches, dividing seminary 
students, and (in some cases) leading to conflict between wives and husbands. 
After 1979, the SBC leadership made opposition to women ministers a focal point 
of denominational politics and Baptist theology. Even today, Southern Baptist 
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leaders discuss the increasing occurrence of women ministers in terms of what 
they see as a broader assault on traditional gender roles. But Texas Baptists in 
the 1970s and 1980s were more progressive on the issue than Baptist leaders 
today. That is certainly not to say that Texas Baptists were unanimous in 
supporting women ministers, or even that most of them supported it. But it is 
clear that the state leadership either favored women in ministry or believed it was 
not important enough of an issue to divide the convention. Where their 
fundamentalist counterparts would insist on opposition to women ministers as a 
theological litmus test, Texas Baptists were quite content to let individual Baptists 
and local congregations sort out the issue for themselves. This moderation on 
questions of gender placed Texas Baptists on the opposite side of the staunch 
conservatives who came to lead the SBC; it also placed them in opposition to 
leaders of the Christian Right, who began organizing an entire political movement 
around opposition to any new understandings of gender or sexuality.4 
Observers of Southern Baptist politics in recent years are often quite 
surprised to learn that the denomination was one of the first in the country to offer 
political cover for pro-choice activists by supporting liberalization of the country's 
abortion laws. At the SBC's annual meeting in 1971, messengers (as delegates 
to the convention were called) met in St. Louis to determine the convention's 
official position on a range of controversial issues, including the topic of abortion, 
which was becoming a potent national issue at the time. After a floor debate (not 
4For more information on the Christian Right and the issue of abortion, see William Martin, With 
God On Our Side (New York: Broadway Books, 1996), 154-180; for more on the Christian Right 
and gender issues, see Daniel Williams, God's Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 105-132. 
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unusual for any issue at a Baptist convention), the SBC passed a resolution 
supporting federal legislation that "will allow the possibility of abortion under such 
conditions as rape, incest, clear evidence of fetal deformity and carefully 
ascertained evidence of the likelihood of damage to the emotional, mental, and 
physical health of the mother."5 The language of the resolution was striking, 
particularly its insistence that abortion should be allowed even in cases where 
the woman's physical health was not threatened by a pregnancy, but her 
emotional or mental state might be. Certainly, that statement did not place 
Southern Baptists on the left end of the spectrum on reproductive issues, and it 
left room for much disagreement with the feminist push for wholesale 
liberalization. But it was a decidedly moderate statement by a conservative 
denomination that became crucial to the anti-abortion coalition in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. 
Even before the Roe decision brought abortion politics to the forefront of 
national debates, prominent Texas Baptists had indicated that a moderate 
response to the issue was in keeping with Baptist values. Dan McGee, a 
professor of religion at Baylor University, gave an address on the issue to the 
Baptist Student Union of Baylor in 1971, outlining what he saw as an appropriate 
Baptist outlook on abortion. He insisted that concern for "potential life" must be 
balanced against other considerations. "Rhetorically, how do we balance off our 
commitments to the protection of fetal life to our loyalty to other members of 
society?" he wondered. In no way did he deny the concern many Baptists had for 
protecting fetal life. "Our evaluation of human life is reflected in our own value of 
5"Southern Baptist Convention: Abortion Resolution Passes," Baptist Standard, June 9, 1971,9. 
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fetal life because it symbolizes human life to us, and because the fetus also has 
potential for human life," he said. No one could accuse McGee of being a rabid 
defender of "abortion-on-demand," the catch phrase that was becoming a 
popular line of attack against feminists in the 1970s. But he also favored an 
approach that considered the impact of abortion laws on women and gave 
doctors the maximum flexibility in dealing with the issue. He offered support for 
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, which argued that 
exceptions for the health of the mother should not be limited to her physical 
condition but should also include her emotional well being. Overall, McGee 
endorsed a holistic approach to the issue that gave strong consideration to the 
impact of abortion laws on women: "A realized life will not be sacrificed for just 
potential life," he insisted.6 His support for abortion rights was qualified, and his 
position on the issue was decidedly moderate. But his willingness to consider 
women's health and his insistence that the debate should extend beyond "just 
potential life" placed him in opposition to the rigid position on abortion rights that 
characterized the Christian Right in the late1970s and 1980s. 
The Southern Baptist Convention went on record as favoring some form of 
legal abortion in 1971, but it was not until 1973 that the issue of abortion rights 
truly became a dominant one in national politics. That year, of course, the 
Supreme Court's Roe vs. Wade ruling prevented states from banning abortion for 
most reasons in the first trimester, allowing for legal abortion across the country. 7 
Although the SBC would eventually become a staunch opponent of abortion 
6"Human Life Said Abortion Question," Baptist Standard, March 17, 1971, 8. 
7"Excerpts from Abortion Case," New York Times, January 23, 1973, 20. See also, M. A. Farber, 
"Abortions at Any Time Sought in State," New York Times, January 24, 1973, 13. 
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rights, the initial reaction from Southern Baptist leaders was not especially 
conservative. Texas Baptists, in particular, stood out for their moderation. James 
Wood led the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs' opposition to amending 
the constitution to restrict abortion. Conservative congressmen were already 
circulating plans for an amendment that would grant full constitutional rights to 
"unborn offspring at every stage of their biological development." At Wood's 
behest, the Committee voted to oppose to such measures at its semi-annual 
meeting in December 1973. Wood emphasized that the resolution was not in 
support of the practice of abortion but simply an affirmation of "civil liberties and 
religious freedom" for individuals as they determined their response to the issue.8 
Wood's tendency to view the issue in terms of religious liberty and the separation 
of church and state was typical of Texas Baptist leaders in the early 1970s. But 
their views on the subject would eventually be drowned out by the more rabid 
response of other elements of the SBC. 
The pro-choice tendencies of Texas Baptist leaders would eventually give 
way to the stridently anti-choice views of fundamentalists like Paige Patterson 
and Paul Pressler, who seized power in the convention in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. But as late as 197 4 the pro-choice views of Texas Baptists were in 
step with the national SBC. At the convention's annual meeting, conservatives 
proposed a resolution opposing all abortions, without exceptions for rape, incest, 
or the life and health of the mother. That resolution lost by a wide margin, an 
indication that at least in 197 4, a more moderate view of the issue was dominant 
in Southern Baptist circles. After losing the resolution banning all abortions, 
8"Baptist Joint Committee: Abortion Proposal Opposed," Baptist Standard, October 10, 1973, 5. 
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conservatives tried to repeal the 1971 resolution, which had endorsed legislation 
that would allow for abortion "under such conditions as rape, incest, clear 
evidence of fetal deformity," and a threat to the woman's life or health. But 
messengers reaffirmed that stance by a wide margin, ending fundamentalist 
hopes of making the convention a vehicle for anti-abortion politics, at least for the 
time being.9 By the mid-1980s Texas Baptist leaders would be moderate outliers 
in a convention that had become extremely conservative on reproductive issues, 
in both its official proclamations and its chosen leadership. But it is important to 
recall that the convention's ultimate anti-choice stance was the result of a 
protracted struggle between two visions of Baptist politics, not the foregone result 
of Baptist theology. Indeed, it was Baptist history and belief, particularly 
regarding the separation of church and state, that led Baptist moderates to 
oppose universal restrictions on abortion in the early years of the abortion wars. 
One of the most influential Texas Baptists who articulated a moderate 
stance on the issue of abortion was Foy Valentine. Valentine had served as 
director of the Texas Christian Life Commission from 1953 to1960, and he was 
the director of the national Christian Life Commission for Southern Baptists 
throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. In that role, he witnessed the early 
mobilization of anti-abortion forces and their impact on Baptist politics. To his 
mind, the issue was always more of a Roman Catholic one than a Baptist one, at 
least politically, and he did not remember it being a significant debate among 
Baptists until the 1970s. "The subject didn't even surface until about 1970," he 
recalls. "Now, the Roman Catholic bishops started pressing on this stuff early in 
9"Convention: Reaffirms Abortion Stand," Baptist Standard, June 19, 1974, 4. 
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the forties. They were pressing a little more in the fifties, into the sixties they were 
pressing. Not until the bishops had worked at it for decades did they politicize the 
issue enough to get it into the thinking of some of our people."1° For Valentine, 
the decision to bring the abortion debate into the political realm (and to insist on 
using the law to ban the procedure) was a Roman Catholic one that Southern 
Baptists should be careful not to emulate. "Our response to the challenges 
related to abortion should not be based on Roman Catholic dogma, or the pope's 
notion as to when life began, or ensoulment, or any of the old doctrines from 
Augustine to Aquinas," he insisted. Instead, "it should be based on theological 
and psychological truth, our convictions about it."11 Anti-abortion politics came to 
unite evangelicals and Catholics in the 1980s, but at the time of Roe the two 
groups were still quite divided over theological and, sometimes, political issues. 
Valentine's reluctance to embrace what he saw as a Catholic political agenda 
was not unique among Southern Baptists, particularly those in Texas. 
Although Valentine resented the fact that Catholics originally pushed the 
issue and found the politicization of abortion distasteful, his views on the subject 
were in no way liberal. As with most other social or political issues, moderate 
Baptists like Valentine were broadly conservative in their outlook. But they 
resented the all-or-nothing attitude about abortion that Christian Right activists 
pushed, and they questioned the wisdom of pursuing an exclusively political 
strategy on an issue that for them held private religious significance. He summed 
up his position this way: "Abortion is not a satisfactory or morally justified way of 
1'\/alentine, Fey Dan. Oral Memoirs of Fey Dan Valentine. Interview by Thomas L. Charlton. 
~Texas Baptist Project, 10 August 1989), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 125. 
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birth control." Yet he continued, "We should accept it as the least objectionable, 
lesser of available evils, in cases of rape, incest, manifest deformity to the life of 
the fetus, or clear danger to the physical or mental life of the mother."12 In other 
words, he supported the original position of the Southern Baptist Convention. 
Fundamentalists Baptists would eventually tar Valentine and others with the 
"liberal" label because they supported abortion rights in some instances, but that 
says more about the conservative direction of the denomination than it does 
about the position itself. Valentine's stance was easily within the bounds of 
political conservatism in the 1970s and beyond.13 
In his views on reproductive issues, Valentine also split with Christian 
Right leaders in emphasizing sexual education as part of a strategy to reduce 
unwanted pregnancies and inform teenagers about the consequences of 
promiscuity. Specifically, he felt that Baptist churches should include programs of 
sexual education as part of their curriculums for young people. "We need to start 
with responsible Christian sex education," he stated. "I don't think we should take 
sex lightly, and that's the reason I had much rather we be talking about not 
committing adultery than not committing abortion."14 His support for such 
programs was clearly not based in any desire to advance an agenda of sexual 
liberation. He was adamant that "the sexual revolution has resulted in an 
incredible increase in unfaithfulness, premarital sex, unchastity, all sorts of 
121bid., 126. 
13For more on Baptist moderates and liberalism (specifically, their rejection of it), see Walter B. 
Shurden, The Struggle for the Soul of the SBC: Moderate Responses to the Fundamentalist 
Movement (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1993). 
14yalentine, Foy Dan. Oral Memoirs of Foy Dan Valentine. Interview by Thomas L. Charlton. 
(Texas Baptist Project, 10 August 1989), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 128. 
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problems that sort of surround the abortion concerns that we have. "15 
In short, Valentine was concerned about the problems he felt were 
inherent to sexual freedom, but he tended to favor a solutions-based approach 
as opposed to the rigid political stance of Baptist fundamentalists. He took a 
great deal of heat from those fundamentalists for his stance in favor of what he 
called "Christian sexual education." He made little progress towards that goal: 
" ... though we have made some halting steps in that direction, we never go very 
far with it because the extremists are always at the door yapping and howling 
and snarling and biting to keep any sex education from happening. No matter 
how carefully it may be proposed or done, they will find ways to kill it or stop it 
wherever they can."16 As one of the primary spokespersons for Texas Baptists 
and the moderate Baptist camp, Valentine clashed often with fundamentalist 
Baptists over reproductive issues. By 1980 he had become a lighting rod of sorts 
and a clear political enemy of fundamentalist Baptists. But it is always important 
to bear in mind that he was no activist on the pro-choice side, nor was he 
particularly enthralled with "the sexual revolution," as he always called it. Instead, 
he was one of a dying breed: Baptist moderates who were uncomfortable with 
many of the sexual changes that gripped America after 1960, but who preferred a 
measured response that emphasized Baptist self-improvement over robust 
political agitation.17 
It was Valentine's response to the 1973 Roe vs. Wade decision that 
151bid. 
161bid., 127. 
17For more on Valentine's status as an enemy of Baptist fundamentalists, see Barry Hankins, 
Uneasy in Babylon: Southern Baptist Conservatives and American Culture (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 2002), 171. 
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cemented his reputation as an opponent of the Christian Right and Baptist 
fundamentalists. At the time, he served as executive director of the Christian Life 
Commission, the national Baptist agency responsible for dealing with major 
social issues. After the fact, he described the strategy that made him a major 
enemy of anti-abortion forces: "We sought to resist the extremist right-wing 
forces that sought to use Christians in general, and Baptists in particular, for their 
political ends, and made abortion their rallying cry. "18 He was particularly 
contemptuous of Jerry Falwell, who by the mid-1970s was a leading 
spokesperson for the Christian Right (and a leading critic of Baptist moderates).19 
"We sought to resist people like Jerry Falwell, who was wont to wear a gold fetus 
in his lapel, as a symbol of his concern about it."20 Besides Falwell, Valentine also 
reserved special scorn for Francis Schaeffer, one of the earliest advocates for an 
anti-abortion political agenda and a leader among politically motivated 
evangelicals.21 "We sought to resist Francis Schaeffer, the daddy rabbit of the 
present right-wing fundamentalists, who, as a former associate of Carl Mcintire's 
little one-eyed fundamentalist school in Pennsylvania, his only formal education, 
was pressing for a constitutional amendment."22 He could not disguise his 
contempt for such leaders, and his refusal to endorse a constitutional 
amendment banning all abortion was at the heart of his differences with 
18Valentine, Foy Dan. Oral Memoirs of Foy Dan Valentine. Interview by Thomas L. Charlton. 
~Texas Baptist Project, 10 August 1989), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 128. 
9For more on Falwell's rise as a leader of the Christian Right, see Martin, With God On Our Side, 
191-220; and Williams, God's Own Party, 33-45. 
20Valentine, Foy Dan. Oral Memoirs of Foy Dan Valentine. Interview by Thomas L. Charlton. 
Fexas Baptist Project, 10 August 1989), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 128. 
1 For more on Francis Schaeffer and the abortion issue, see Martin, With God on Our Side, 155-
161. 
22Valentine, Foy Dan. Oral Memoirs of Foy Dan Valentine. Interview by Thomas L. Charlton. 
(Texas Baptist Project, 10 August 1989), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 128. 
152 
fundamentalist Baptists. Besides his disagreements with pro-lifers over sexual 
education and the legality of abortion in some cases, Valentine also rejected the 
near-exclusive focus on abortion of some members of the Christian Right who 
"wanted us to be dealing with this issue above all others. The anti-abortionists" 
he continued, "are simply a one-theme people who would like to see us doing 
nothing about hunger or race relations or citizenship or separation of church and 
state or morality or hardly anything else, just as long as we were talking about 
their accepted belief that life in its full human form begins at the moment of 
conception, and, therefore, all abortion, even if it kills the mother, is unacceptable 
and must be rejected ."23 
One interesting aspect of Valentine's opposition to the fundamentalist 
position on abortion is that he thought it too similar to the one coming from the 
Pope in Rome and driving Catholic reaction to the issue. In 1981 he authored a 
pamphlet in which he insisted that, "It is questionable that Christian love and 
justice would be served by extremely restrictive laws which do not give 
conscientious people with proper medical advice the opportunity to choose when 
they are faced with very grave moral dilemmas related to abortion."24 He argued 
this while condemning "the casual use of abortion as a means of birth control, a 
situation that is socially irresponsible and morally indefensible."25 If he viewed 
most abortions in such negative terms, why did Valentine also resist a move to 
criminalize most abortions? The answer is complicated, but it begins with his 
resistance to what he saw as the Catholic way of practicing politics. By the time 
231bid. 
24Hankins, Uneasy in Babylon, 171. 
25 1bid. 
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the abortion debate began to dominate national politics, he had spent years 
advocating against Catholic resistance to church/state separation and insisting 
that Baptists should zealously guard against any intrusions by the state into 
religious life. For him, Baptist responses to the abortion issue should not reflect 
dictates from Rome. When speaking about the increasing prevalence of abortion, 
he cautioned, "Christians may properly work to change this situation without 
moving to the other extreme and insisting that the whole nation be required to 
accept Roman Catholic dogma related to abortion under the law of the land."26 In 
1985 he went further, arguing that Baptists should never be "willing to shape 
public policy to the demands of the Roman Catholic bishops. "27 
James Dunn was another influential Texas Baptist who pressed for a 
moderate response to the abortion question. He served as head of the Texas 
Christian Life Commission from 1968 to 1980, when he became executive 
director of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs. He used both these 
perches to battle what he saw as an overzealous response to abortion from the 
fundamentalist camp. At the 1974 annual meeting of the SBC, he spoke in favor 
of the resolution affirming the right of women to choose abortion in some 
circumstances. Following the adoption of that policy, he also noted his pride that 
the convention "overwhelmingly" rejected "an abortion-is-murder resolution" with 
"at the most, 5 percent who voted to support" it.28 He was especially pleased that 
the Southern Baptist Convention went "overwhelmingly on record with a rather 
261bid. 
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28Dunn, James Milton. Oral Memoirs of James Milton Dunn. Interview by H. Wayne Pipkin (Texas 
Baptist Oral History Project, 13 June 1974), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 31. 
open position on abortion. And it's probably good that these guys brought it up, 
so we could take this position and make it clear that the convention is not a 
154 
conservative denomination on the abortion issue, as we are so often labeled."29 
Like most other Baptist moderates, he refused to support what he called 
"abortion on demand," but he insisted upon legal abortion "in instances of rape, 
incest, clear evidence of fetal deformity, or clearly ascertained indication of 
damage to the physical, mental, or emotional health of the mother" (Again, the 
exact position moderates successfully pushed the convention to adopt).30 His call 
for "reject(ing) the extremes of abortion on demand or abortion is murder under 
all circumstances"31 was perfectly in tune with the national convention in the mid-
1970s, but it was out of step with the fundamentalist crusade to ban all abortions 
that would eventually characterize the SBC's position on the issue. His moderate 
voice on the abortion issue was another example of the growing divergence 
between the emerging movement of Christian Right activists and Texas Baptists. 
The moderation of Texas Baptists on the issue stood in stark contrast to 
the rhetoric of fundamentalists who battled them for power in the convention in 
the 1970s and took firm control in the 1980s. In Nancy Ammerman's polling of 
Southern Baptists in the 1980s, 63 percent supported restricting abortion to only 
cases in which the mother's life was threatened, and one-third actually opposed 
abortion in every single circumstance. Fundamentalist leaders were particularly 
brazen in their statements on abortion. Bailey Smith, a leading conservative 
voice whom fundamentalists helped elect president of the convention in the mid-
291bid, 32. For more on SBC resolutions on abortion, see Hankins, Uneasy in Babylon, 181-184. 
301bid. 
31 1bid. 
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1980s, put it this way: "I want to say to every supreme court justice, I want to say 
to every compromise lily-livered congressman, I want to say to every liberal pulpit 
in America, you'll stand before almighty God and answer for the deaths of those 
little babies!"32 Adrian Rogers, whom fundamentalists elected president of the 
convention in 1979, regularly used his platform to attack abortion rights and insist 
that Southern Baptists should oppose legal abortion in nearly every situation. To 
him, the "slaughter of millions of innocent lives" was "wrong, wrong, wrong!"33 
Given the starkly different views on the politicization of the abortion issue 
between fundamentalists and moderates, it was probably no surprise that the two 
groups saw Christian Right leaders like Jerry Falwell differently. By the early 
1980s, 89 percent of self-identified fundamentalists agreed with the statement, "It 
is good that groups like the Moral Majority are taking a stand for Christian 
principles." Only 15 percent of moderates agreed.34 
To understand how moderate and fundamentalists Baptists could disagree 
on abortion when they were nearly unanimous in expressing contempt for the 
procedure, observers must bear in mind the very different views they held on the 
issue of church-state separation. After all, the moderates within the Southern 
Baptist convention took a position on abortion rights that, although troubling to 
fundamentalists, was still more conservative than the prevailing sentiment in the 
country at large. In the end, moderates sided with James Wood, who in 1973 had 
argued that over-regulation of abortion was a violation of church-state separation 
32Nancy Ammerman, Baptist Battles: Social Change and Religious Conflict in the Southern 
Baptist Convention (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 100-101. 
331bid. 
34lbid, 105. 
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"regardless of one's own moral or religious views on abortion."35 Baylor professor 
Dan McGee put it this way: "There is the perennial danger of setting the 
precedent of enforcing our view of God's will through the state and someday 
being victimized by the state as a moral minority."36 Mindful of Baptists' historical 
preference for the separation of church and state, he insisted that they not force 
their abortion views on others through the law. Cecil Sherman, another moderate 
Texas Baptist, framed his personal opposition to abortion in the same manner: "I 
am unwilling to make my abortion position to be the law of the land ... Just 
because most of the people in this country are living like pagans does not give us 
a right to abandon our first premise and force those pagans to be moral. All 
religion and religious rule ought to be voluntary."37 ln explaining his earlier 
decision to oppose a constitutional amendment restricting abortion rights, James 
Wood echoed these sentiments. His opposition, he said, was "out of concern that 
in our pluralistic society the state should not embody into law one particular 
religious or moral viewpoint on which differing views are held by substantial 
sections of the religious and nonreligious communities." He went on to say that 
most restrictions on abortion "violate the free exercise clause of the First 
Amendment as we understand it in in the Baptist faith. To be consistent with the 
freedom of conscience protected by the free exercise clause, public policy 
decision should neither condone nor espouse abortion and should take no 
position on the nature of the fetus."38 These Texas Baptist leaders found it difficult 
35"Wood Criticizes Abortion Bill," Baptist Standard, July 25, 1973, 4. 
36Hankins, 173. 
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to see any social or political issue, even one as controversial as abortion, outside 
the lens of their strong views on the separation of church and state. Regardless 
of how much they opposed abortion on a personal or religious level, to impose 
those beliefs on the public through the passing of laws seemed to them a very 
un-Baptist thing to do. 
To be sure, these opinions were dominant among the leadership of Texas 
Baptists, with many lay persons opposing abortion in more visceral terms or even 
expressing shock that the leadership was not more disposed to ban abortions in 
most circumstances. The letters that readers sent to the Baptist Standard are 
indicative of this point. As the abortion debate heated up in the 1970s, one letter 
chastised Texas Baptist leadership for supporting the national convention's 
resolution on abortion. "Our church has been writing to our senators and 
congressmen to let them know that as Southern Baptists we are against 
legalized abortion," the letter read. "Now our Southern Baptist leaders come up 
with compromising even to the point of sin. They said if a woman was 
emotionally upset it was a reason for abortion."39 The author followed this 
statement with a threat to leave the convention if it did not move in a more 
conservative direction. "I have always been a true Southern Baptist, but as I see 
it our convention is compromising with sin .... We must get right with Jesus as 
Southern Baptists or I am afraid those of us who really want to serve God will be 
leaving the convention."40 Another lashed out at the convention's support for 
exceptions, insisting, "I would like for someone to give me the book, chapter, and 
39 Jim Wilkerson, "Letters to the Editor: Abortion Debate Continues," Baptist Standard, July 21, 
1971, 2. 
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verse that justifies the destruction of fetal life whether it be by rape, incest or be 
deformed." The author also insisted that the exception for the emotional, 
physical, or mental health of the mother "really boils down to abortion-on-
demand," leaving "it to the option of the mother and a cooperating abortionist."41 
Following the Roe vs. Wade decision, some Texas Baptists worried that the 
convention's relatively open policy would eventually allow abortions to be 
performed in Baptist hospitals. One such letter read: "How can we, as a 
denomination, witness with credibility about the Christ who died that all might live 
abundantly while life itself is being destroyed in our Baptist hospitals?" The same 
letter urged the "Southern Baptist and Texas Baptist conventions to speak out 
publicly against abortion and to take all steps necessary to eliminate abortive 
procedures in our denominational medical institutions."42 
The Standard also received positive responses to the leadership's 
moderate position on abortion rights. A typical letter maintained that the policy 
was an attempt "to deal righteously with this tragic problem" and offered support 
to the national convention for "its concern and its responsible stand."43 But it is 
fair to say that state Baptists were far more divided on the question than the 
leadership, which was strongly inclined to support the national convention's 
moderate approach in the early years of the abortion wars. The very fact that 
Baptists debated this issue so strenuously belies the common narrative that 
white southern evangelicals moved easily into an alliance with the Christian Right 
41 Paul Payne, "Letters to the Editor: Abortion Debate Continues," Baptist Standard, July 21, 1971. 
2. 
42Robert J. and Vickie Butler, "Letters to the Editor: Plea for Abortion Policy," Baptist Standard, 
June 6, 1973, 2. 
43J. R. Clemons, "Letters to the Editor: Abortion Debate Continues," Baptist Standard, July 21, 
1971, 2. 
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and the pro-life movement. But the moderation of Texas Baptist leaders on the 
issue is even more surprising, given that many scholars have taken for granted 
that Southern Baptists were unanimous in opposing abortion rights. To fully 
understand the tumultuous nature of political change in the South after 1960, 
historians must be honest about the initial Southern Baptist reaction to Roe vs. 
Wade. Not only did the convention adopt a moderately pro-choice stance, but 
Baptist leaders openly defended that stance and questioned the wisdom of using 
the law to implement private religious beliefs about the sinfulness of abortion. In 
short, the strident anti-abortion rabble rousers often associated with the Christian 
Right were outsiders in the country's largest evangelical denomination as late as 
the 1970s. The story of Texas Baptists should give pause to historians and 
political scientists who have taken for granted the alliance between the 
Republican Party and southern evangelicals. 
Another issue that distinguished Texas Baptists from their Christian Right 
counterparts was the role of women within evangelical churches. From the early 
1970s on, a subtle shift occurred in Southern Baptist life on this issue. Members 
of the denominational leadership, although usually not adamant about the need 
for women ministers, generally allowed for leniency as more women voiced their 
desire to enter the clergy and more churches began ordaining women. The 
denomination's right wing was furious at the thought of Baptist dollars going to 
support a cause that they were sure was a violation of scripture. They believed 
that the Bible's admonition that pastors be "the husband of one wife" eliminated 
women from the possible pool of pastors. Further, they maintained that "when it 
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says that women should be silent in church and submissive to their husbands, 
God's intentions are made all the more clear. No matter how a woman feels, the 
Bible says she cannot be called by God to become a pastor."44 This 
fundamentalist emphasis overlapped with arguments by Christian Right leaders 
like Jerry Falwell who argued that liberals were fundamentally redefining 
women's role in the family and the church.45 But it also set them once again on 
the opposite side from Baptist moderates, who were mostly content to let women 
ministers become the norm within the Southern Baptist Convention. As usual, 
Texas Baptists drew a clear line in the sand in support of the moderate cause. 
In 1972 the Standard published a letter by Linda Jordan, a recent 
graduate of Southern Seminary who was actively calling for the ordination of 
women ministers in the SBC. Her letter was nothing less than a personal, 
passionate plea for the inclusion of women in the Baptist ministry. "You 
encouraged me continually in my pilgrimage," she wrote, "always stressing that I 
open my life to total commitment, wherever that leads. Well, it led me to the 
seminary and into the field of theology." She continued: "Now I must ask you 
candidly: Do you really believe the gospel you preached to me?"46 She insisted 
upon the ability of women to perform on an equal basis with men and rejected 
the idea that it was "unnatural" for women to share the pulpit. "If God can use a 
woman minister to our children and our youth, to educate the family, to minister 
in music, can God not use a woman to speak His words of proclamation or to 
44Ammerman, 93. 
45Fore more on Falwell's views on the family, see Martin, With God On Our Side, 166-168. For 
more on the Christian Right and changing views of the family, see James Davison Hunter, 
Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York: BasicBooks, 1997), 186-196. 
46 Linda Jordan, "'Called' or Confused?: Letter From a Daughter," Baptist Standard, November 
10, 1972, 13. 
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administer pastoral care?" she asked. "Are we doubting women, or God?"47 She 
noted accurately that women filled many roles within the church without much 
protest from fundamentalists who were eager to oppose women serving in 
pastoral roles. "If we're doubting women's abilities, then we should promptly 
remove them from all forms of functional ministry because they are surely 
shaping lives," she continued.48 She criticized fundamentalist leaders for 
launching "an attack on me as if I were your enemy" and insisted that Baptists 
should "deal with our prejudices."49 Her letter was a clarion call to Baptists and an 
open attack on fundamentalists. But it ran in the Standard with editorial approval; 
a caveat printed above the article noted she had been the subject of "strong 
reaction" from some Baptists and offered that she was merely interested "in a 
spirit of seeking God's will within the Christian community."50 Throughout the 
1970s and into the 1980s, Texas Baptists pursued a moderate course on the 
ordination of women, much to the chagrin of their fundamentalist opponents. 
Even before Linda Jordan took to the pages of the Standard to argue for 
women ministers, the editors of that publication had paved the way by endorsing 
women deacons, which was another subject of controversy. In Southern Baptist 
churches, deacons served on a leadership team, guiding the laity, consulting with 
the pastor, and generally providing direction for the congregation on issues like 
evangelism, missions, and worship. Historically, Baptists reserved such roles for 
men who were considered to be especially devout in their faith and worthy of 
471bid. 
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such a high leadership position. By the 1970s, some Baptist churches had begun 
allowing women to serve in such roles, angering fundamentalists.51 In 1972 the 
Standard published an article by Professor Glenn Hinson that presented the case 
for women deacons and rejected the notion that the practice was unbiblical. He 
insisted, "Of all denominations none perhaps has a stronger practical motivation 
for proceeding with this (the ordination of women deacons) than Southern 
Baptists."52 Contemporary readers might be surprised at the ease with which the 
article brushed aside the tradition of excluding women, dismissing it as more 
rooted in culture than in scripture. Male-only deacon policies were "doubtless 
weighted more heavily on the side of tradition or prejudice than on that of the 
Bible and theology. Western society has been paternalistic from the beginnings 
of the Christian era."53 As for the fundamentalist insistence on taking literally the 
verses about male deacons, the article warned: "Scripture, taken out of context 
and applied as hard and fast rules, and history have been used as sticks to prop 
up typical prejudices in this regard." 54 Hinson went on to describe why Baptists 
should embrace the spirit of Paul's admonition that "there is neither male nor 
female in Christ" rather than the letter of particular verses that seem to exclude 
women from serving in churches. His ultimate conclusion was that "society ... 
has moved on ahead of the churches" on women's issues and that churches 
would suffer if they did not embrace "the principle of equality among all human 
51 For more on the controversy surrounding Baptist women in ministry, see Libby Bellinger, "More 
Hidden than Revealed: The History of Southern Baptist Women in Ministry," in Shurden, The 
Struggle for the Soul of the SBC, 129-150. 
52 E. Glenn Hinson, "Symbols of Mission Emphasis: Early Christian Practices Give Support to 
Ordination of Baptist Deaconesses," Baptist Standard, March 29, 1972, 8. 
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beings."55 His conclusions do not seem particularly radical by today's standards, 
but they were a direct assault on the values of Baptist fundamentalists who had 
concluded that moderates were not sufficiently conservative in their 
interpretations of the Bible. The role of women became a focal point for conflict 
between the two camps; fundamentalists pointed to new understandings of 
women's roles as evidence that "moderates did not really believe the Bible." 
Likewise, "when moderates wanted to contrast their tolerance and open-
mindedness with fundamentalist oppressiveness, they pointed to their 
acceptance of women as proof."56 A growing number of moderate churches 
moved to embrace women as deacons, but when they did so they often faced 
efforts at the national convention to deny their members a role in convention 
proceedings. And women who accepted these roles routinely faced derisive or 
dismissive comments from their fellow Baptists (One tasteless joke said that a 
"balanced" committee would include a "Jew, a woman, and a cripple").57 By 
embracing a more active role for women in local churches, Texas Baptists placed 
themselves on the progressive side of a contentious denominational issue, 
further alienating them from the burgeoning movement of Christian Right activists 
and the movement's primary spokesperson, Jerry Falwell. 
In 1974 the Standard ran another article on the subject, this one 
concerning the "changes that have occurred among the churches of our 
551bid. 
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denomination concerning the place of leadership of women."58 The author noted 
with approval that "Women have been ordained to the ministry and women have 
been ordained as deacons in a number of churches."59 As with many moderate 
arguments, the Standards emphasis was not on dispensing with biblical authority 
but with slightly altering traditional understandings based on newer readings of 
the Bible. For example, the author reports that a noted Baptist "outstanding 
Greek scholar" had recently offered a new interpretation of verses in I Timothy's 
third chapter that had traditionally been used to argue against women deacons. 
Based on better understandings of the Greek word for "women" (as opposed to 
"wives"), he concluded that the verses in question actually offered support for the 
ordination of women ministers. 5° While more liberal mainline denominations were 
content to do away with a literal understanding of the Bible, moderate Baptists 
were careful not to do anything that would undermine their historic belief in the 
full authority of the Bible over the lives of Baptists. But they were willing to 
consider new interpretations, which distinguished them from their fundamentalist 
counterparts. The article offered, "We are driven to the conclusion that the 
practice of having women deacons developed within the New Testament times 
and became fairly common in the period just after the close of the New 
Testament era ... The New Testament seems clearly to allow such a practice."61 
In 1974 the SBC's Christian Life Commission (CLC) took a bold stance on 
women's issues when it recommended a bylaw change that would require one-
58Robert L. Cate, "Issue for Some Churches: 'Shall We Have Women Deacons?"' Baptist 
Standard, April17, 1974, 4. 
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fifth of all convention boards and committees to be filled by women. Foy 
Valentine was director of the CLC at the time, and his leadership on the issue 
was another sign that Texas Baptists were out of step with the convention's 
gradual move towards a fundamentalist position on women's issues. The 
Standard published the full text of the proposed changes, along with an article 
from the CLC (presumably written by Valentine himself) that explained the 
reasoning behind them. The article noted that "The Bible champions human 
liberation" and insisted that "Both men and women share the freedom which 
Christ gives."62 It went on to delineate ways that society at-large discriminates 
against women, pointing out that "Injustice towards women persists to some 
degree in every institution in society: government, business, education, and the 
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church. So imbedded is discrimination against women that it affects not only the 
hearts and minds of people in society, but also the institutions and structures of 
society itself."63 The author noted that Baptist churches had often mimicked such 
discrimination by refusing to allow women leadership roles, either through official 
policies or social custom. It is important to understand that even while the CLC 
implored Baptists to embrace "the great concept of the human liberation of 
women in Jesus Christ," its leaders cautioned that they were not endorsing "the 
ideas or actions of every person who unfurls the women's liberation banner. 
Irresponsibility is no respecter of the sexes."64 As was often the case for 
moderate Baptists, the threat of being identified with liberals or feminists was so 
62"Freedom for Women! Southem Baptist Convention Christian Life Commission Recommends 
Bylaw Changes," Baptist Standard, May 29, 1974, 8. 
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great that CLC leaders expressly separated themselves from the broader 
movement for women's liberation. 
Although Valentine shied away from identification with feminists, he did 
offer a plan that was a substantive and quite progressive attempt to change how 
Southern Baptists dealt with women. First, he called for an affirmation of "the 
Bible's teaching that every individual has infinite worth and that in Christ there is 
neither male nor female."65 He also proposed working "to develop greater 
sensitivity to both overt and covert discrimination against women" and urged that 
Baptists "endeavor through religious, political, social, business and educational 
structures to eliminate such discrimination."66 Additionally, he argued that 
Baptists should reject "discrimination against women in job placement by 
providing equal pay for equal work and by electing women to positions of 
leadership for which God's gifts and the Holy Spirit's calling equips them."67 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, he recommended that the SBC change its 
bylaws to allow for and promote greater gender diversity. His proposal was 
simple; he wanted to add only one sentence to the section titled "How Board 
Members, Trustees, Commissioners or Members of Standing Committees Are 
Elected." That sentence would read: "At least one-fifth of the total members shall 
be women."68 
Valentine faced fierce resistance to his calls for change on the issue of 
women in leadership and grew frustrated that, as he put it, "Southern Baptists are 
651bid. 
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behind most other church groups in the nation."69 His explanation for that 
backwardness, interestingly, was geographical: "There's no place in America as 
committed to male chauvinism as the South, and we are Southern Baptists. And I 
think that's a reflection of the culture. You find the cries against women in 
leadership reminiscent of the Old South and 'Protect our women upon our 
plantations."170 He was unequivocal in his view that fundamentalists were not 
endorsing a particular view of the Bible so much as they were defending 
outdated ideas about the role of women in society. He described the 
fundamentalist strategy to block his proposals as "just an unregenerate approach 
to the issue and a kind of continued defense of male chauvinism and male 
sexism, which goes back thousands of years."71 He continued: "It is a 
conservative attitude" that led "the fundamentalist members" to "carry the torch 
for that ultra conservatism. It is authentic extremism."72 
Following the CLC's proposals, the annual meeting of the SBC in June 
197 4 was dominated by controversies about the proper role of women in the 
church. Messengers to the convention took up the CLC's resolution, but split it 
into two separate items. The first resolution offered a general statement affirming 
"the Bible teaching that every individual is of infinite worth" and "that, in Christ, 
there is neither male nor female. "73 It also pledged the convention to work to 
eliminate discrimination against women. Since changes to the Southern Baptist 
bylaws required a two-thirds majority, supporters of women's rights believed this 
69yalentine, Foy Dan. Oral Memoirs of Foy Dan Valentine. Interview by Thomas L. Charlton 
~Texas Baptist Project, 10 August 1989), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 110. 
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resolution would be less controversial and might get passed; they were wrong. 
Some messengers interpreted it as a "tacit endorsement" of ordaining women in 
Southern Baptist churches and spoke against it. Others agreed with a Houston 
delegate that "the external ordination of women" could "revolutionize our 
denomination" and that any debates touching on the subject should be made at 
the locallevel.74 Ultimately, messengers tabled discussion of the measure, opting 
to leave the decision in the hands of local churches. The other CLC resolution 
concerned the more controversial measure to require that one-fifth of all 
committees, commissions and boards consist of women. Much of the debate 
surrounding the amendment involved fears of a "quota system" and feminism 
generally. The resolution failed by a large margin. A Baptist Standard reporter 
wryly noted that "The debate ranged across a quota system and messengers 
appeared to be more concerned about that than about the matter of women and 
boards."75 
Valentine led the national efforts of the CLC, and James Dunn led the 
local efforts of the Texas Christian Life Commission. For his part, Dunn agreed 
with Valentine and lamented the convention's refusal to embrace women 
ministers. Speaking the day after the convention, he insisted, "That whole move 
yesterday and the mood of the convention is so antifeminist, anti-woman."76 Dunn 
worried about how the failed resolution might impact women who were pursuing 
the ministry as a career. "I just don't think we can estimate the damage that was 
741bid. 
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done" to those women by the antifeminist tone of the convention. "They already 
have problems with that, and then they see this slap in the face from the 
convention," Dunn said. "I don't think we can appreciate how many sensitive, 
intelligent, committed, dedicated young women (and men, too, for that matter, 
who are sensitive to the rights and dignity of women) have been hurt; and whom 
we will ultimately, if not immediately, lose from the denomination.'177 While that 
prospect may not have been troubling to the fundamentalists who were gaining 
power in the convention, it bothered Dunn a great deal. To him, such women and 
their supporters were "the very kind of people we desperately need to keep. And 
... the very fact that we'd be debating whether or not to recognize the call of 
God if it were felt by a woman, that that would be a matter of convention debate, 
is very negative."78 Although moderates like Valentine and Dunn had held sway 
with the national convention in the past, their support for women's rights was 
gradually replaced by the more strident, antifeminist approach of the 
fundamentalists. 
In short, Texas Baptists were on the losing side of a denominational battle 
over the role of women in the church and in society. Although they lost that 
battle, the commitment of the state Baptist leadership to women's reproductive 
freedom and to ending discrimination against women is striking. Given the role of 
contemporary Southern Baptists in opposing abortion rights and in defending 
traditional roles for women, observers might be surprised to find Texas Baptists 
arguing for progressive change in the 1970s and 1980s. But the concern for 
771bid, 29. 
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women's rights was perfectly in keeping with their moderate Baptist tradition, 
which embraced incremental change on social issues without abandoning the 
historic Baptist belief in the supremacy of the Bible. It also distinguished them 
from fundamentalists and conservatives within the Southern Baptist Convention, 
who formed the backbone of the Christian Right in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. The moderate approach of Texas Baptists to women's issues is a 
reminder that the alliance of white evangelicals with the Religious Right and the 
Republican Party was not the inevitable result of Baptist theology. Large 
numbers of Baptists, particularly in Texas, rejected the fundamentalists' posturing 
on issues of gender and preferred a more measured response to changing social 
attitudes about the role of women. This knowledge should complicate our 
understanding of southern evangelicals, deepen our appreciation for the 
complexity of southern religious thought, and give pause to historians who have 
assumed that Southern Baptists moved easily into the New Right and the 
Republican Party. 
171 
Chapter 5 
"God's Economic Justice": 
Texas Baptists and Poverty Activism, 1960-1985 
In the summer of 1971 W. R. White, former president of Baylor University 
and a prominent Texas Baptist, penned an editorial in the Baptist Standard titled 
"God's Economic Justice." In it, he expressed a viewpoint on the Christian 
response to poverty that was characteristic of many Texas Baptists in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Quoting passages from the Old Testament, he concluded, "It is very 
evident that, in addition to His great redemptive passion, the Lord is described as 
very interested in the poor, oppressed, and strangers. In fact, God is presented 
as a champion of the cause of the poor."1 Like many evangelicals, White held to 
the biblical teaching that "if we give to the poor, we lend to the Lord."2 But unlike 
leaders of the Christian Right, who came to view poverty as an issue better 
handled by private charity than public action, he believed society had a collective 
responsibility to alleviate the suffering of the poor. "Our society should protect the 
rights of all citizens and see that the door of opportunity is kept open for all 
without artificial hindrances."3 To justify his position, he cited a passage from the 
book of Micah in which God punished leaders who ignored the needs of the poor 
or sought to do them harm. "They became obsessed with the idea of devouring 
the poor and defenseless," he wrote, "stripping them of every vestige of comfort 
and well-being, even the very necessities of life. Their selfish covetousness 
1W. R. White, "God's Economic Justice," Baptist Standard, June 16, 1971, 23. 
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seemed to have had no limits." To White, this story was still relevant: "Top 
leaders in the land are reminded that they should know and champion justice," 
eschewing "hate and prejudice."4 
White's statements, featured in the pages of Texas' leading Baptist 
magazine, demonstrate an important distinction between moderate Texas 
Baptists and their Christian Right counterparts: their responses to poverty. In the 
1970s and 1980s, Christian conservatives pushed for a government that was 
active in its promotion of traditional family values but limited in its response to 
economic and social matters like poverty, health care, illiteracy, and hunger. 
Their attitude was reflected in statements such as those of Christian Right activist 
Connie Mashner, who recoiled at the idea of "a welfare state" in which "the 
government feeds the poor." To her and other organizers within the Christian 
Right, "When Jesus Christ says 'Feed the hungry' ... he means, "Go in your 
kitchen and cook a meal and take it down the street to the homeless shelter, not 
'Pay some taxes' .... "5 This type of sentiment did not reflect the mainstream of 
thought among Texas Baptists, and it is yet another reason that Texas Baptists 
parted company with the emerging movement of religious conservatives. While 
Texas Baptists never sought to replace evangelism or spiritual concerns with 
economic activism, they did embrace a much broader response to the issue of 
poverty than leaders of the Christian Right. Their anti-poverty work in the 1960s 
and 1970s included an embrace of governmental action, which distinguished 
them from a Christian Right movement that rejected such governmental activism 
41bid. 
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and ultimately supported a slashing of the welfare state in the 1980s. 6 
To understand how Texas Baptists handled poverty issues in the 1960s 
and 1970s, historians must recognize that they filled a political and social space 
somewhere to the right of "social gospel" proponents and to the left of the 
Christian Right. Since the late nineteenth century, advocates of a social gospel 
had argued that Christian ethics should be extended to a range of social 
problems like poverty, hunger, illiteracy, and the unequal treatment of women 
and African Americans. While this type of thinking became influential in northern 
churches, southerners mostly rejected the Social Gospel, holding to a more 
fundamentalist interpretation of God's justice. Religious historian George 
Marsden has argued that theological conservatives rejected the Social Gospel 
because its "implication was that theological doctrine and affirmation of faith in 
Christ and his deeds were irrelevant, except as an inspiration to moral action, 
more specifically social action.'17 Fundamentalists saw the Social Gospel as a 
threat because it "was presented, or was thought to be presented, as equivalent 
to the Gospel itself.''8 To put it another way, religious groups like Southern 
Baptists found it difficult to take action on social issues without seeming to 
embrace the Social Gospel's abandonment of individual salvation as the 
cornerstone of Christian faith. But Texas Baptists actually found a way to balance 
conservative theological understandings with a call to social action. By the 
6For a detailed synthesis of the Christian Right's involvement with economic conservatism, see 
Martin's With God on Our Side; Matthew C. Moen, The Transformation of the Christian Right 
(Tuscaloosa, AL and London: University of Alabama Press, 1992); and Ruth Murray Brown, "For 
a Christian America": A History of the Religious Right (New York: Prometheus Books, 2002). 
7George Marsden, Fundamentalism and the Shaping of American Culture (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1980), 92. 
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1960s, they were merging those two impulses in powerful ways, resulting in a 
brand of Christianity that rejected northern liberalism but also could not be 
reconciled with the economic concerns of the Christian Right. The story of Texas 
Baptists in the 1960s and 1970s is one that does not fit easily into the common 
theological tropes of northern liberalism and southern fundamentalism. For that 
reason, they found themselves increasingly isolated, unable to accept the 
Christian Right's disregard for pressing social problems but unwilling to abandon 
the conservative theology that had guided Baptists for many years. 
To understand how Texas Baptists viewed these issues, historians must 
assess the work of the Texas Christian Life Commission (TCLC), the social 
advocacy arm of the Baptist General Convention of Texas. From the start, the 
agency was devoted to alleviating major societal ills in a Christian context. 
Founded in 1950, the TCLC was the primary vehicle through which Texas Baptist 
leaders aimed to increase the social consciousness of Baptists. In doing so, 
these leaders often promoted concern for issues that many Baptists deemed 
outside the realm of Christian life. From the moment of its inception, the TCLC 
faced attacks from many national Southern Baptists (and some within Texas) for 
a number of its emphases, from racial equality to support for government welfare 
to its insistence that churches stay active on economic issues. Critics insisted 
that it was replacing evangelism and personal salvation with social activism and 
concern for the poor. In general, Texas Baptists resisted these attacks and 
defended the agency's work, insisting that a reasonable application of social 
Christianity should be part of Baptist life. They were mostly inclined to agree with 
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Foy Valentine, who led the TCLC in the 1960s and 1970s and refuted 
fundamentalist claims "that we were an offense to (their) great work of saving the 
world, and we were scandalizing (their) efforts to save the human race, and 
therefore should be abolished."9 
When Valentine took over the TCLC in 1953, he found a thriving agency 
but also strong resistance to its goals from some elements of the state Baptist 
convention. At that time, years before fundamentalists formally organized an 
effort to take control of the Southern Baptist Convention, Valentine realized that 
Texas Baptists would need to be vigilant in protecting the social dimension of 
their work. "There were a lot of folks that thought they could get us abolished," he 
remembers, "but there was too much acceptance on the part of too many leaders 
and too much grassroots acceptance of the basic things we were trying to do ... 
for us to be in jeopardy as an agency. "10 Before the fundamentalists gained 
control of the national convention (and before the Christian Right was a 
prominent political movement), Texas Baptists mostly believed the TCLC was 
"too important a part of our overall Christian witness for the convention to back 
itself away from. When the votes were taken from time to time on whether to cut 
our budget completely ... we really were not much threatened."11 Throughout 
his tenure, Valentine led the TCLC to support liberal economic measures that 
embraced government aid to the poor, championed public welfare, and 
challenged the assumption that poverty was inevitable in a thriving capitalist 
~alentine, Foy Dan. Oral Memoirs of Foy Dan Valentine. Interview by Thomas L. Charlton and 
David Stricklin. (Texas Baptist Project, 1989), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 63. 
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economy. The interesting part of this story is not that one Texas Baptist pushed a 
liberal economic agenda, but that he did so with the support of the state 
convention, the well wishes of most Texas Baptists, and routine editorial support 
from the official publication of the state convention. His efforts laid the 
groundwork for the social activism that was a central part of the Texas Baptist 
experience in the 1960s and 1970s. That activist work provides a clue as to why 
Texas Baptists rejected an alliance with the Christian Right and national 
conservatives in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
Valentine gave particular emphasis to his goal of engaging Baptist pastors 
in Texas to spur Christian activism on issues like poverty and Baptist efforts to 
improve race relations (the subject of Chapter 6). In 1957 he started a TCLC 
tradition: an annual conference at Southwestern Seminary at which pastors could 
receive training in the social aspects of Baptist faith. These conferences dealt 
with a myriad of issues; for example, the 1958 conference touched on politics, 
race relations, and the need to defend the separation of church and state. 12 To 
Valentine, the purpose of these meetings was "to bring together a cross section 
of Baptist leadership, particularly pastors, to discuss the application of the gospel 
to a particular area of life."13 In 1960 Valentine left the TCLC to become executive 
secretary of the Southern Baptist Christian Life Commission, the national version 
of the agency he headed in Texas. 14 He left the TCLC in great shape. By the time 
of his departure, it benefited from generous funding, institutional support, and a 
12The March 1, 1958, issue of the Baptist Standard provides information about the various topics 
of the 1957 conference. 
13John W. Storey, Texas Baptist Leadership and Social Christianity, 1950-1980 (College Station: 
Texas A and M University Press, 1986), 155. 
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general feeling among Texas Baptists that social activism was an important part 
of their Christian duty. 
If Valentine's stint at the TCLC laid the groundwork, it was Jimmy Allen's 
term as president that cemented the organization's reputation for social activism 
and solidified Texas Baptists' commitment to economic issues. He replaced Foy 
Valentine in 1960 and continued the push to keep Texas Baptists socially 
relevant and engaged on issues like poverty, race relations, the separation of 
church and state, and education. Raised in Hope, Arkansas, Allen had attended 
Howard Payne University, a Baptist school in west Texas, and graduated from 
Southwestern Seminary, the largest Baptist seminary located in Texas. 15 Allen 
was relatively open about the fact that before his tenure at Southwestern, he 
viewed Christian faith almost exclusively in terms of personal salvation, 
evangelism, and missions. The idea that Christianity should also play a role in 
major social or economic issues was foreign to him. It was his exposure to Dr. 
T. B. Maston, a Christian ethics professor at Southwestern, that fundamentally 
transformed his view of Baptist life. Maston was a "demanding scholar" and a 
"very excited kind of teacher" who developed Allen's graduate curriculum and 
guided him through his studies. Maston helped transform Allen's experience at 
Southwestern into one of "intellectual excitement and growth." Most importantly 
to Allen, Southwestern introduced him to "social ethics and political action," 
prompting him to question why Baptists were not more involved in dealing with 
15AIIen, Jimmy Raymond. Oral Memoirs of Jimmy Raymond Allen. Interview by Thomas L. 
Charlton. (Religion and Culture Project, 1972}, Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 39, 59. 
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social concerns. 16 By the time he arrived at the TCLC, Allen was deeply 
committed to the project of increasing social activism among Southern Baptists, 
in general, and Texas Baptists in particular. 
When Allen took over the TCLC in 1960, it was divided into four broad 
subcommittees: State Missions, Christian Education, Human Welfare, and 
Christian Life. Significantly for Allen, Bill Pinson, who had worked under Foy 
Valentine, agreed to stay on and help Allen push Texas Baptists to be more 
active on social issues. Pinson ended up becoming a leader and full-time staffer 
in the organization who was particularly helpful in Allen's campaigns to expand 
public welfare funding in Texas in the 1960s and 1970s. Allen would later 
describe him as a "demonstration model A of what was really happening ... to 
create the whole change" of increased social awareness among Texas Baptists. 17 
Although he inherited a reasonably strong agency and an important partner in 
Pinson, Allen also found an agency that was unaccustomed to strong political 
action and faced frequent questions from state Baptists about the necessity of its 
existence. Occasionally, these questions became hostile and turned into attacks 
on the TCLC and its work. Allen came to the TCLC with a strong belief that to 
achieve social justice for all citizens, Texas Baptists would have to become more 
direct in engaging the political process. He had a deep "concern for political 
things, when it came down to actually walking the halls of the legislature and 
16AIIen, Jimmy Raymond. Oral Memoirs of Jimmy Raymond Allen. Interview by Thomas L. 
Charlton. (Religion and Culture Project, 1972), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 89-90. 
17 Allen, Jimmy Raymond. Oral Memoirs of Jimmy Raymond Allen. Interview by Daniel B. McGee. 
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dealing with" pressing issues. 18 But before Allen could transform the organization 
into a vehicle for political action, he first had to defend it against attacks from 
some Texas Baptists who worried that it was becoming too liberal and could 
draw the focus of state Baptists away from evangelism. 
Almost immediately upon taking office, Allen realized that his first 
responsibility would be "the task of just survival of the commission, which dealt 
with the inner ecclesiastical politics of trying to keep the commission alive and 
structured so that it could be free and viable to do its task. "19 The immediate 
threat came from Dr. Woodrow Fuller, who served as secretary of the State 
Missions Commission (SMC). Over time, the SMC had become one of the most 
powerful entities within the Baptist General Convention of Texas, and Dr. Fuller 
was in the process of pulling as many different commissions as possible under 
the larger umbrella of the SMC. When he set his sights on the TCLC, Allen 
viewed it as "a death knell to our commission," largely because of the structure of 
the SMC, which emphasized a top-down approach. From Allen's vantage point, 
the TCLC could push more easily for an emphasis on social activism if it did not 
receive constant instruction and oversight from the SMC, which was generally a 
much more conservative organization.20 
To avoid this change, Allen had to convince the new executive secretary 
of Texas Baptists, T. A. Patterson, who had been elected to the position just 
months after Allen took over the TCLC. Patterson was not a natural ally for Allen 
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and Texas Baptists who wanted to emphasize the social aspects of Baptist faith. 
Following his election, Patterson had gone on record in the Baptist Standard as 
stating that "evangelism should pervade everything we do because the main 
business of the church is winning souls to Christ."21 Patterson had already 
developed a reputation as a strong proponent of evangelism and a skeptic of 
social activism through his regular articles in the Baptist Standard. But Patterson 
surprised Allen by inviting him to executive meetings, at which major decisions 
about Baptist agencies were usually made. Although he shared more 
ideologically with Fuller, Patterson also seemed to realize that Fuller's extensive 
power made him the de facto leader of Texas Baptists. Patterson was not 
interested in helping Fuller further expand his influence. The "power struggle," as 
Allen described it, worked to the benefit of the TCLC and helped Allen gain more 
influence in state Baptist politics than previous leaders of the organization.22 With 
his newfound influence, Allen proceeded to establish the TCLC as an 
independent commission, cooperating with other agencies on certain issues but 
not answerable to them about the inner workings of the TCLC. According to 
Allen, the TCLC "had enough enemies who wanted to do us in" that "politicking 
for the preservation of the Christian Life Commission" was the most essential 
task in the early days of his leadership.23 The robust political actions of the TCLC 
in the 1960s and 1970s would probably not have been possible without Allen's 
early work in guaranteeing the independence of the organization and making it 
21T. A. Patterson, "Evangelism First," Baptist Standard, September 21, 1960, 7. 
22AIIen, Jimmy Raymond. Oral Memoirs of Jimmy Raymond Allen. Interview by Daniel B. McGee. 
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central to Texas Baptist life. He later credited "good friends in key pastorates and 
a whole lot of sitting through meetings that I didn't enjoy" with his successes.24 
Whatever the reason, his organization grew in influence in the 1960s and 1970s, 
creating and strengthening a Texas Baptist tradition of supporting the needy, 
agitating for liberal economic policies, and pushing conservative Baptists to 
consider non-evangelistic elements of their Christian faith. 
Upon establishing the TCLC as a vital part of Baptist life, Allen set to work 
convincing his fellow Texas Baptists that "Christian social concern" should be an 
important part of their faith. But he aimed for more than simply raising awareness 
about issues like poverty, education, immigration, and others; he also believed 
that Baptists should be politically engaged on those issues.25 The impulses of the 
1960s and the activism they generated certainly helped his cause. "This was a 
time, during the Sixties, when the whole culture was becoming more and more 
politically oriented, more and more politically aware," he remembers. "We 
became greatly enthusiastic as Americans about the possibilities of social 
change through the political process that reflected a great deal in our own 
philosophy and in what we were able to do at that time."26 Building on that desire 
for a more socially-conscious type of Baptist faith, Allen focused on "making 
contacts in Austin," gaining "a better understanding of the workings of state 
government," and "build(ing) the citizenship IQ of our Texas Baptist 
constituencies so that they could respond more effectively to other issues. "27 
241bid. 
251bid, 129. 
261bid, 130. 
271bid, 142. 
182 
Even as Allen pushed to educate Texas Baptists about political issues and 
social activism, he never abandoned his belief in the separation of church and 
state. In fact, many of his political activities involved defending the separation of 
church and state (some of these are documented in chapters 1 and 2). To Allen, 
his reputation for defending church/state separation actually helped in his 
advocacy for the poor when it came to convincing legislators to grant more 
funding. "They knew we weren't asking for anything for Baptists, which is the first 
separation of church and state," he remembered. "We're not here trying to get 
you to put money into our institutions ... We're here trying to ask for something 
for other people, and we've got good reasons for it."28 
Over time, Allen and the TCLC gave Texas Baptists a reputation for social 
concern (critics sometimes called it liberalism) and political activism. But this 
activism in the 1960s and 1970s was a far cry from the activities that would 
characterize the Christian Right in the 1970s and beyond. Allen supported 
increased welfare spending, championed the cause of bilingual education, openly 
supported Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty programs, and pushed Texas 
Baptists to reach out to "the least of these." His brand of Baptist politics might be 
surprising in a contemporary context, but he saw it as just another extension of 
his Christian beliefs. His work and the precedent it set helps us understand why 
so many Texas Baptists rejected an alliance with the Christian Right and 
provides a more complicated picture of white southern evangelicals than 
historians have previously considered. 
One example of Allen's social Christianity was his ardent support for 
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allowing teachers in Texas public schools to conduct lessons in Spanish. As 
Texas experienced a surge in its Latino population in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
question of bilingual education became a controversial one in the state. 
Advocates noted the impracticality of insisting on English-only instruction in areas 
of south Texas where a majority of students in many school districts were only 
fluent in Spanish. Conservatives worried that allowing bilingual education would 
hamper efforts at assimilation and position Spanish as an alternative language 
for common use in Texas. To say that many of these critics shrouded their 
concerns in veiled racism would probably be an understatement_29 Historian 
Carlos Blanton has identified the years of 1965-1968 as the time period when 
advocates of bilingual education truly gained political prominence and began to 
push their agenda through advocacy, activism, and organized politics. 30 
Those years coincided with the height of Allen's power at the TCLC, and 
he used that power to support Spanish-language instruction in Texas 
classrooms. The TCLC went on record in support of bilingual education, splitting 
with many conservative evangelicals in the state. "We worked for years to try to 
get the Spanish language taught in the public schools so that we could have 
bilingual education," he remembers. "It was a hot issue that we took some heat 
for but we believed it was best for some of the most vulnerable citizens in Texas, 
in helping them have a chance at an education."31 James Dunn, who worked at 
the TCLC at the time and eventually succeeded Allen, helped Allen craft the 
29For a more detailed examination of the controversy surrounding bilingual education in Texas, 
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message and push for bilingual education. Allen and Dunn only advocated for 
funding to help Spanish-speaking children receive instruction in both languages, 
with the ultimate goal being for students to become fluent in English. The main 
idea was that Spanish-speaking students would learn English quickly but would 
not fall behind academically while learning the language. "We were trying to get 
folks to understand that you can't Americanize them (Spanish-speaking students) 
or teach them English unless you start very early on and you have someone who 
can move them from the language they speak into English," Dunn explained. "So 
it was just transitional bilingual education, required in the early grades only."32 
In staking out a position in favor of bilingual education, Dunn and Allen 
drew a series of attacks from conservatives whom Dunn believed "misunderstood 
what we were discussing when you said the phrase, bilingual education."33 These 
critics "thought that we were talking about bilingual education for both Anglo and 
Spanish-speaking children, that we were going to ... require in the public school 
systems that all Anglo children speak Spanish."34 Dunn personally felt that doing 
so "was not a bad idea, but it was not what we were working on."35 The other 
significant charge that critics leveled at the TCLC was that the real goal was to 
run a dual program in which Spanish-speaking students went all the way through 
high school speaking two languages without ever moving fully to English. While 
Dunn clearly believed that all students would be better off speaking two 
languages, he described these fears as "foreign, completely foreign, to what we 
32Dunn, James Milton. Oral Memoirs of James Milton Dunn. Interview by Daniel B. McGee. 
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were talking about."36 Despite these criticisms, the TCLC was successful in 
getting the bill passed, and it did include funding from the state for the type of 
early-grade bilingual education that Dunn and Allen advocated.37 Although it took 
until the early 1970s before the bill was finally passed, Allen was gratified that 
"the Christian Life Commission played a very significant role in getting that 
done."38 
One interesting aspect of the TCLC's fight for bilingual education is the 
role of Billy Graham, who proved infuriating to Texas Baptist leadership on social 
issues, particularly with his embrace of then-Governor John Connally. Connally 
had been an erstwhile opponent of the TCLC on many issues, ranging from his 
support for gambling to his response to poverty. James Dunn described the 
Texas Baptist feelings about Connally: "He ... shafted a living wage for the 
school teachers, insulted the blacks, and refused to even listen to the Mexican-
American migrant workers."39 Additionally, he failed "to fund bilingual education 
once it had been passed" and "in general, had demonstrated that he didn't have 
a great deal of concern for the little man or for social issues."40 It was in that 
context that Billy Graham frustrated many Texas Baptists in 1969 during one of 
his crusades in San Antonio. Not only did he invite Governor Connally to share 
the stage with him (that was probably to be expected), but he went out of his way 
to call Connally forward and to extol his virtues as a Christian man and an 
36lbid. 
37"State Approves Some Funding for Bilingual Education," Dallas Morning News, April2, 1971, 3. 
38AIIen, Jimmy Raymond. Oral Memoirs of Jimmy Raymond Allen. Interview by Daniel B. McGee. 
~Religion and Culture Project, 1972), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 153. 
9Dunn, James Milton. Oral Memoirs of James Milton Dunn. Interview by Daniel B. McGee. 
[exas Baptist Oral History Project, 1974), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 79. 
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excellent governor. Dunn remembers it this way: "Here we were fighting him 
(Connally) for all we were worth, with a lot of other denominational leaders 
across the denominational spectrum who felt our concern about the direction the 
governor was leading the state."41 In the middle of that struggle, "Billy Graham 
comes in, apparently not even knowing what was going on in the state, and 
casually puts his blessing on the man."42 When asked why Bill Graham would 
undermine the TCLC's efforts so publicly, Allen attributed it to ignorance.43 But 
Graham's comments were another demonstration of the ambivalence Texas 
Baptists faced from the larger evangelical world about their efforts to raise social 
awareness and fight for economic justice. 
Allen also pushed Texas Baptists to reshape some of their evangelistic 
enterprises in light of social concerns and to make them more responsive to the 
concerns of the poor. This emphasis became especially important in the 
development of a new "river ministry" that Texas Baptists crafted in the 1960s to 
bring Baptist churches to the Rio Grande Valley along the Texas/Mexico border. 
Allen had no objection to the goal of evangelism, calling it "legitimate activity" for 
Baptists. But he was frustrated with the original plan, which "was going to consist 
of simply putting up tents and having Bible schools."44 Allen and other TCLC 
leaders felt that the project would be a failure without some measure of cultural 
understanding and a greater emphasis on the physical needs of people in the 
region. To that end, the TCLC proposed that Texas Baptists coordinate their 
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efforts with workers from the Community Action Program (CAP), who were 
already working on poverty issues in the Rio Grande Valley.45 
First proposed by President Lyndon Johnson as part of his famous "War 
on Poverty," CAP programs took root all across the country with the primary goal 
of equipping the poor to deal with persistent problems like poverty, malnutrition, 
and unsafe drinking water. Johnson envisioned the program in part as a way to 
funnel federal dollars to Democratic constituencies, but many of its proponents 
saw it as a way to organize the poor politically, which they did in many cases.46 
Allen viewed CAP organizers in the Rio Grande Valley as both cultural assets 
who could help Baptists understand their role as allies in the struggle to meet the 
material needs of the impoverished region. "We are not going to be able to do 
this job unless we hear from these people who are dealing with the poor up and 
down the river," he insisted. "We need to go out and hear them and to find out 
what they're doing and find out what they've learned so we don't duplicate their 
efforts."47 Texas Baptists leaders agreed, and the TCLC's insistence on 
coordinating with CAP workers fundamentally transformed the "river valley" 
project.48 
Far from simply putting on Bible schools or holding church services, Texas 
Baptists worked with CAP to provide clean drinking water for communities by 
digging new wells, setting up clinics to stop the spread of malaria, and organizing 
451bid. 
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the poor to funnel federal dollars to the most vital projects in their communities. 
To be sure, Texas Baptists' never abandoned their original goal of evangelism; 
but thanks to the TCLC, the program came to place at least as much emphasis 
on the social and physical needs of the region. To Allen, CAP workers were 
crucial to Baptist work in the region: "We listened to them and their input 
fashioned our understanding of the needs of the people in ways that nothing else 
could have done."49 Allen and the TCLC did all of this with the full support and 
cooperation of state Baptists and without much controversy. It is telling that the 
same government programs that stirred opposition from the Christian Right in the 
1980s were crucial to the outreach efforts of Texas Baptists in the 1960s. Texas 
Baptists' embrace of Johnson's CAP was another indication that they did not 
share the emphases of the growing conservative movement, whose leaders saw 
the worst of America in such programs. Texas Baptists were not liberals, and 
they never claimed to be. But they did have a social conscience, they were 
particularly interested in helping the poor, and they were not naturally inclined to 
embrace a political movement that was contemptuous of efforts to alleviate 
poverty. 
In 1968 Jimmy Allen made the decision to retire from the TCLC and take a 
pastorate in San Antonio. By the end of the his tenure, the Commission "was 
finally recognized across the state as being a legitimate commission of Texas 
Baptist life" and "considered a major commission by everybody."50 Hoping that his 
successor could build on that work, Allen recommended James L. Dunn as his 
491bid. 
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replacement, and Dunn became executive director of the TCLC. 51 Previously, 
Dunn had served as associate director of the TCLC, but he did not initially plan to 
accept the post. "I didn't see myself in the public spokesman role that Allen had 
done so well," he explained, but he eventually agreed because "Jimmy (Allen) 
agreed to be a great deal of help to me."52 
Despite his initial reluctance, Dunn would end up serving on the TCLC 
through 1980. His tenure pushed Texas Baptists even further down the path of 
social activism and away from the emphases of the Christian Right, a movement 
that would be fully organized by the end of Dunn's tenure. During his time as 
director, Dunn emphasized a range of social issues, but he gave particular focus 
to the issue of poverty, working in tandem with liberal leaders in the state to 
ensure greater public assistance to the poor. He did so with the full support of the 
state Baptist convention. As the Christian Right organized in the 1970s, it 
embraced the conservative economics of the New Right and became a central 
part of the Republican coalition. But Texas Baptists, who were equally 
conservative on theological issues, did not fit easily into this coalition when it 
came to economic or social justice issues. The comparative liberalism of Texas 
Baptists on these issues is a central reason why the country's largest group of 
Baptists rejected an alliance with the Christian Right and the GOP. Dunn's time 
with the TCLC solidified the Texas Baptist commitment to social justice, thereby 
cementing the divide between themselves and the emerging movement of 
51 Storey, 167. Also, see Valentine, Foy Dan. Oral Memoirs of Foy Dan Valentine. Interview by H. 
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Christian conservatives. 
Dunn's tenure pushed Texas Baptists in a liberal direction on a number of 
issues, but the most obvious example was their activism on the issue of welfare. 
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, organized conservatives throughout the 
South had already begun campaigns to reduce welfare benefits or, in some 
cases, to do away with them entirely. 53 In 1969, early in Dunn's tenure, the issue 
became a hot-button one in Texas because of Proposition 5, which proposed to 
raise the welfare "ceiling," the maximum number of dollars the state could spend 
on welfare payments. The ceiling had been written into the state's constitution in 
1871 and remained there until the 1969 campaign to change it. The ceiling did 
not account for population growth or inflation, which meant, in practical terms, 
that the payments poor families received in the state was very low.54 Jimmy Allen 
had put the TCLC on record in favor of raising the welfare ceiling, working with 
leaders like Houston Congresswoman Barbara Jordan to get Proposition 5 on the 
ballot. When Dunn took over, he continued that push, leading the 1969 campaign 
to raise the ceiling from $60 million to $80 million. That effort had a great deal of 
bipartisan support, as even many conservatives understood that the state 
constitution was outdated and needed amending. Even so, Dunn had to fight 
conservative ideas about welfare, some of them based mostly on misinformation. 
"We fought all the welfare myths," he remembered. "The person on welfare is a 
woman who just keeps having children in order to get the welfare payments and 
53For a full history of the New Right's activism on welfare and other economic issues, see Lisa 
McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New Right (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002); Kevin Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: 
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54"Texas Debates Welfare Ceiling," New York Times, May 1, 1969, 17. 
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all that sort of thing."55 Dunn insisted that "the vast majority of people on welfare 
were too old, too disabled, or too young to hold a job if they wanted to. Most of 
them were older people .... "56 Proposition 5 passed rather easily in 1969, a 
victory for the TCLC and state liberals. 57 But the battle over welfare in Texas was 
really just beginning. 
Although Proposition 5 had raised the welfare ceiling, it did so only 
slightly. Within two years, Texas had already experienced enough population 
growth and inflation that liberals wanted to raise the ceiling again. As Dunn put it, 
"We were back down to literally starving people again."56 But in 1971 liberals 
realized that the only way to deal with the long-term issue of welfare payments 
was to amend the state constitution, undoing the arbitrary cap and placing power 
in the hands of state legislators. Since the bill would leave such decisions in the 
hands of state legislators, the TCLC leadership saw it as a responsible measure 
and endorsed it. In May 1971 Phil Strickland, who had worked at the TCLC under 
Allen and continued on under Dunn, set the tone for the Baptist response with an 
article in the Baptist Standard. Before even a word about politics, he quoted a 
simple scripture: "But if anyone has the world's goods and sees his brother in 
need, yet closes his heart against him, how does God's love abide in him? (I 
John 3:17}."59 His choice of Bible verse was indicative of his liberal leanings on 
the issue, and he went on to plead with Texas Baptists to vote in favor of 
55Dunn, James Milton. Oral Memoirs of James Milton Dunn. Interview by Daniel B. McGee. 
~Texas Baptist Oral History Project, 1980), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 123. 
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Proposition 3, which he said would "authorize the spending of additional money 
for the aged, the blind, the handicapped and the poverty children of Texas."60 He 
could not have been more passionate in his support for the measure. "There is a 
larger percentage of people living in poverty in Texas than in any other state in 
the nation," he insisted. "Many old people scraping out a meager existence on 
welfare checks will anxiously wait to discover if that assistance will be even more 
meager."61 If the measure failed, "The blind will be hurt ... The disabled will be 
hurt. Hungry children will be hungrier. It is important!"62 To support his case, 
Strickland carefully explained why he believed the dollar ceiling on welfare 
payments was irresponsible. "As population increases and more people become 
eligible for assistance, the dollar amount does not rise."63 He also pointed out 
that, due to inflation, the "dollar ceiling" that was originally set in the 1800s had 
very little relevance to the budgetary constraints of Texas in the 1970s.64 
Strickland also attacked what he saw as myths about the state welfare 
program. To refute the notion that welfare mostly ended up in the hands of 
women with many children, he simply listed the percentages of what type of 
families ended up with Texas aid: 62.5 percent went to elderly families, who 
received on average $62.58 per month, hardly a lavish amount; 28.8 percent 
went to families with dependent children; the permanently disabled got 6.9; and 
1.8 percent went to the blind. "Aren't there a lot of people getting welfare who 
601bid. 
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could be working?" he asked. "Not state welfare."65 He noted the findings of a 
recent study of the Texas welfare system: "No one is on welfare in Texas by his 
own choice. He is on because he has desperate financial and medical needs 
beyond his capacity to provide."66 He urged voters to move past their 
preconceptions about welfare generally and to vote to "move Texas out from 
under the present ceiling" and to "allow the expenditures in these programs to be 
set by the elected representatives of the people."67 He was certainly right about 
the meager level of assistance Texas provided to dependent families: The New 
York Times noted that the average Texas family on welfare received only $80 per 
month from the state. 68 
Dunn, Strickland, and the TCLC were not fighting an isolated Baptist 
battle. The editors of the Baptist Standard also staked out a position in favor of 
repealing the welfare ceiling and giving state legislators the power to set welfare 
payments. In a state Baptist convention that was decentralized and emphasized 
local church autonomy, an endorsement by the Standard was as close to the 
Texas Baptist stamp of approval as a political campaign could achieve. The 
editorial, simply titled, "Yes to Proposition No.3," noted that Texas was the only 
state in the country with a strict dollar ceiling for welfare payments, and urged 
state Baptists to remove it. The article acknowledged voter frustration with 
welfare, saying, "There is a lot that is evil in both policy and administration of our 
651bid. 
661bid. 
671bid. 
68"Texas Cuts Welfare Grant," New York Times, March 23, 1971,21. 
194 
welfare programs. Few will argue differently."69 But such sentiment "must not 
discourage a 'yes' vote May 18 when Texas should remove the $80 million 
ceiling on welfare programs."70 Standard editors emphasized that the majority of 
funds from the Texas welfare program went to elderly citizens and the severely 
disabled. They also acknowledged the concerns of many Baptists that aid to 
families with dependent children might encourage premarital sex and more 
"illegitimate children," as the editorial referred to them. But "our wrath must be 
confined to the parents and not to the children," they insisted.71 
Even as they acknowledged frustration with welfare payments to single-
parent families, the editors insisted that, "We do not believe that aid for 
dependent children is a factor in illegitimate births. The $25 per month per child is 
too small an amount" to encourage women to have more children in order to 
receive more payments. They also noted that the average number of children for 
families receiving aid was three, a relatively small number. "Legislation to correct 
the evils (of the program) is mandatory but, meanwhile, it is not for us to starve 
the children" the editors concluded. 72 Interestingly, the editorial listed a number of 
liberal-leaning organizations that had endorsed the bill as evidence that it was 
worthy of support. These organizations included the Texas Association for 
Services to Children, the Community Welfare Councils, Texas AFL-CIO, the 
Hispanic-American Institute, and the Anti-Defamation League. Standard editors 
insisted that these groups were "entirely unselfish in their position" and argued, 
69"Editorials: Yes to Proposition No. 3," Baptist Standard, May 5, 1971, 4. 
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"Surely, the support of these organizations would convince the voter of the 
wisdom in approving Proposition 3."73 That the official newsmagazine of Texas 
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Baptists, distributed to hundreds of thousands of Baptists every month, would ally 
with these organizations is further evidence of how different Texas Baptist 
emphases were than those of the Christian Right. 
Not only did the Standard and the TCLC promote Proposition 3, but Dunn 
and Strickland received reasonably positive responses from rank-and-file Texas 
Baptists. "We got very little organized opposition" from state Baptists, and "since 
there was little organized opposition with any clear, logical statements against it, 
we got a pretty good response," Dunn remembered. 74 To promote the issue, the 
TCLC printed over 250,000 bulletin inserts that "were happily picked up and 
distributed" by local churches. In a low-turnout special election in May, 
distributing that much political literature through church bulletins was no small 
feat. It represented an impressive act of political organization. Indeed, Christian 
Right leaders adopted similar tactics to promote very different causes in the 
1970s and 1980s. Even some Texas Baptists who were considered more 
conservative than Dunn or Standard editors ended up supporting their efforts. 
The best example is W. A. Criswell, a fiery conservative pastor from the Dallas 
area. Later in the 1970s he gained notoriety for his insistence on a 
fundamentalist interpretation of the Bible and his opposition to political and 
theological liberalism. But in 1971 he actually supported Proposition 3, even 
going on TV to discuss why he supported removing the welfare ceiling. Dallas 
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voters ended up supporting the measure, in part due to Criswell's efforts.75 That 
is not to say that every Texas Baptist supported the TCLC's social activism or the 
Standards political leanings. In fact, the Standard occasionally received letters 
like a 1972 plea that the paper "would do well to stay out of politics." The letter 
chastised the Standard for "political slanting" that "might offend someone."76 
Another letter attacked the notion that "Mr. Strickland's position with the BGCT 
Christian Life Commission qualifies him" to discuss politics.77 But even with 
occasional complaints like these, the striking thing about the TCLC's welfare 
campaigns was the lack of serious opposition from Texas Baptists. The Standard 
editorial board continued its work unabated, the TCLC continued to receive 
generous funding from state churches, and Dunn and Strickland continued to 
speak out on controversial social issues from their perch of denominational 
leadership. As the Standard and the TCLC led the fight for getting rid of the 
welfare ceiling, they faced remarkably little opposition from state Baptists. They 
did, however, end up losing the campaign. In May 1971, Proposition 3 went down 
to defeat by a 8 point margin, 54 percent to 46 percent. 78 
The defeat of Proposition 3 did little to dampen the enthusiasm of Texas 
Baptist leadership for political activism. In the 1972 presidential election between 
incumbent Republican Richard Nixon and Democratic challenger George 
McGovern, the TCLC publicly encouraged Baptist voters to judge the candidates 
based on their commitments to the poor and vulnerable. Phil Strickland, the 
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TCLC associate who played a crucial role in its welfare campaigns, set the tone 
for the debate by publishing an article in the Baptist Standard, with the full 
support of the publication's editors. In an article titled, "Welfare: What Attitude,?" 
Strickland published a defense of welfare that would be difficult to find today 
even in the pages of the country's most liberal magazines. His article was 
nothing less than a full-throated endorsement of public welfare and a refutation of 
some of the most common arguments against it_l9 
Strickland published the article as part of a series the editors ran on 
"topics of Christian concern."80 He began by focusing on the biblical basis for 
helping the poor, citing Proverbs 82:3 ("Defend the poor and fatherless; do 
justice to the afflicted and needy"), Proverbs 14:21 ("Blessed is he that 
considereth the poor"), Proverbs 21:13 ("Whoso stoppeth his ears at the cry of 
the poor, he shall cry himself, but shall not be heard"), and Matthew 25:45 
("Inasmuch as ye have done it unto the least of these, ye have done it unto 
me").81 For Strickland, these verses and others provided a clear message to 
Christians: "The biblical concern for the poor rings loud and clear ... One cannot 
love and at the same time ignore human hunger of suffering."82 
Strickland took on some of the typical arguments against welfare on a 
point-by-point basis, insisting that "A lack of factual information" led to "much 
misunderstanding" about programs to help the poor. 83 He directly attacked the 
notion that welfare payments mostly aided African Americans or that "welfare 
79Phil Strickland, "Welfare: What Attitude?" Baptist Standard, October 6, 1969, 9. 
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children are illegitimate." Strickland cited a recent study showing that white 
Americans made up the largest racial group using welfare and that over 70 
percent of children on welfare were "legitimate" (to use Strickland's outdated 
phrase).84 Strickland also addressed the common perception that employable 
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males made up a large portion of the welfare population and that cheating was a 
major problem within the system. He noted that less that 1 percent of welfare 
recipients were "able-bodied males" and that a recent review of the program 
concluded that only 0.4 percent of welfare cases showed any indication of 
fraud. 85 Finally, Strickland disputed the notion that people frequently stayed on 
welfare for many years without ever intending to work, sometimes becoming 
fairly well-off in the process. He cited studies showing that the majority of welfare 
recipients had received assistance for less than two years. He also noted that it 
would be incredibly difficult to live an opulent lifestyle on $300 per month (the 
average payment to a family of four). 86 
Strickland encouraged Baptists to assess the Nixon and McGovern 
candidacies in light of their views on welfare and their emphasis on helping the 
poor. He highlighted the fact that both candidates supported "providing a 
minimum income for those who cannot work."87 But he clearly preferred 
McGovern's program to Nixon's. Starting in 1969, Nixon had begun advocating a 
yearly payment of up to $2,400 for a family of four in need of assistance. But he 
tied this proposal to his insistence that the food stamp program be discontinued. 
841bid. 
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Strickland believed that the overall effect of his program would be "a significant 
cut in welfare recipients in at least 45 states."88 Strickland much preferred 
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McGovern's proposal, which was the establishment (through increased Social 
Security payments, food stamps, and welfare benefits) of a basic level of support 
of $4,000 a year for a family of four. In the heat of a campaign in which 
McGovern was often derided as too liberal in his concern for the poor, the TCLC 
defended not just McGovern but the very idea that government should use its 
power to help disadvantaged families. Noting "the tragedy ... that individuals 
and social institutions, such as the church, have failed to assume the 
responsibility" to care for society's poor, Strickland disputed the notion that 
"welfare should not be the responsibility of the federal government. "89 
Linking his political statements with Baptist faith, Strickland concluded that 
"one of the greatest needs" for Christians was to "seek out those who have not 
been so fortunate as we have and begin to learn again what it means to express 
the love of Christ to such persons."90 Nixon, of course, went on to win a landslide 
of epic proportions, cementing in many people's minds that advocating for the 
poor was not a wise political strategy. Today, even liberal-leaning politicians shy 
away from direct advocacy of the kind that Strickland embraced, much less his 
open defense of welfare. But in embracing McGovern's policies and defending 
welfare payments to the poor, Strickland was only following in the footsteps of 
other Texas Baptist leaders in the 1960s and 1970s. Not only that, but he did so 
with the full editorial approval of the Baptist Standard, from his position of 
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denominational leadership that was annually approved by the state's 
membership. 
Although the domestic policy prescriptions of Texas Baptists are probably 
the most striking part of their activism, they certainly did not limit their activities to 
the United States. At the 1974 state Baptist convention, the TCLC issued its 
annual report. The document emphasized not just domestic poverty but also 
elevated "world hunger to a major concern and called upon Christians to assume 
their responsibility for feeding those who starve."91 The report began by 
emphasizing the dire nature of the problem, noting that 200 to 400 million people 
"will stare starvation directly into the face this year," and that "more than 10 
million persons, most of them children five years of age or under, will perish as a 
direct result of too little food to eat."92 The report intoned, "In light of the urgent 
need and clear scriptural teaching, we must assume our Christian 
responsibility."93 While many conservative denominations dealt with poverty on a 
religious level, encouraging its members to individually help the poor, Texas 
Baptists stood out because their activism was geared specifically towards 
governmental action. "We challenge every citizen to urge congressional 
representatives and senators to pass responsible legislation immediately," the 
report implored. The only proper response was for government to "reorder 
economic priorities to provide a continuing system for world hunger relief."94 Once 
again, Texas Baptists embraced a more active federal government, arguing that 
91"Convention: Elevates World Hunger As a Concern," Baptist Standard, November 4, 1974, 4. 
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it should use its power on behalf of the disadvantaged, not just in the United 
States but all around the world. 
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A slew of recent works has emphasized how the economic views of 
southern whites made it easier for Republicans to gain a foothold in the South 
and created a political culture that was so conservative that even the best 
Democratic candidates could not hope for much in the South.95 But this current 
research does not reach back to cover the experience of Texas Baptists in the 
1960s and 1970s. Their views on economic policy, the poor, and government's 
role in helping the disadvantaged allied them away from, not towards, an 
alliance with conservatives and the Republican Party. The Baptist General 
Convention of Texas was and is the largest statewide organization of southern 
evangelicals in the country, so it is difficult to write off their experiences when 
examining the broader currents of American politics and religion after 1960. 
Without question, many northern transplants to the South found easy alliance 
with the emerging conservative movement, and many of them already had some 
identification with the Republican Party. But for many white southerners, 
especially those with a historic connection to the Democratic Party and a pattern 
of supporting liberal economic programs, the gradual shift towards conservative 
politics was not inevitable, and it certainly was not easy. Not only that, but for 
Texas Baptists, the depth of their religious commitment actually led them away 
from conservative politics and towards a more activist view of the federal 
government. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Texas Baptist politics consisted of opposing 
95Kruse, White Flight, and Lassiter, Silent Majority, are two of the most compelling. 
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governmental activism if it intruded into the realm of personal religious belief or 
action. But they embraced it when it meant alleviating suffering, promoting 
literacy, or providing much-needed assistance to poor families. To put it bluntly, 
their view of the federal government was the exact opposite of the Christian 
Right's, which emphasized a strong role for the government in private affairs but 
rejected the notion that it could alleviate poverty or improve the material lives of 
its citizens. For historians seeking to understand the place of white southerners 
in the changing political landscape of the 1960s and 1970s, the experience of 
Texas Baptists is instructive. It reminds us that while some white southerners 
merged easily with the Christian Right and the GOP, others did not. The activism 
of Texas Baptists presents a much more complicated picture of southern religion 
and Baptist politics than historians have previously assumed. It should give 
pause to historians whose work has implied that the southern transition to 
Republican politics was inevitable and unavoidable. 
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Chapter 6 
An "Embarrassing Question": 
Texas Baptist Leaders and Race Relations, 1950-1985 
In February 1972 editors of the Baptist Standard ran a provocative 
editorial titled, "Embarrassing Question" in the opening pages of the paper. They 
did so in advance of that year's "Race Relations Sunday," an event Southern 
Baptists began celebrating in 1968 as an expression of hope for progress on 
racial issues.1 "What if we had church and EVERYBODY came?" they asked. 
"The question is simple, but the answer is disturbing."2 The intent of the editors 
was clear: to point out that racial segregation, although legally outlawed in 
schools and public accommodations, was alive and well in the pews of Southern 
Baptist churches. They went on to paint a dire picture of racial progress and to 
encourage Baptists to make their congregations more racially inclusive. "It is not 
enough to congratulate ourselves that as Christians we are making progress 
towards closing the gap in our attitudes and our practices," the article warned. 
"The racial barrier is down in thousands of our churches but many which pride 
themselves on this have not rolled out the welcome mat."3 The editors worried 
that, despite progress, churches continued to tolerate and perpetuate 
discrimination: "Some will accept the black but not the brown. For others, it is the 
1
"Editorials: Embarrassing Question," Baptist Standard, February 2, 1972, 6. 
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Indian or the Asian who recognizes hostility when he is in a minority."4 Besides 
subtle prejudice at churches that were trying to move forward on racial issues, 
the Standard also worried that old-school bigotry would weaken even these 
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minimal efforts. "Our major problem, to be sure, is in churches which ignore the 
New Testament teaching of brotherhood and of respect for all people," they 
insisted. "They scream the loudest in disagreement and they make the headlines. 
One church slamming the door in a black face does more damage than a dozen 
churches can do good as they open wide their doors."5 The editors encouraged 
Texas Baptists to "implement Christ's teachings" by pushing their churches and 
pastors to adopt racially inclusive practices. They even noted that the Texas 
Christian Life Commission (TCLC) sent packets to every church that could help 
pastors put such policies into place. After encouraging readers to work for these 
goals, Standard editors concluded by stating, "Texas Baptists probably have the 
greatest of all opportunities to show the Christian way in race relations."6 
This 1972 editorial demonstrates an important difference between Texas 
Baptists and the early organizers of the Christian Right: their handling of the 
issue of race. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Texas Baptist leadership 
remained committed to racial progressivism and took a great deal of political heat 
for their strong stance in favor of complete integration in the South. Not only were 
they passionate supporters of nearly every liberal political effort to advance the 
cause of African American rights, they were also religiously committed to 
integrating the Southern Baptist Convention and putting their denomination firmly 
41bid. 
51 bid. 
61bid. 
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on the side of civil rights. The depth of their commitment to racial liberalism might 
be startling for contemporary readers who are accustomed to thinking of 
Southern Baptists as part of the conservative coalition that exploited racial fears 
for political gain in the 1960s and 1970s. But the work of Texas Baptists during 
those years paints a much different, more complicated picture of white 
evangelical reaction to the coming of civil rights. 
A number of recent works has demonstrated the importance of race as a 
motivating issue for southern conservatives in their shift to the Republican Party 
after 1960. Scholars like Dan Carter, Joseph Crespino, and Paul Harvey have 
written extensively on the subject. 7 While it would be too simplistic to say that 
race was the only issue motivating southern conservatives to reject the 
Democratic Party and embrace hyper-conservative politics, there is little doubt 
that it was a major factor. In general, the scholarship has painted a picture of 
southern evangelicals resisting desegregation, avoiding the religious entreaties 
of African American ministers to embrace equality, and eventually developing a 
politics of economic conservatism that rejected calls for black advancement and 
protected white privilege. In short, the story of white evangelicals and race in the 
1960s and 1970s has been a mostly negative one. 
But the scholarship on the New Right and southern politics has been too 
quick to assume a monolithic reaction among white, southern evangelicals to 
7For more on this scholarship, see Chapter One, pgs 28-30. Also see Dan Carter, The Politics of 
Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of 
American Politics (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1995); Paul Harvey, Freedom's 
Coming: Religious Culture and the Shaping of the South from the Civil War through the Civil 
Rights Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); and Joseph Crespino, In 
Search of Another Country: Mississippi and the Conservative Counterrevolution (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007). 
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changes in the region's racial order. In Texas, home to the largest state 
convention of Southern Baptists in the country, Baptists pursued a far different 
course on race relations than many of their counterparts did elsewhere in the 
South. Not only did they accommodate the end of segregation but they embraced 
the cause of true integration, in society at large and in their churches. Their 
handling of race controversies in these years might be surprising for 
contemporary readers, but for Texas Baptists it was merely an expression of their 
deeply held religious beliefs and a basic requirement of their Baptist faith. The 
racial progressivism of Texas Baptist leaders is one important reason that they 
found the Christian Right such an unnatural fit during the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Just as with social activism, gender politics, and the separation of church 
and state, issues of race drove a clear wedge between an emergent Christian 
Right and Southern Baptists in Texas. While the Christian Right refused to 
embrace racial justice as a primary concern, Texas Baptists remained firmly 
committed not just to integration but to racial uplift and African American 
advancement. The story of Texas Baptists during these crucial years should 
trouble scholars who have assumed cohesiveness among white evangelicals and 
encourage a broader examination of southern religion's role in shaping national 
politics. 
As with other social issues like poverty and education, the Texas Christian 
Life Commission (TCLC) shaped the Texas Baptist response to racial 
controversies. The commission was led by racial liberals during the 1950s, 
1960s, and 1970s, which allowed the TCLC to take the lead in pushing Texas 
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Baptists towards accepting the end of segregation and even promoting an 
agenda aimed at racial integration in Southern Baptist churches. Foy Valentine, 
the prominent Texas pastor who became known for his vocal stance on 
church/state separation and poverty relief programs, took over the TCLC in 1953. 
Although he did not know it at the time, he would end up leading the organization 
through some of the most tumultuous racial changes the state of Texas and the 
country had ever witnessed. Just one year into his term, the Supreme Court 
issued its famous Brown vs. Board of Education ruling, outlawing public school 
segregation in a shocking unanimous verdict.8 Having been raised in segregated 
Texas and (by his own admission) exposed to vicious racism among family 
members and friends, Valentine was not the likeliest person to place Texas 
Baptists on a trajectory of racial liberalism. But perhaps because of that 
background, he was uniquely qualified to speak with authority to his fellow Texas 
Baptists, arguing for acceptance of federally mandated integration in public 
facilities and racial reforms within the Baptist General Convention of Texas itself. 
After spending his childhood in segregated East Texas, Valentine came to 
Baylor University to pursue degrees in Bible and English, both of which he 
viewed as preparation for the ministry. His understanding of race relations 
expanded during his time at Baylor, and he became convinced that Southern 
Baptists ought to move away from their history of racism. But it was not until he 
attended Southwestern Seminary in the mid-1940s that Valentine fully committed 
8For more on the Brown decision, see James T. Patterson, Brown vs. Board of Education: A Civil 
Rights Milestone and Its Troubled Legacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Richard 
Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown vs. Board of Education and Black America's 
Struggle for Equality (New York: Vintage, 2004); and Michael J. Klarman, Brown vs. Board of 
Education and the Civil Rights Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
himself to the cause of racial equality. Southwestern was and is the largest 
Baptist seminary in Texas and one of the best-known Baptist seminaries in the 
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world. Although fundamentalists managed to take control of the seminary in the 
1980s, for most of its history it served as a home to moderate and (in a few 
cases) liberal Baptist professors who advocated for integration both in public 
spaces and in the Southern Baptist Convention. At Southwestern, Valentine met 
Dr. T. B. Maston, a professor of Christian ethics who by that time was known in 
Baptist circles for his racial liberalism and his emphasis on social issues. 9 To 
Valentine, Maston's mentorship was crucial: "He took time to relate to students, 
he was in touch with social reality, he knew what was going on in the world, he 
introduced us to the structures of society, he acquainted us with the NAACP, to 
the Urban League--- to help our work in the community."10 Under Maston's 
guidance, Valentine became a vocal advocate of black equality and an ardent 
supporter of integration in the South. He also became convinced that Southern 
Baptists had played a role in promoting segregation and resolved to change the 
direction of the denomination. To that end, he spent a year of his time in 
graduate school working with Texas Baptist churches to promote racial 
cooperation, particularly in the area of religion. He hosted numerous interracial 
revival meetings, helped found a Baptist student ministry at Prairie View College 
(now called Prairie View A and M University), one of the largest historically black 
colleges in Texas, and helped organize youth events that brought together 
9For more on Maston, see John W. Storey, Texas Baptist Leadership and Social Christianity, 
1900-1980 (College Station: Texas A and M University Press, 1986), 119-121, 130-137, and 185-
86. 
10Valentine, Fey Dan. Oral Memoirs of Fey Dan Valentine, Volume I. Interview by Daniel B. 
McGee. (Texas Baptist Oral History Consortium, 1990), Baylor University Institute for Oral 
History, 78. 
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African American and white college students. He was so moved by the possibility 
of racial change that he ultimately wrote his doctoral dissertation on the subject. 
His dissertation, titled "A Historical Study of Southern Baptists and Race 
Relations from 1917 to 1947," examined interactions between white and black 
Southern Baptists and the role white Baptists played in resisting changes to the 
Jim Crow system. 11 
Following his time at seminary, Valentine was surprised to learn that, on 
Dr. Maston's recommendation, many influential Texas Baptists were pushing for 
him to take a role as the director of the Texas Christian Life Commission. After 
some soul-searching, he decided that the position was right for him, particularly 
given his desire to push for a stronger emphasis on racial and economic justice 
among Texas Baptists. In 1953 he formally accepted the position. In early 1954 
Valentine began leading a conference series that he held in various Baptist 
churches, exploring the legacy of racism in the South and encouraging church 
members to support racial equality. 12 Valentine could not have picked a timelier 
topic to begin his work with the TCLC because, of course, that same year 
witnessed the Supreme Court's monumental ruling in Brown vs. Board of 
Education. 13 For Valentine, the ruling brought race relations to the forefront of 
Texas Baptist life, giving him the perfect opportunity to make a comprehensive 
11Valentine, Foy. "A Historical Study of Southern Baptists and Race Relations" (ThO dissertation, 
Southwestern Seminary, 1949). 
12Valentine, Foy Dan. Oral Memoirs of Foy Dan Valentine, Volume I. Interview by Daniel B. 
McGee and Thomas L. Charlton. (Texas Baptist Oral History Consortium, 1990), Baylor 
University Institute for Oral History, 100-102. 
13Patterson, 3. 
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case for what he called "Christian social ethics."14 The Baptist Standard had 
already gone on record in support of the idea that "Baptists must be involved in 
social issues, as well as evangelism."15 
In general, the legacy of racism and the prospect of school integration 
provided him a platform with which to convince his fellow Texas Baptists that 
they needed to be more active on the social aspects of the gospel. To do that, 
Valentine had to deal with the white racism that was prevalent in much of the 
state. Brown "was violently disagreed with in East Texas, which culturally 
reflected the racism of the Deep South," Valentine remembered. 16 But even with 
those feelings, Valentine never viewed his state or his state Baptist convention 
as being quite as agitated about integration as many other parts of the South. 
"My judgment is ... it (Brown) was not the end of the world for the Texas Baptist 
Christian Life Commission by any stretch of the imagination," he insisted. "With 
our Spanish-American influences in South Texas and some of West Texas, there 
was simply not the feeling that everything that had been nailed down was coming 
loose in Texas that was found in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, South 
Carolina, Georgia, and Virginia."17 Perhaps because of that different racial 
climate, Valentine was able to establish a legacy of civil rights advocacy among 
Texas Baptists that distinguished them from their counterparts in other southern 
states and ultimately brought them into conflict with the burgeoning movement of 
14yalentine, Foy Dan. Oral Memoirs of Foy Dan Valentine, Volume I. Interview by Daniel B. 
McGee and Thomas L. Charlton. (Texas Baptist Oral History Consortium, 1990), Baylor 
University Institute for Oral History, 101. 
15David Gardner, "Timely Issues," Baptist Standard, Jun 13, 1953, 6. 
1SValentine, Foy Dan. Oral Memoirs of Foy Dan Valentine, Volume I. Interview by Daniel B. 
McGee and Thomas L. Charlton. (Texas Baptist Oral History Consortium, 1990), Baylor 
University Institute for Oral History, 100. 
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religious conservatives known as the Christian Right. 
One of Valentine's primary roles as director of the TCLC was to respond 
to the backlash against the Brown decision among conservative whites in Texas. 
As in many other southern states, Texas legislators responded to the Supreme 
Court decision with a rash of proposed bills that would prevent integration of the 
public schools in any way possible. Valentine described the mood of the South 
following Brown: "After 1954, the state legislatures in the South nearly all started 
passing little racist legislation on their own; and the people were told by the White 
Citizens Councils that they didn't have to obey the law and that the Supreme 
Court was made up of communists, and that this was all a communist plot to 
bring about an amalgamation of the races. "18 Given the virulent reaction against 
any form of integration and the history of tacit acceptance of segregation among 
Southern Baptists, Valentine could easily have pushed the TCLC towards 
activism on other, less controversial issues like gambling, alcohol abuse, or even 
church/state separation. But his training in Christian social ethics and the 
commitment to racial equality that he developed at Southwestern led him to a 
bolder course of action. He ultimately placed the TCLC (and, by extension, the 
Baptist General Convention of Texas) on record in opposition to segregation. As 
he put it, "We had to oppose that early manifestation of the new racism 
legislatively, educationally, and in the churches by preaching, writing, and every 
way that we could."19 
Valentine was fortunate that his efforts to oppose this "new racism" were 
181bid., 106-107. 
191bid., 107. 
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not the first Texas Baptists attempts at moderation on issues of race. 
Immediately following the Brown decision, the Baptist Standard ran an article by 
its editor at the time, David Gardner. Gardner was not as emphatic as Valentine 
in pushing for advances in racial equality, but he was very clearly a moderate 
who saw no wisdom in continued opposition to change. "Whatever one feels, it 
(Brown) is now the law of the land, a fact we which we must face and adjust 
ourselves to as good citizens and loyal Americans."20 Typical of Texas Baptists, 
Gardner (and, by extension, the editorial board of the Standard) was most 
worried that the coming of integration would cause whites to abandon public 
schools. He condemned the efforts of some pro-segregationist forces to end 
public education as "unthinkable." He called for Texas Baptists to work with 
anyone who was willing to focus on "saving our free public school system."21 
Not only did Valentine have like-minded people in leadership at the state 
level, but he also had an ally in the national Southern Baptist Convention. 
Although rank-and-file Southern Baptists have received some of the worst 
depictions in the scholarship on racial change (and for good reason), historians 
have tended to ignored the fact that Southern Baptists at the national level often 
pushed for racial equality. At the 1956 annual convention of the SBC, the 
organizers asked T. B. Maston, Valentine's mentor at Southwestern Seminary, to 
deliver an address on race relations. Since Maston had been active on issues of 
racial justice for years, convention leaders could hardly have been surprised by 
the tenor of his speech. He gave a passionate appeal for "Christian activism that 
20David Gardner, "Changes Coming," Baptist Standard, June 11, 1954, 2. 
21 1bid. 
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changes the racial situation for the better" and called integration of public schools 
"a necessity." He declared that it would be "tragic" for "the churches in the South 
to place the stamp of divine approval upon social customs and traditional modes 
of behavior that fall short of the spirit and teachings of Jesus."22 Not only did 
Maston speak at the convention, but the SBC commissioned him to write a short 
book on the subject of racial change, simply titled Integration. The book was 
merely a fuller version of his convention speech, and it was decidedly liberal in 
outlook. In it, Maston forcefully endorsed the cause of integration, insisted upon 
its inevitability in the South, encouraged Baptists to welcome black children into 
public schools, and even suggested that Baptist churches should play a role in 
easing the transition to integration.23 That such a prominent Texas Baptist would 
publicly advocate for racial justice in this way is an indication that, at least in the 
1950s, the national denomination had not yet shifted to ardent conservatism on 
racial issues. 
The primary focus of Valentine's efforts was the education of Texas 
Baptists about the treatment of African Americans, the need for improved race 
relations, and the urgency of achieving political equality for the black community. 
To accomplish this goal, he organized annual (sometimes biannual) conferences 
that he designed as a means of educating Texas Baptists about social issues 
and encouraging them to bring activism back to their local churches. Typically 
held at Southwestern Seminary or Baylor University, the purpose of these 
conferences was "to help set the tone and raise the level of consciousness with 
22T. B. Maston, "Southern Baptists and the Negro," May 1956, printed copy from the Maston 
Collection, Southern Baptist Library and Historical Archives. 
2~. B. Maston, Integration (Nashville: Christian Life Commission, 1956). 
regard to Christian social ethics."24 They seem to have been successful in that 
goal. When he began holding the conferences, only 14 associational Christian 
life committees existed at local churches. By 1960, there were 110.25 The 
214 
conferences dealt with a range of social issues, but they gave special emphasis 
to the topic of race; one conference even focused exclusively on that issue, 
examining "Christianity and Race Relations" in seminars and lectures.26 Besides 
his efforts at educating Texas Baptists, Valentine also used his position with the 
TCLC to lobby the Texas legislature against bills aimed at preserving 
segregation. His goal was "to try to position ourselves (Texas Baptists) against 
some of the racist legislation that the legislators put through or tried to put 
through for public consumption so they could be seen as voting for the 
preservation of segregation."27 To no one's surprise, Texas Baptists received a 
cold response from most legislators, routinely enduring "some abuse in the 
legislative hearings from the people that would fight us ... who expected this 
sort of defense of their prejudices."28 
To demonstrate the kind of opposition pro-integration Texas Baptists 
faced, Valentine was fond of telling one story. Not long after the Brown decision, 
he boarded a plane and was stopped by a member of the White Citizens Council, 
who recognized Valentine. The man walked over to him and said, "We could 
2
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solve this problem if it weren't for you preachers. If you would stay quiet about it, 
we could get it worked out."29 He followed that statement up by noting, "My 
minister has taken an ideal position on this issue: he has never once even 
mentioned it."30 Valentine took pride in this resistance, seeing it as the natural 
result of pushing for societal change from a Christian perspective. In 1960 he 
resigned his position as executive director of the Christian Life Commission to 
lead the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, the national political arm of 
the Southern Baptist Convention. 31 It was in that role that he gained the most 
notoriety, pursuing an agenda of economic and racial activism that cheered 
liberal and moderate Baptists and frustrated the fundamentalists who would 
eventually seize control of the convention. Valentine left the TCLC with a legacy 
of agitation on racial issues that his predecessors would continue; that activism 
helps explain why Texas Baptist leaders were so reluctant to make common 
cause with the Christian Right as it emerged during the 1970s. 
That tradition of activism on racial issues continued in the SBC, not only 
through Valentine's successors at the TCLC but also in the pages of the Baptist 
Standard. E. S. James, best known for his ardent support of church/state 
separation, became editor of the Standard in 1954, the same year the Brown 
decision forever changed southern politics. When James took over at the 
Standard, he was nowhere near as racially progressive as his counterparts at the 
TCLC or in the leadership of the national convention. By his own account, he had 
accepted the racial system in the South: living in "a culture where segregation 
291bid., 111. 
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was practiced ... we thought little about it until circumstances forced it upon our 
attention."32 Ultimately, though, James transitioned to a more liberal stance in the 
mid-1960s, largely due to his Baptist faith. He concluded that a person could not 
"be a segregationist and be the kind of Christian I ought to be."33 
After his conversion to the cause of civil rights, James became adamant 
about the need to quickly extend rights to African Americans and move away 
from the South's segregationist past. In 1963 he wrote a Standard editorial in 
which he laid out his views on race more clearly than he had previously done. "It 
is unacceptable that representatives of religion" have "to be reminded of their 
moral duty by representatives of government," he declared. "With the exception 
of the Christian Life Commission and the men who work with them, how many of 
us have ever really risked our necks in defense of the Negro's rights?"34 He could 
scarcely have been more condemnatory of Baptists who defended segregation 
and "hurl(ed) epithets at the Court."35 He pointedly insisted, "If Jesus were here in 
the flesh there is no doubt that He would defend the rights of the downtrodden 
just as He did when He was here. As His followers, we can do no less."36 Later 
that year, when Baylor University formally desegregated, James praised the 
university for its "responsible actions."37 In 1964, following Lyndon Johnson's 
signing of the Civil Rights Act, James argued that Christians who insisted on 
opposing the law were making a major mistake. "No Christian has a moral right 
32James, E. S. Oral Memoirs of E. S. James. Interview by Thomas L. Charlton. (August 5, 1971), 
Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 89-90. 
331bid. 
34E. S. James, "More Must Be Done," Baptist Standard, June 26, 1963, 4. 
351bid. 
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37E. S. James, "Baylor Moves Forward," Baptist Standard, August 29, 1963, 4. 
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to disobey any law of his nation" aside from religious objections, he wrote. "And 
there is nothing in this new law that in any measure prevents one's full devotion 
to God."38 James also steadfastly refused to print any pro-segregation articles, 
arguing that it would have been inappropriate since the Supreme Court had 
already ruled segregation illegal. 39 James' advocacy for civil rights was crucial 
because it demonstrated that leaders at the TCLC like Valentine were not alone 
in their fight for racial justice. On the contrary, they had the institutional support of 
the Texas Baptist leadership, including the editorial board at the Standard. 
Before leaving the TCLC, Valentine handpicked his successor, choosing a 
young minister, Jimmy Allen, to replace him. Allen, already a staff member, 
believed strongly in Christian social activism and shared Valentine's political 
orientation. Like Valentine, Allen's background did not seem to foretell his 
extensive involvement with racial justice and civil rights agitation. Born in Hope, 
Arkansas, Allen ended up moving to south Dallas in the 1920s where his father 
took the pastorate at a Baptist church. It was in Dallas that Allen first 
remembered being exposed to the brutality of southern racism and the 
devastating effects of segregation. By his own recollection, "There was a great 
degree of racism and race hatred in my background."40 As a child, he even went 
so far as to read a pro-segregation history of white supremacist politics that 
"colored my thinking about the Ku Klux Klan at that time so that I really accepted 
38E. S. James, "Changes," Baptist Standard, April4, 1964, 4. 
39E.S. James, "Editorial Policy," Baptist Standard, April 22, 1964. 
40AIIen, Jimmy Raymond. Oral Memoirs of Jimmy Raymond Allen. Interview by Daniel B. McGee. 
(Religion and Culture Project, 1972), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 18. 
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it as being true."41 As a 16 year old, Allen participated in a mission trip that took 
him to Americus, Georgia, where he attended the Young Men's Mission 
Conference. At the event, he met Clarence Jordan, founder of the Koinonia Farm 
and one of the country's most dedicated advocates for black equality.42 To put it 
mildly, Allen's first real exposure to racial liberalism did not go over well. "I was 
very angry at Clarence Jordan; I was in his class every day," Allen remembers. 
"We argued the whole time. I took a totally segregationist posture."43 
Having been raised by a segregationist father who "thought Negroes 
ought to stay in their place" and a mother who "didn't think a Negro had a soul," it 
is probably not surprising that Allen had a viscerally negative reaction to Jordan's 
pro-equality stance.44 But Jordan's message influenced Allen, despite his hostility 
to it. "Clarence Jordan hit me ... with the demands of the Christian ethic," Allen 
recalled. "And it was years later before I communicated with Clarence how much 
he helped me, but he really shook me up. And I left for home there very angry 
about what he had said but unable to get away from the logic of it."45 But although 
the seed had been planted, it was not until his college years that Allen finally 
realized that his racism "was a pattern of concern for my own life."46 Allen would 
eventually develop a profound commitment to civil rights, breaking with his 
segregationist past and joining the chorus of Americans insisting on an end to the 
41 1bid., 33. 
42For further reading on Clarence Jordan and Koinonia, see Ann Louis Coble, Cotton Patch for 
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Jim Crow system that divided black from white and denied opportunity to African 
Americans. 
Upon finishing high school, Allen enrolled at Howard Payne University, a 
Baptist liberal arts college in Brownwood, Texas. Initially, he was much more 
attracted to the student revival movement than to liberal politics. Like many 
young Baptists, he saw evangelism and missions as the primary emphases of 
Christian theology and gave little thought to issues of social justice. But his years 
at Southwestern Seminary forever changed his outlook on racial issues. His 
transformation began with one of his first experiences as a young pastor (at this 
time, nearly all seminary students also worked as pastors to fund their graduate 
education). The year was 1951, and Allen had not yet become active on issues 
of racial justice. But when he became pastor of First Baptist Church in Van 
Alstyne, Texas, he inherited one project from the previous pastor: a planned 
interracial service with a local black church. At the time, Allen did not view the 
event as an attack on segregation as a political system but simply a religious 
event that he was called upon to organize. His partners in organizing the event 
were a black Baptist pastor and a white Methodist minister, whose congregation 
would be hosting the event. Since Methodists had a reputation for being more 
liberal on racial issues than Baptists, Allen expected little resistance to the type of 
religiously themed event they were planning.47 But as soon as he began 
organizing the event, a deacon at the Methodist church approached him with this 
message: "This is not the way I feel; I do not think this service is wise. Our 
47For more information on Methodists and racial issues in the 1950s, see Peter C. Murray, 
Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 1930-1975 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 
2004). 
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denomination, though, has been on record being for this and the community is 
planning it. Therefore, I don't see how we can avoid doing this."48 Despite the 
opposition, the service turned out to be a huge success; and it convinced Allen 
that Southern Baptists ought to be more active in pursuing racial justice and 
working with African American churches on religious issues. As he put it, "It 
reinforced me in a realization that this was really where the vacuum was in 
Southern Baptist life and that something had to be done about it."49 He ultimately 
changed the focus of his studies to Christian ethics and became one of the 
strongest Southern Baptist advocates for racial equality. 
That experience was in the back of Allen's mind as the Southern Baptist 
Convention debated the Brown decision at its 1954 annual meeting in St. Louis, 
Missouri. Allen, of course, was not yet director of the TCLC, but he had switched 
his doctoral focus to ethics and had finally broken with his segregationist past. He 
attended the convention "as a young field hog greatly convinced that we ought to 
politic as strongly as possible to get the convention on record behind the 
Supreme Court decision."50 Given the reputation of Southern Baptists for 
backwardness on race relations, modern observers might be surprised to learn 
not only that there was a discussion about race at the 1954 convention, but that 
Allen's side was victorious in passing a resolution supporting the Brown decision. 
In fact, the resolution passed overwhelmingly. 51 Not surprisingly, the resolution's 
source was the national office of the Christian Life Commission, which by that 
48AIIen, Jimmy Raymond. Oral Memoirs of Jimmy Raymond Allen. Interview by Daniel B. McGee. 
iReligion and Culture Project, 1972), Baylor University Institute for Oral History, 93. 
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time was already known for its efforts to pull the denomination in a liberal 
direction on racial and economic issues. The resolution was unequivocal in its 
support for racial progress, insisting upon "the constitutional guarantee of equal 
freedom to all citizens ... with the Christian principles of equal justice and love 
for all men."52 It called for Baptists to "use their leadership in positive thought and 
planning to the end that this crisis in our national history shall not be made the 
occasion for new and bitter prejudices, but a movement toward a united nation."53 
The vote passed by an overwhelming margin, an accomplishment that Allen 
celebrated. "I think it was one of the most significant decisions that Southern 
Baptists made in the decade," he remembered. "Because if we had gone on 
record in the other direction ... the robbing of the local church of what I 
discovered in Van Alstyne, which was denominational witness, would have 
devastated us."54 Despite the pledge of support from the national convention, 
many local churches resisted their denomination's support for school integration, 
and Allen's church fell into this camp. When he returned from the convention and 
presented the resolution, along with an explanation of why it was needed, the 
response was mostly hostile. But after further explanation and several difficult 
conversations, a majority of the church at least let the issue die down, with some 
members even embracing the change. Allen thought the entire process was "very 
healthy" and took a lesson from it: "If you are in a highly prejudiced culture but 
you have a real love for your folks and they have a confidence in you, they will 
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either listen to you and believe you or they will respect you."55 That lesson would 
serve Allen well in his leadership at the TCLC, where he had more difficult 
conversations and continued to press his denomination to stand on the side of 
racial justice. 
As with his predecessor, Allen benefited from institutional support for 
racial equality among the Texas Baptist leadership, particularly the editors at the 
Standard. John Hurt, who had replaced E. S. James as editor, was a staunch (if 
also cautious) ally to the TCLC. He went on record in several editorials urging 
Christians in the South to embrace the cause of civil rights and attacking those 
who continued to resist integration. 56 In one of his most pointed editorials, he 
sarcastically noted of Southern Baptists, "We are attacking racial barriers in the 
churches with the effectiveness of a slingshot assault on Gibraltar."57 He routinely 
criticized opponents of integration and insisted that a proper Christian response 
to the issue was not only accommodation to racial change, but advocacy for it. 
Having the support of the Standard no doubt made Allen's job easier, though he 
still faced significant opposition from some rank-and-file Texas Baptists. 
But it is important to understand that Allen did not only have the 
institutional support of Texas Baptists; he was in sync with the national 
leadership of Southern Baptists well into the 1970s. In 1968 Southern Baptists 
held their annual convention in Houston. Texans had a disproportionate impact 
55 Ibid. 
56For examples, see John Hurt, "Topics of Interest," Baptist Standard, July 7, 1967, 4; John Hurt, 
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on the convention, as 25 percent of the attendees were Texas Baptists. 58 Much of 
the convention debate centered on a race relations resolution that Foy Valentine 
and the Christian Life Commission were pushing. Titled, "A Statement 
Concerning the Crisis of Our Nation," the resolution was a full-throated 
endorsement of integration and a call for Southern Baptists to stand clearly 
against those still holding out for a segregationist South. Although it touched on 
other topics, the main focus of the resolution was resolving the problem of race 
relations. T. B. Maston insisted that "No action at the Southern Baptist 
Convention in Houston was more significant than the adoption" of Valentine's 
resolution.59 "Some of us believe that this action represents the turning of an 
important corner for our convention," he wrote. 50 John Hurt and the Baptist 
Standard also endorsed the resolution, deeming it the most important order of 
business for the convention. 51 Texas Baptists were not the only ones who 
supported the resolution: It passed by a vote of 5,687 to 2,119 (73 percent to 27 
percent).62 The support for Valentine's efforts at racial justice was another 
reminder that Texas Baptists like Valentine and Allen were not operating in a 
political vacuum. Indeed, until fundamentalists gained control of the convention in 
1985 (see Chapter Three), their views were dominant among the national 
leadership. 
It was not long after taking leadership of the TCLC that Allen realized he 
would have to confront the issue of race relations head on. He took the position 
58 Storey, 196. 
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in 1960 at a time when much of the South (and some of the North) was in turmoil 
over federal court orders to desegregate public schools. Allen described it this 
way: "We were at the point where the whole school desegregation thing was now 
moved away from decisions in Washington down into our communities and we 
had to help our pastors to understand how to relate to that explosive emotional 
issue."63 To accomplish that goal, Allen led the TCLC in setting up a conference, 
sponsored by the Baptist General Convention of Texas, to be held in the summer 
of 1962. The focus of the conference would be on bringing African Americans 
and whites together to overcome racial divisions and to facilitate a peaceful 
transition to integration. To say that the tenor of the conference was more racially 
liberal than people normally expected from Southern Baptists would probably be 
a huge understatement. The Baptist Standard called it "a positive step towards 
working through the racial problems we have, "64 but the conference certainly 
dealt with racial issues in a more forthright way than Texas Baptists were 
accustomed to. Guy Moore, pastor of Broadway Baptist Church in Forth Worth, 
led a seminar on preparing local communities for school integration. The 
superintendent of Fort Worth schools happened to be a member of Moore's 
church, which he mentioned in his remarks. To Allen's recollection, the main 
point of the seminar was to explore "the role of pastors in desegregation" in light 
of the fact that "school integration's gonna happen; we must find ways to cushion 
63AIIen, Jimmy Raymond. Oral Memoirs of Jimmy Raymond Allen. Interview by Daniel B. McGee. 
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this shock."65 To examine the subject further, Allen brought in pastors from Little 
Rock, Arkansas, who could speak about the impact of the famous Little Rock 
Nine's successful desegregation of Central High School. In Allen's view, the 
seminar was simply an exercise in preparedness, his own liberal views on race 
notwithstanding. A reporter for the Fort Worth Star Telegram saw it differently, 
and Allen woke up the next day to the following headline: "Baptists Attack Fort 
Worth School Board."66 The headline was somewhat misleading, as the article 
was mostly just a summary of the conference's proceedings, but it stirred 
controversy nonetheless. 
Apparently, members of the Fort Worth School Board had taken issue with 
some of Moore's statements, particularly his insistence that the school board 
make their intentions known on the subject of integration. Their goal had been to 
resist integration at all costs but to avoid publicity on the subject, and the TCLC's 
conference was a direct attack on that strategy. On the morning the Star 
Telegram published its article, Allen had to deal with backlash from local 
Southern Baptists. The most vocal critic was Fred Swank, pastor of Singamore 
Baptist Church in Fort Worth, who greeted Allen at the campus of Southwestern 
Seminary with an angry message. Swank was livid about the newspaper article 
and insistent that Allen shut down the conference to avoid further controversy. 
He had heard from several members of his congregation who thought the 
conference was pushing school integration and did not want Texas Baptists 
65AIIen, Jimmy Raymond. Oral Memoirs of Jimmy Raymond Allen. Interview by Daniel B. McGee. 
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affiliated with that cause. Allen's response was simple: "No, Fred, we're not going 
to close the thing down. We're here because we ought to be here doing this."67 At 
that point, Swank insisted that Allen make a statement "that you're talking just for 
yourself; you're not talking for me, you're not talking for Baptists."68 Allen, of 
course, was a strong defender of "soul liberty," the Baptist idea that each 
individual is responsible for her or his own theologies and philosophies. So he 
had no problem fulfilling Swank's request. At the beginning of the conference that 
day, Allen made the following statement: "I've been requested by a Fort Worth 
pastor to clarify with everybody here that we are a group of Baptists speaking for 
ourselves, trying to discover the mind of God on this question, and that we're not 
speaking for anybody else. We speak to the conscience of Baptists, not for 
them."69 Allen's statement did not put an end to the controversy, and Swank 
continued to press the issue. Ultimately, Swank involved Paige Patterson, a 
leading Texas fundamentalist and a staunch opponent of Southern Baptist 
moderates like Allen. Patterson convinced Allen to meet with Swank and other 
Fort Worth pastors, with Patterson facilitating the meeting. The attempt at 
reconciliation failed. Swank started the meeting by demanding an apology from 
Allen, who responded, "Fred, I can't apologize for something I'm not sorry for."70 
With that stalemate, the meeting was mostly unproductive, and the two sides 
simply agreed to disagree on the issue of integration. Allen's continued push for 
integration was no doubt even more galling to his opponents because of his 
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status as executive director of a major Texas Baptist organization like the TCLC. 
The strong reaction against Allen's work on racial issues belied one of his 
most fundamental goals: to create change in a way that was moderate, 
incremental, and very much within the confines of Baptist theological 
conservatism. On the issue of race, he never adopted or advocated the 
techniques of direct action protest that characterized the work of other civil rights 
advocates of the time. His focus was on educating Baptists who might not be 
initially supportive but were at least open to the idea of a gradual move towards 
integration. When asked about his greatest accomplishment at the TCLC, Allen 
answered: "The whole process of education on Christian social concerns which 
included the conference method, coming into local churches to set up Christian 
life conferences, Christian Life weeks, furnishing ... information to the pastor or 
program planner."71 To Allen, these efforts represented his best chance of getting 
Texas Baptists on the right side of the civil rights issue. He believed the 
emphasis on education allowed his group to become "a catalyst for getting things 
done."72 At times, Allen received criticism from those who wanted a more strident 
push towards full equality for African Americans and a more confrontational 
approach to achieving that goal. Without disagreeing with their methods, he 
simply defended his own. One of his favorite anecdotes was the reaction of the 
Christian Century editor who came to one of his conferences on race in the 
1960s. The Christian Century embodied the liberal, direct-action wing of 
American Protestantism, and Allen expected complaints that the TCLC was too 
71AIIen, Jimmy Raymond. Oral Memoirs of Jimmy Raymond Allen. Interview by Daniel B. McGee. 
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accommodating of Southern Baptist racism. But the editor instead "was very, 
very complimentary about the fact that Texas Baptists ... probably had more 
energy moving at that level, at that point than any of the conferences he had 
been to anywhere and we were in the heart of where the problem was. "73 Allen 
was more than happy to defy conventional wisdom about "Southern Baptists with 
their nationwide reputation ... for being so totally out of it."74 
The resistance Allen received from some Baptists underscored the stark 
contrast between the TCLC's progressive approach to racial change and the 
conservative backlash that was sweeping cities like Fort Worth at the time. While 
Allen cannot reasonably be placed in the same category as the activists who 
were on the front lines of the civil rights movement, he certainly preferred a 
liberal course on racial issues; and he put his reputation on the line to push for 
integration. In doing so, he distinguished himself from the conservative 
evangelicals who organized the Christian Right in the 1970s and 1980s. His 
actions on race help explain the reticence of many moderate Baptists to make 
common cause with that movement. 
By 1968 Allen believed it was time for him to return to full-time pastoring, 
and he resigned from his position at the TCLC. But he did not leave until he was 
sure that his replacement would continue to push in the direction of racial 
equality and to keep Texas Baptists on record in favor of integration. His choice 
of successor was James Dunn, another Southwestern Seminary graduate who 
had been influenced by T. B. Maston's teachings on the social aspects of 
731bid. 
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Christianity. Dunn was already an employee of the TCLC, and Allen was 
confident he would keep a strong emphasis on racial issues. Dunn himself never 
believed he would end up in that position and considered himself less than 
qualified because "I had not been a platform man" and "had not been the public 
speaker" on controversial issues in the past_75 Despite his reservations, he would 
become one of the foremost Baptist spokespersons on racial issues, often 
defying a national leadership that was becoming more conservative and pushing 
Texas Baptists to stay active on racial issues. 
Having witnessed some of the blowback Allen received for his advocacy 
on racial justice, Dunn had no illusions that his message would be uniformly well 
received. "I think all of us who are involved in Christian social concerns have to 
operate on hope, largely unrealized at the time," he insisted. "Because as we 
speak to injustice ... we don't expect it to be applauded like a Mother's Day 
sermon or we don't expect it to be extremely popular .... We have to be careful 
not to go around feeling persecuted and get paranoid because we have to realize 
that we're doing a thing that by its very nature is not going to be exceedingly 
popular."76 But he was determined to continue Allen's legacy, which he thought 
"was marked by strong leadership to get Southern Baptists in general, Texas 
Baptists in particular, to respond in a Christian fashion to the racial crisis that the 
nation was facing. 1177 To Dunn, the race issue was "the major social problem of 
75Dunn, James M. Oral Memoirs of James M. Dunn. Interview by H. Wayne Pipkin. (Texas Baptist 
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the day."78 
One important aspect of Dunn's handling of racial issues was his early 
insistence that the TCLC's internal employment practices match its emphasis on 
racial equality. Years earlier, Allen had finally gotten the Baptist General 
Convention of Texas (BGCT) to approve his motion abolishing separate 
bathrooms and dining facilities for African Americans in Texas Baptist buildings. 
But the point was a theoretical one, not a practical one: Until Dunn's tenure, no 
Texas Baptist agency employed an African American. Simple discrimination was 
certainly at the heart of the issue, but a major contributing factor to the lack of 
black employees was the rule that all employees be members of a Southern 
Baptist church. African American membership in SBC churches had been 
virtually non-existent, going all the way back to the years following the Civil War, 
when African Americans withdrew in large numbers.79 Upon taking the helm of 
the TCLC in 1968, Dunn believed the hiring of an African American by the BGCT 
was long overdue. So he simply hired an African American woman to work in his 
administrative offices, hoping that it would not arouse too much controversy. As it 
turns out, the only controversy it caused was due to the fact that she was not a 
member of a Southern Baptist church. "We had to insist upon a little more 
flexibility of the legalism about there being a member of the Southern Baptist 
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church because at the time, this young woman was not."80 Ultimately, the woman 
was able to persuade her church (which had a Baptist history) to join the Dallas 
Baptist Association, which included mostly Southern Baptist churches. To Dunn, 
that act served as evidence of the positive impact the TCLC's attempts at racial 
inclusion had. "We've tried to work very closely and believe that we have, as a 
kind of catalytic agent, with other denominational agencies" to promote racial 
justice.81 In conjunction with his efforts to change the hiring practices of the 
BGCT, Dunn also persuaded Texas Baptist leaders to formally change the 
retirement procedures of state Baptist organizations, which had held separate 
policies for African Americans and whites, dating back many years. Not long after 
Dunn took control at the TCLC, that policy ended.82 
Dunn was another advocate for racial justice who enjoyed strong support 
from the editorial board at the Baptist Standard. For example, a 1972 editorial 
lashed out at those who spread racial violence and hatred in the most 
unequivocal language: "These United States of ours will strike down these 
fugitives from hell---these hate mongers, these champions of violence and their 
kin---or the self-destruct button will destroy us sooner than we think."83 Insisting 
that "No decade in our history is more scarred by the devil's disciples," the 
editorial noted that it included the assassination of one president, the murder of 
another presidential candidate, and "the murder of two Negro leaders in the civil 
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rights crusade."84 Ultimately, the article called for peaceful solutions to conflict 
and spoke out against the "rule of the mob" that too often stood in the way of "the 
rights of the individual."85 To be sure, Standard editors were careful not to offer 
the kind of overflowing embrace of the civil rights movement that religious liberals 
did, but it is nonetheless significant that Texas Baptist leaders spoke out on the 
issue at all. 
The Standard also frequently used its pages to advertise, analyze, and 
support the conferences on race relations that Dunn and denominational liberals 
continued to hold. For example, a 1973 article praised the work of the national 
Christian Life Commission for holding a special conference called "Race: New 
Directions for a New Day." Printed without an attributed author, the article was 
clearly the work of the Standards editorial staff, and it could scarcely have been 
more forthright in its support for racial liberalism. The article began by noting that, 
"Apathy, inactivity and regression, mingled with some signs of hope, characterize 
race relations in America today ... "86 lt went on to quote Larry McSwain, a well-
known Southern Baptist advocate for racial equality: "Much of the apathy and 
inactivity in racial affairs is the result of the widespread belief by white America 
that since the riots have stopped, the problems are solved."87 He went on: 
"America is more segregated than it was five years ago. There is more residential 
segregation and more school segregation than five years ago."88 A Southern 
Baptist professor, Thomas Bland, went even further, stating that Baptists should 
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see "what is happening in race relations today as an expression of God's 
judgment upon us" and that "the consequences of sin are shared across 
generations. "89 
The article did not simply embrace the conference's examination of 
lingering racial problems, but also its liberal solutions. T. B. Maston, the 
Southwestern Seminary professor who mentored Valentine and Allen, delivered 
a speech in 1973 titled, "Where We Are in Race Relations." In the speech, 
delivered at a Christian Life conference in Atlanta, he embraced the need for 
school busing as a way to achieve racial equity in public education, breaking 
sharply with other southern evangelicals who viewed busing as a form of 
government intrusion.9° Calling busing opposition a "phony issue," Maston noted 
that transporting children to schools had long been a practice in American public 
education. He also called the fear that busing would lower academic standards 
"part of the problem" and insisted that, "White people will have to pay for a while 
for the inferior education that Negro youngsters received for years in segregated 
schools."91 Seminary professor Bland echoed Maston's comments, saying that 
Southern Baptists should not let what some "may feel to be a loss of educational 
quality" deter them from the traditional Baptist support for public schools. He 
admonished Southern Baptists to "stand by our schools" and insisted, "We 
should resist all efforts to have our church buildings become private, segregated 
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'Christian schools."'92 Again, his comments were in stark contrast to the growing 
movement of religious conservatives who saw private religious academies as a 
way to undermine public schools, which they were convinced served as tools of 
secularization.93 By aligning themselves with the liberal-leaning Christian Life 
Commission, Texas Baptists leaders were implicitly rejecting the anti-public 
school stance adopted by many leaders of the Christian Right in the 1970s. 
Besides their support for public schools, conference leaders also argued that 
Southern Baptists should be proactive in pushing for integration of their 
churches. "The local church has the challenge before us to make visible in the 
human community the love of God for all people," Bland said. "This surely means 
a racially inclusive membership."94 Calling the church "the most segregated 
institution in American society," he argued that "as the numerically dominant 
denomination in those regions with the greatest involvement in race relations," 
the SBC "should be exceedingly careful to fulfill our Christian service as 
citizens."95 Undeniably, the Christian Life Commission represented the left wing 
of Southern Baptist politics on racial (and most other) issues. But it is significant 
that the largest state Baptist association in the country associated itself openly 
with the Commission's liberal racial politics. 
The Standard also gave positive coverage to Baptist efforts to dispel 
common myths about race and sex. A 1973 conference sought to undermine the 
notion that "the breakdown of the family" was in any way due to African American 
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civil rights.96 The main point of the conference was to achieve "freedom from all 
racial and sexual mythologies."97 Two pastors (one African American and one 
white) took aim at what they considered popular misconceptions about these 
subjects. Specifically, they tried "to explode the myths that all blacks are immoral, 
that all black people want to marry white people, that black men are exceptionally 
virile and that blacks are totally uninhibited about sex."98 The very discussion of 
such topics might seem bizarre to contemporary readers, but in the early 1970s, 
such ideas were far too common in white southern circles.99 That Texas Baptists 
would go on record against these myths showed a progressive inclination on 
issues of race and gender that was quite rare among white evangelicals in the 
South. 
Talking about these issues openly was controversial, but Harry Hollis, an 
organizer with the Christian Life Commission, presented the need for doing so. 
"Talk about sex can lead to everything from angry pickets to empty pulpits," he 
said. "Talk about race has split churches and broken families, so when we talk 
about race and sex together, it is not surprising that the result can be dynamite. 
Yet talk we must because it is often claimed ... that sex is the hidden agenda 
between races in this country."100 Hollis invited an African American minister from 
Houston, William Lawson, to give a black perspective on these issues. Lawson 
was unequivocal in labeling the common myths about race and sex "racist to the 
96
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core" and "another way of trying to keep blacks in their place."101 For his part, 
Hollis not only agreed with Lawson's assessment and pushed for racial 
reconciliation, but he also embraced a liberal stance on women's issues. "At this 
time of women's liberation movements ... I want to say that I celebrate the 
advent of woman's liberation, and man's liberation, but only if they point to that 
much desired goal of human liberation."102 The support of the Standard for this 
conference and its goals was another indication that Texas Baptists represented 
a very different point of view on racial issues than most of their white evangelical 
counterparts in the South. Historian Paul Harvey has argued that to defend "the 
southern way of life" in the 1970s, white evangelicals shifted from overt racism to 
a strict defense of gender norms. 103 For Texas Baptists, though, the opposite 
seems to have been true: Their leadership embraced progressive changes in 
race relations and gender expectations, albeit in a moderate and gradual way. 
Leaders at the Standard and the TCLC never convinced all of their fellow 
Baptists to embrace the social aspects of the gospel or to push for racial justice 
in their communities. But they did give Texas Baptists a reputation for being 
much more progressive on racial issues than any other group of state Baptists in 
the country. A. C. Miller, the Southwestern Seminary professor who mentored 
Valentine, Allen, and Dunn, and helped found the TCLC, ultimately viewed their 
work as a success. He conceded that "There are too many of our churches that 
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don't even yet believe in talking about social matters."104 He also worried that 
some churches were too willing to emphasize evangelism to the exclusion of 
advocating for social change: "If you want to talk about a social matter, they want 
to talk about revivalism. They are still warning us that we mustn't be too 
concerned about man's physical needs."105 But even with the continuing 
struggles, he firmly believed "progress is being made" and lauded his successors 
in both the Southern Baptist and Texas Baptist commissions as being 
"instrumental in causing a change in Southern Baptist thinking regarding social 
problems."106 Specifically, he was convinced that the Christian Life Commission 
was firmly entrenched in Texas and that it could continue its work of advocating 
for racial justice and other controversial issues. "I think the Christian Life 
Commission is set in our convention for such a time as this," he insisted. 107 
Not all Texas Baptists would have agreed with him on that subject, but it is 
clear that the leadership of the state convention was very much in sync with the 
goals of the TCLC in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. From repeated attempts to 
racially integrate churches to numerous seminars designed to promote racial 
justice to the consistent editorial support of the Baptist Standard, Texas Baptist 
leaders charted a path of moderation and racial reconciliation that diverged 
significantly from that of many other white evangelicals. Historians like Harvey, 
Dan Carter, and Joseph Crespino have noted the connection between the white 
backlash against civil rights and the rise of evangelical conservatives as a 
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national political force. In short, the politics of cultural anxieties resonated in the 
1960s and 1970s, not just with white southerners, but with a broad range of 
Christian activists who rose to prominence in the Republican Party and 
eventually helped elect Ronald Reagan president. But the story of Texas Baptists 
during these same years should complicate our understanding of white southern 
politics and remind us that not all evangelicals shared the rightward bent of 
Christian conservatives on issues of race. It should also help us understand why 
the largest Baptist convention in the country ultimately rejected the embrace of 
Republican politics that characterized many other Baptists during these years. 
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Conclusion 
Charting a Different Course 
By the late 1980s moderates in the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) 
had mostly lost hope of regaining control of the convention from fundamentalists. 
They had lost every convention battle since the fundamentalist victory in 1979, 
and it was apparent that the denomination would not move away from its 
conservative course. In December 1987 Daniel Vestal, a leading voice for Baptist 
moderates, appeared on a PBS documentary, "God and Country," hosted by Bill 
Moyers. He detailed for viewers how fundamentalists had seized control of the 
SBC and lamented Baptist moderates' loss of influence in denominational and 
national politics. His comments caused quite a stir. "I received hundreds of 
responses by phone, mail, and personal visit," he remembered. "Everywhere I 
turned, people were saying to me, 'Something has to be done."'1 Reacting to 
these queries, he urged concerned Baptists to join Baptists Committed, an 
organization that moderates formed to fight fundamentalist influence in the 
denomination. Working with this organization, Vestal ran for president of the SBC 
at the annual convention in New Orleans in 1990. He and other moderate leaders 
viewed it as a last ditch effort to save the convention, but fundamentalists 
soundly defeated his bid. In response, moderate Baptists met in Atlanta later that 
1Daniel Vestal, "The History of the Cooperative Baptist Fellowship" in Walter B. Shurden, ed., The 
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year to discuss the possibility of breaking away from the national convention, 
which had moved so far to the right on many issues that it no longer felt like 
home. Jimmy Allen, who had worked so tirelessly on issues like church-state 
separation, poverty, and racial justice, was one of the leaders of the new group. 
Moderates eventually voted to found the Cooperative Baptist Fellowship, a rival 
organization to the SBC that was committed to traditional Baptist principles like 
the separation of church and state, the autonomy of individual churches, and 
"soul liberty" for each believer.2 
Although moderates in the national convention ultimately broke away from 
the SBC due to fundamentalist influence, in Texas, it was the fundamentalists 
who broke off to form a rival faction. Moderates had always controlled the state 
convention in Texas, but after 1990 they grew increasingly worried that the same 
fundamentalists who gained power in the SBC would do so in the BGCT. To 
prevent that, they formed Texas Baptists Committed, a statewide branch of 
Baptists Committed, to promote the moderate cause and oppose the 
fundamentalists. They were quite successful in their efforts. Texas Baptist 
moderates began running slates of candidates and winning elections at state 
conventions. They were so good at turning out the moderate vote that they 
convinced fundamentalist Baptists in the state that they would need to form a 
new faction. Southern Baptists of Texas, a group of fundamentalist Baptists in 
the state, formed in 1995 and split completely with the Baptist General 
21bid., 254-257. 
Convention of Texas (BGCT) in 1998.3 By that time, Texas Baptist moderates 
had lost the battle for control of the national convention, but defeated their 
fundamentalist opponents at the state level.4 
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The defeat of fundamentalist Baptists in Texas was another demonstration 
of the moderation present in the country's largest state association of evangelical 
Christians. When presented with an agenda of right-wing political agitation, 
attacks on the separation of church and state, and the enforcement of theological 
purity in the SBC, Texas Baptists rejected it. Not only was such an agenda 
inconsistent with their traditional support for church/state separation, but the 
attacks leveled against Texas Baptist institutions like Baylor University and 
Southwestern Seminary rankled many Baptists in the state. Ultimately, these 
differences led to an irrevocable split between the fundamentalist Baptist 
movement and the largest group of Baptists in the country. 
There is little doubt that Texas was unique in some ways. The presence of 
Baylor and Southwestern certainly gave moderates an edge, as hundreds of 
pastors in the state were trained at those bastions of the moderate cause. The 
Baptist Standard was a unique weapon that moderates did not hesitate to use in 
the battle to win over the loyalties of rank-and-file Baptists. And the Texas 
Christian Life Commission allowed moderates in the state to organize more 
effectively against fundamentalists and to more quickly oppose the conservative 
political agenda they began pushing in the 1970s and 1980s. Finally, of course, 
Baptist moderates in Texas were fortunate to have leaders like E. S. James, 
3Rick McClatchy, "The Texas Two-Step," in CarlL. Kell, ed., Exiled: Voices of the Southern 
Baptist Convention Holy War (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 2006}, 81-83. 
41bid. 
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Jimmy Allen, Foy Valentine, and James Dunn, who were willing to expend 
political and social capital to prevent their state convention from effectively 
becoming an arm of the Republican National Convention. 
But it would be a mistake for historians to assume that Texas Baptists 
were so unique that their story holds little relevance for a broader examination of 
southern politics after 1960. Not only was Texas the largest state group of 
Baptists in the country, but leaders of the BGCT were important players in the 
national denomination throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and even into the 1980s. 
Before the Christian Right began to organize as a movement, the moderation 
that characterized Texas Baptists was also present in the leadership of the SBC. 
When fundamentalists took control of the national convention, they did so 
narrowly. For example, at the 1979 annual convention, the fundamentalist choice 
for president of the SBC, Adrien Rogers, won with only 51 percent of the vote.5 
The fact that moderates eventually lost control of the convention should not blind 
us to their status as important players in the religious and political changes that 
reshaped the South after 1960. Southern Baptist moderates were a powerful 
force that controlled the country's largest Protestant denomination until at least 
1979 (and, in practice, until their defeat at the 1985 convention).6 
As the experience of Texas Baptists demonstrates, these moderates 
articulated their own unique version of Baptist ideology, one which is rarely 
accounted for in the existing scholarship on the rise of the Christian Right. They 
5Barry Hankins, Uneasy in Babylon: Southern Baptist Conservatives and American Culture 
Fuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2002), 6. 
See Nancy Ammerman, Baptist Battles: Social Change and Religious Conflict in the Southern 
Baptist Convention (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 3-18. 
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were rigidly defensive about issues of church and state. Whether opposing 
organized prayer in public schools, defending a woman's right to terminate a 
pregnancy, or organizing against public funding of private schools, they were 
consistent in their belief that government should stay as far away from private 
religion as possible. On issues of gender, they were surprisingly open to the idea 
of women in ministry and committed to opposing a political agenda centered on 
abortion. Theologically, they were adamant in defending the right of each Baptist 
to make up her or his own mind about religious issues and reluctant to enforce 
theological purity within their denomination. They were avid supporters of a 
robust social safety net, even going so far as to organize political campaigns in 
defense of welfare and in support of poverty relief programs. On racial issues, 
they were decidedly moderate, hosting campaigns to facilitate integration in 
public schools and insisting that Baptist churches extend a welcoming hand to 
people of color. 
To be sure, Texas Baptists never flirted with theological liberalism. Not 
only did they consistently hold to the Bible as the rule of faith, but they always 
maintained that the most important role for any Christian was to spread the "good 
news" of salvation to lost souls. In other words, they were committed 
evangelicals in the historic sense.7 But despite their pronounced theological 
conservatism, they emphatically rejected an alliance with the Christian Right as it 
emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. For historians who have assumed a monolithic 
response among southern evangelicals to the coming of the Christian Right, the 
7For more on definitions of evangelicals, see George Marsden, Fundamentalism and American 
Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 3. 
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experience of Texas Baptists should cause a reexamination. Too often, the 
scholarship on southern politics after 1960 has assumed that the religious 
conservatism of evangelicals made the region a very natural fit for Christian Right 
organizing and Republican political dominance. But the country's largest state 
group of evangelicals found the political changes that swept the South quite 
troubling. Their story indicates that the alliance between evangelicals and the 
Christian Right was neither inevitable nor unavoidable. In fact, given the long 
Baptist tradition of supporting the separation of church and state, it was 
somewhat surprising that the denomination eventually came under the control of 
Christian Right activists. 
As historians consider how religion contributed to the reshaping of 
southern politics after 1960, they would be wise to probe further the experiences 
of conservative evangelicals who did not find a welcoming home in the Christian 
Right or the Republican Party. They should also insist on an examination of 
southern religion that is as complicated as the South itself, resisting the 
temptation to assume uniformity among southern evangelicals. Texas may be a 
surprising location for strong resistance to the Christian Right, but Baptists there 
nevertheless offered a critique of conservative religious politics that was as 
thoughtful and deeply felt as anything the political left could muster. For those 
seeking to understand the profound political and religious changes that 
transformed the South after 1960, the story of Texas Baptists should be 
instructive. It should prompt a rethinking of common assumptions, a retelling of 
the Christian Right's history, and a renewed interest in the role moderate Baptists 
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played in creating the modern South. 
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